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ABSTRACT 

An abstract ofthe dissertation ofGerald Herman Williams, Jr. for the Doctor ofPhilosophy 
in Systems Science: Engineering Management presented September 25, 2003. 
Title: 	 An Evaluation ofPublic Construction Contracting Methods for the Public Building 
Sector in Oregon using Data Envelopment Analysis 
Since 1976 public agencies in Oregon have been allowed to select construction 
contractors using a "qualification" based competition instead of the more typical lowest 
responsible bid or Design-Bid-Build (DBB) basis. Since 1985, at least 136 such selections, 
commonly known as CMlGC for Construction Manager/General Contractor, have been 
made. The results ofthis policy have not previously been analyzed. This research compares 
these selection methods, seeking to answer the following questions: 
1. 	 Does the CMlGC method result in projects that differ from DBB projects 
regarding cost and schedule control? 
2. 	 Are CMlGC projects more efficient than DBB projects, where efficiency is 
defined as the data envelopment analysis (DEA) technical efficiency score? 
3. 	 Does efficiency depend on an interaction between project type and the 
selection method? 
4. 	 How do project stakeholders evaluate the benefits and drawbacks of the 
two selection methods? 
5. 	 How do projects compare when the only apparent difference between them 
is the selection nlethod? 
To answer these questions, we identified 407 Oregon public building construction 
projects and obtained a variety of data, including cost and schedule results, for 215 jobs 
(111 CMlGC and 104 DBB). We analyzed the data several ways, including statistical 
analysis, DEA, and various qualitative methods. 
Results: 
1. 	 There was no statistically significant difference between the CMlGC and 
DBB projects regarding cost and schedule control. 
2. 	 The DEA technical efficiency scores showed that CMlGC projects 
outperfonned the DBB projects. 
3. 	 There was no interaction effect between project type and selection method. 
4. 	 Project stakeholders stated that reduction of risk is the principal benefit of 
using CMlGC; however, architects and subcontractors are less enthusiastic 
than owners and general contractors. 
5. 	 Data on two nearly identical projects indicated that the DBB project was 
less costly than the comparable CMlGC project and also incurred less cost 
growth; both projects were completed on time. 
To sUlllmarize, this research fails to find support for the current Oregon law that 
exempts certain projects from competitive bidding based on the presumption that CMlGC 
will lead to substantial cost savings but does indicate that the CMlGC projects may be 
better able to accommodate accelerated project schedules. 
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IX 
1 I ntroduction and Scope of Research 
This research was conducted in accordance with the rules established by the office 
of Graduate Studies and Research, Portland State University, in order to satisfy 
requirements for the Doctor of Philosophy in System Science: Engineering & Technology 
Management. The scope of the research was approved by the dissertation committee with 
minor deviations approved by the committee chainnan as allowed by the university. All 
data used in the analysis and this research was "public infonnation" except opinions and 
comments elicited from construction experts and project personnel regarding project 
performance summarized in Chapter 5. 
1.1 	 Purpose, Research Questions and Hypotheses 
The principle purpose of this research is to detennine if the different project 
delivery systems result in better projects and to detennine if the public policy that allows 
public agencies in Oregon to use qualifications based selection processes for construction 
contractors, instead ofthe traditional lowest responsible bidder method is justified. 
The second objective is to determine if there are "best uses" of the different 
contracting methods and establish a method for comparing construction project 
perfonnance using Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA). To meet the objectives five 
research questions have been fonnulated: 
1. 	 Do negotiated, performance based contractor selected projects outperfonn 
the traditional competitively bid projects? 
2. 	 Are negotiated projects more efficient than bid projects? 
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3. Are there best practices for the specific PDS's? That is, is one PDS better 
for a specific project type than the other? 
4. 	 What are the benefits and drawbacks of the two methods according to the 
principal project stakeholders? Are all the stakeholders' views consistent 
with each other, and supported by the data analysis? What insights into 
how these policy decisions are made can be drawn from the stakeholders 
and are these consistent with the data analysis? 
5. 	 Are cases studies of projects and comparisons of similar projects that use 
different contracting methods consistent with the data analysis? 
In order to answer these questions, the following research hypotheses have been 
formulated: 
HA1 : Negotiated Procurement, Construction Manager/General 
Contractor (CM/GC) method of Project Delivery System (PDS) 
results in projects that outperform the traditional Design-Bid­
Build (DBB) PDS method on cost and schedule control metrics. 
H01 : There is no significant difference between CM/GC and DBB 
projects with respect to cost and schedule control metrics. 
HA2: CM/GC projects are more efficient than DBB projects, 
where efficiency is defined by a DEA model that considers both 
inputs and outputs from the construction process model. 
H02: There is no significant difference between CM/GC and DBB 
projects with respect to efficiency scores where efficiency is 
determined by a DEA model that considers both inputs and 
outputs from the construction process model. 
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HA3: CM/GC PDS results in projects that outperform DBB PDS 
on similar types of projects. 
HA3.1: When applied to corrections projects, CM/GC PDS 
results in projects that outperform DBB PDS projects. 
HA3.2: When applied to hospital projects CM/GC PDS 
results in projects that outperform DBB PDS projects. 
H A3.3: When applied to institutional projects CM/GC PDS 
results in projects that outperform DBB PDS projects. 
HA3.4: When applied to library projects CM/GC PDS 
results in projects that outperform DBB PDS projects. 
HA3.5: When applied to office building projects CM/GC 
PDS results in projects that outperform DBB PDS 
projects. 
HA3.6: When applied to parking structure projects CM/GC 
PDS results in projects that outperform DBB PDS 
projects. 
HA3.7: When applied to building remodel projects CM/GC 
PDS results in projects that outperform DBB PDS 
projects. 
HA3.a: When applied to school projects CM/GC PDS 
results in projects that outperform DBB PDS projects. 
HA3.9: When applied to sports facility projects CM/GC PDS 
results in projects that outperform DBB PDS projects. 
H03: CM/GC PDS does not result in projects that outperform 
DBB PDS on similar types of projects. 
(Note the sub-hypotheses of the null hypothesis H03 are omitted 
for brevity.) 
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1.2 Research Design and Data Collection 
How is "outperformed" determined? Or, more generally, how is performance 
determined, what measures are used, and where does the required information come from? 
Clearly, performance can be defined in a number ofways and use any number ofmetrics or 
measures. Sanvido [182] Chua [47, 48] and others have laid some of the groundwork by 
providing critical project success factors, while Knuf, [123] Harma, [104] Russell, [177] 
and others have contributed benchmarking metrics. These can be thought of as inputs and 
outputs to a construction project management model. However, the number ofmetrics and 
measures provided in the literature is quite large, and therefore only the most important 
measures must be separated out from those oflesser importance for this analysis. 
The process undertaken in this research started with assembling a panel of 
construction industry experts (referred to hereafter as the Expert Panel), which is detailed in 
Chapter 3. Metrics were elicited from the Expert Panel consistent with methods described 
by Ayyub [13], Chua [48] and Kocaoglu [124]. 
Data was obtained on a 407 public projects constructed in Oregon from 1986 to 
2002 (the "Oregon database"). One hundred and ninety-two of the projects either did not 
meet the criteria for the analysis or had significant missing data, which made them 
unusable in the model. Two hundred and fifteen projects were used in the final DEA 
model and analysis. These were nearly equally distributed between competitive lunlP sum 
Design-Bid-Build (DBB) and negotiated Construction Manager/General Contractor 
(CM/GC) Project Delivery Systems (PDS) at 104 and 111 respectively. 
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Research Objective, 

Metric Formulation, 

Modeling, and 

Data Collection 

Figure 1: Research design 
1.2.1 Research Objective 
The research objective of this study is to detennine if the public policy, allowing 
public agencies to select construction contractors on past perfonnance and proposal basis, 
instead of lowest responsible competitive price basis, should be continued. 
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1.2.2 	 Research Question 1; PDS Performance - Statistical Analysis of 

Output 

The first research question is to detennine if CMJGC projects outperfonn DBB 
jobs. For this analysis we apply a simple statistical analysis on the output metrics, cost and 
schedule control to test the hypothesis: 
HA1 : Negotiated Procurement, Construction Manager/General 
Contractor (CM/GC) method of Project Delivery System (PDS) 
results in projects that outperform the traditional Design-Bid­
Build (DBB) PDS method on cost and schedule control metrics. 
H01 : There is no significant difference between CM/GC and DBB 
projects with respect to cost and schedule control metrics. 
1.2.3 	 Research Question 2; Project Efficiency - Nonparametric Statistical 
Analysis 
The second research question is to detennine if CMlGC projects are more 
technically efficient than DBB jobs. Since DEA is a non-parametric method that results in 
efficiency scores that are distinctly non-nonnally distributed, non-parametric statistical 
analysis is the appropriate method to use in hypothesis testing ofDEA model scores. DEA 
models both inputs and outputs and results in an overall score of project technical 
efficiency_ Here we test the hypothesis: 
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HA2: CM/GC projects are more efficient than DBB projects, 
where efficiency is defined by a DEA model that considers both 
inputs and outputs from the construction process model. 
H02: There is no significant difference between CM/GC and DBB 
projects with respect to efficiency scores where efficiency is 
determined by a DEA model that considers both inputs and 
outputs from the construction process model. 
1.2.4 Research Question 3: Benchmarking - Cluster & Statistical Analysis 
Is there one type of project that is better suited to a particular PDS? A cluster 
analysis on DEA weights is used to detennine if projects that use different PDS also use 
different weighting schemes and test the hypotheses: 
HA3: CM/GC PDS results in projects that outperform DBB PDS 
on similar types of projects. 
HA3.1: When applied to corrections projects, CM/GC PDS 
results in projects that outperform DBB PDS projects. 
HA3.2: When applied to hospital projects CM/GC PDS 
results in projects that outperform DBB PDS projects. 
HA3.3: When applied to institutional projects CM/GC PDS 
results in projects that outperform DBB PDS projects. 
HA3.4: When applied to library projects CM/GC PDS 
results in projects that outperform DBB PDS projects. 
HA3.S: When applied to office building projects CM/GC 
PDS results in projects that outperform DBB PDS 
projects. 
HA3.6: When applied to parking structure projects CM/GC 
PDS results in projects that outperform DBB PDS 
projects. 
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HA3 .7: When applied to building remodel projects CM/GC 
PDS results in projects that outperform DBB PDS 
projects. 
HA3.8 : When applied to school projects CM/GC PDS 
results in projects that outperform DBB PDS projects. 
HA3.9: When applied to sports facility projects CM/GC PDS 
results in projects that outperform DBB PDS projects. 
H03: CM/GC PDS does not result in projects that outperform DBB 
PDS on similar types of projects. 
(Note the sub-hypotheses of the null hypothesis H03 are omitted 
for brevity.) 
1.2.5 Research Question 4: Stakeholder Analysis 
The fourth research question is an evaluation of the PDS's based on the opinions of 
practitioners. This evaluation is more complex than the previous research questions 
because we seek to detemline why practitioners like or dislike the PDS' s, what justifies the 
choice of PDS, and if there are significant differences between project stakeholders on 
these issues? 
Beierly, [23] Ayyub [13] and others have demonstrated the value of stakeholder 
opinion. The stakeholder analysis was designed to find out how decisions were being 
made by practitioners in the field with respect to the choice ofPDS. In particular, the intent 
is to determine if different stakeholders hold different views on the processes and to 
determine if the stakeholders' opinions support or contradict the data analysis. 
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1.2.6 Research Question 5; Project Comparison Case Study 
The fifth research question involves finding comparable projects that use different 
PDS's. Then making qualitative and quantitative comparisons to confinn or refute the data 
analysis. According to the stated public policy, CMlGC projects must result in substantial 
savings to the public agency, therefore, if two projects were sufficiently similar, the 
CMlGC project should always cost less than the DBB job. 
Secondly, does the comparison lead to further insight about the use of different 
PDS's in certain types ofprojects? 
Case studies are widely used to help evaluate complex systems and interactions 
such as strategies and management. Construction projects are rarely repeated in a way 
that allows for direct and specific con1parisons between projects, particularly with respect 
to PDS. However, two school projects were identified during the data collection phase that 
allow for just that particular case study comparison based on PDS. 
1.3 Background and Motivation for the Research 
In the public sector of the construction industry in Oregon, owners have the 
opportunity to hire contractors with varying levels of project infonnation prior to pricing, 
which is nearly unique among states in the US [55, 166]. Beginning in the mid 1980's, 
public agencies in Oregon started to use alternative construction contractor selection 
methods to hire finns on public projects. This process was authorized by law! as early as 
1976, but little used prior to the mid to late 1980's, particularly in the building sector of the 
I See Oregon Revised Statues: ORS 279.015 (as amended). The original statutory scheme was adopted 
in the 1975 legislature under House Bill #2339, set forth by then Attorney General Lee Johnson, and 
made effective January 1, 1976. 
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construction industry. The common contractor selection method used since the public 
bidding laws were enacted in the 1930's was by competitive lowest bid (commonly known 
as Design-Bid-Build, DBB or Lump Sum Bid, LSB method). However, by the early 
1980' s several public owners and construction contractors felt that the competitive lowest 
bid method was a principal contributor to an ever increasing litigious market sector, delays 
in completion, increasing insurance rates and bond costs and lower overall quality work.2 
As a remedy, first the Port ofPortland3 and next the Portland Development Commission4 
authorized negotiated procurements on their respective construction projects (called 
. CMlGC jobs for Construction Manager / General Contractor method). In a little less than 
twenty years, from the early 1980's to the year 2002, public agencies in Oregon 
constructed more than five hundred public building projects; at least three hundred of those 
cost in excess of a $1 million each5 in total representing nearly $5 billion in tax 
expenditures. At least 1366 of those projects were negotiated procurements where 
contractor selection was based at least in part on prior performance of the firm on overall 
2 It is interesting to note that about this same time, in 1987 Dunlop [82]wrote that owners were going 
away from cost reimbursable contract forms and relying more on fixed price lump sum bid contracts in 
order to establish better cost certainty. 
3 The first known competitive negotiation selection for a construction contractor was the then K-Wing 
of terminal south at the Portland International Airport. It is not known why this project received an 
exemption from public bidding, no records of this project currently exist. 
4 The second known competitive negotiation selection for a construction contractor was for the Yamhill 
parking structure serving the Pioneer Place downtown development. The process was justified in that 
project because the PDC had bad experiences in the past with projects that did not finish on time and 
the parking structure had to finish prior to the opening of the mixed use development for holiday 
season. Increasing liquidated damages to cover the risk ofdeveloper lost profits was thought to be an 
uneconomical approach to ensuring the project opened on time. 
5 Our study focused on projects costing more than $5 million, some smaller projects were included if 
they met our project criteria for size and complexity. 
6 There are 136 known negotiated procurements in the database, and another 80 projects that the 
selection method is not known (whether lump sum bid or negotiated procurement). In addition, not 
included in the database are several CM/GC projects that are currently underway or recently completed, 
including high schools in Oregon City, Astoria, Salem and Beaverton totaling more than $100 MM. 
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project quality, schedule, and safety perfonnance metrics. While there have been some 
attempts to analyze or audit specific negotiated projects, there have been no prior attempts 
to evaluate a large set of these projects and compare their collective perfonnance against 
the more widely used competitive bid project delivery system (PDS) and evaluate the 
public policy in Oregon. 
1.4 Project Delivery Systems (PDS) 
The Construction Industry Institute (ClI) defines a project delivery system (PDS) in 
[183] as: 
A project delivery system defines the relationships, roles and 
responsibilities of project team members and the sequence of activities 
required to provide a facility_ Several systems have evolved over the 
years. Construction management at risk, design-build and design-bid­
build are three principal project delivery systems used in the U.S. today. 
More commonly, the PDS is considered the manner in which the owner hires a 
contractor for construction work, structures the contractual relationships and risks, and 
manages the project to completion. There are three principal PDS' s: the traditional method 
Design-Bid-Build (DBB) , a negotiated procurement method known as Construction 
Management/General Contractor (CM/GC) and Design-Build (DB).7 The Oregon Public 
Contracting Coalition (PCC) [56]8 defines the different Project Delivery Systems 
commonly used in the public construction today as: 
7 DB projects can result from a negotiated or lump sum bid procurement method. 
8 See also [11, 102, 121, 139] for similar definitions. 
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CM/GC Construction Manager/General Contractor: 
CM/GC augments the traditional scope of work of the general 
contractor with that of a construction manager under a single contract 
with the owner. At an early point in the de~ign phase, the owner, using 
a competitive selection process, selects a contractor to provide 
construction management and general contracting services. By joining 
the project team during design, the CM/GC firm can collaborate with the 
architect/engineer (AlE) on the development of the design and 
preparation of the design documents. Once the design has progressed 
to an acceptable level, the CM/GC firm submits a guaranteed maximum 
price (GMP) for the project to the owner. After agreement on a GMP is 
reached, the GM/GC firm undertakes the construction of the facility. 
The CM/GC firm procures subcontracts with trade contractors using 
multiple bid packages to construct the project, and manages the 
construction process on behalf of the owner. General conditions work is 
typically self-performed by the CM/GC firm and, in some cases, the 
CM/GC firm may be allowed to self-perform portions of the trade work. 
Design-Bid-Build 
The design-bid-build process is the traditional approach to delivering 
public improvement projects. In this approach, the owner typically 
contracts with a design professional to design the project and develop 
construction plans and specifications. Construction documents are 
prepared and advertised for bids. Interested contractors review the 
construction documents and submit bids for the construction work. 
Selection of a contractor is deterrriined based on a competitive bidding 
process. While the design professional usually will either employ an 
independent cost estimator or prepare its own cost estimates, the 
actual cost of the project is solely determined by the bidding contractors 
during the bidding process. Following receipt and review of the bids, 
and confirmation by the owner that sufficient funding exists, the contract 
is awarded to the lowest responsive and responsible bidder. The 
contractor then proceeds to construct the project according to the plans 
and specifications. During construction, the design professional 
observes the work to ensure that it conforms to the design plans and 
specifications. 
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Design-Build 
Design-Build is an alternative contracting method used for delivery of 
both the design and construction services under one contract. This 
contract provides a single point of responsibility to the owner, namely 
the design-build firm. Many variations of this method exist, but all have 
"single point of responsibility" as a common element. Design-build can 
be undertaken when a performance specification is developed and the 
entire package of design and construction services is competitively bid. 
More commonly, the design-build firm is selected based on a 
combination of qualifications, technical approach, and price. 
Occasionally, the selection is made primarily on the basis of a design 
competition. By combining design and construction services under one 
contract, an opportunity exists to totally integrate the work of the 
contractor and the design consultant. This allows the selected firm to 
work with the owner during the design process to provide design, value 
engineering, constructability review, scheduling, estimating, and other 
related services. It also allows construction to start before the design is 
entirely complete. Though many variations exist, compensation for the 
design-build firm is typically based on a fixed price or, similar to the 
CM/GC process, a GMP. 
For the purposes ofthis research, the tenn CMlGC will be used to describe both the 
PDS and also the party perfonning the work, such as the "CMlGC." Generally when an 
entity is referred to as "contractor" or "general contractor" the reference is to a DBB PDS, 
unless stated as the CMlGC contractor or as in the stakeholder analysis, where the context 
is clear. 
The Design-Build or DB method will be discussed at length, but only in the context 
of the cn reports comparing the different PDS's found in the Appendix E. DB is not 
widely used in the Oregon public building sector, although it is beginning to be used in the 
highway building sector by the Oregon Department of Transportation. There were only 
two DB projects in the original Oregon database ofprojects~ however, those projects, both 
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parking garages, were discarded before the [mal analysis. In any case, since the crr goes to 
great length to include DB in its analyses of the different PDS's, it is discussed here also. 
Chapter 3 details the data collection process that resulted in the Oregon database of 
projects. The Oregon database contains 407 projects; 510 were originally identified, but 
103 of those projects were discarded as not meeting the project size or type requirements 
for this research. Of these 407 projects, 215 were actually used in the DEA and statistical 
analyses; we were unable to obtain enough information on the other 193 projects, many of 
which had been built nearly 20 years ago, and the final project records for the jobs had 
been either lost or destroyed. We were able to use all 407 projects in the Oregon database 
for some ofthe "project characteristics" that is included here. For example, we know what 
the original project bid or GMP cost of nearly all 407 projects was, therefore we can 
estimate with fairly high confidence the total dollar val~e of the Oregon database and the 
distribution between DBB and CMlGC projects. 
1.5 Legal Construct 
Public procurements are closely scrutinized for sound reasons, the public taxpayer 
must be assured that the money spent by public agencies for public projects is not wasted 
or spent for corrupt purposes. The federal government and most states, including Oregon, 
require competitive open public bidding as a means of assuring "fairness" in the awarding 
ofpublic construction contracts [55]. Oregon Revised Statutes (ORS) makes this explicit 
in Chapter 279 stating: 
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"279.005 Policy of competition in public contracts. (1) It is the policy 
of the State of Oregon to encourage public contracting competition that 
supports openness and impartiality to the maximum extent possible." 
"279.015 Competitive bidding; exceptions; exemptions. (1) Subject 
to the policies and provisions of ORS 279.005 and 279.007, all public 
contracts shall be based upon competitive bids or proposals ... ,,9 
The law in Oregon allows for alternative forms of procuring construction services 
through the "exemption" clause in ORS 279.015(2) subject to a number of conditions that 
are discussed in detail in following chapters and Appendix C. More importantly, it is clear 
that the state favors open public bidding over any other form of construction procurement, 
which justifies the "challenger - defender" mechanism that is used in the data analysis of 
this research. That is, the defender is the "traditional" DBB method described above, and 
the CMlGC PDS form is the challenger. Under the state prescribed scheme of exemptions, 
the challenger "alternate" PDS must show that it is superior to the defender, or traditional 
DBB method. In Chapter 4 of this research, we use this legal construct to help set up and 
analyze the data, giving the defender every benefit of the doubt in terms ofuse ofavailable 
information and performance ofthe work. 
1.6 Validation 
The sample of projects used in this research is not a "statistical sample" of all 
projects constructed during the research time frame; it is however, a large "convenient 
sample." We were able to identify 407 projects that generally met the research criteria for 
size and type of construction that were constructed in Oregon starting construction after 
9 The entire exemption statute, Chapter ORS 279.015 is included in Appendix C. 
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1986 and completed prior to 2002. It is unlikely that there were many more than these 407 
projects constructed in Oregon during the research period that met the research criteria. 
Any projects that were missed are more than likely, projects that started and completed in 
the 1986 to 1994 time frame. This is because the DJC records going back nearly 20 years 
are not as good as those in the period since 1994 when they started keeping records on­
line. Also, several public agencies, in particular Oregon Health & Science University 
(OHSU) and Multnomah County, archived their records, some of which either cannot be 
found or were destroyed. 
To validate the data in the study, we compared the results of our data with that in 
the only other known similar studies; those performed by the Cll and a report from the state 
of Washington. These comparisons are discussed in Section 4.1.2 and presented in Table 
15. 
The Oregon database presents the largest number of building projects studied to 
date, and it is clear from the comparisons that the differences between the Oregon database 
and the other study results are not significant. There is only one comparison where the 
difference exceeds 5%, which occurs in the comparison between schedule growth in the 
Cll Benchmarking Study [51] and the Oregon database where all projects are combined. 
However, the standard error of the means of these populations is 4.7%, which is really 
quite large and means that the difference in the means (5.08%) is not significant. 
Since the Oregon database results are consistent with the other studies on these 
metrics, we conclude that the data collected for this research is valid. 
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1.7 Results 
1. 	 Based on the statistical analysis of the output metrics cost and schedule 
control (in absence of inputs) the hypothesis that the CMlGC projects 
perfonnance is superior to that ofDBB projects is rejected. Group statistics 
indicate that there is no significant difference between the cost and 
schedule control outputs from CMlGC and DBB projects. Therefore we 
reject the hypothesis that CMlGC PDS results in projects that outperfonn 
DBB projects on cost and schedule control metrics. 
2. 	 Based on the DEA model and non-parametric statistical analysis, the null 
hypothesis that CMlGC do not outperfonn DBB projects with respect to 
overall efficiency (based on the DEA model) is rejected, and the alternate 
hypothesis, that CMlGC PDS results in projects with a higher mean 
technical efficiency scores than DBB projects cannot be rejected, and the 
difference is statistically significant. 
3. 	 Interaction analysis of the weights and slacks from the DEA model found 
no evidence of interaction between project type, perfonnance and PDS. In 
addition, we found no evidence of clustering by PDS with respect to 
specific metrics, which indicates that there is no significantly different 
strategy employed by managers when using CMlGC or DBB PDS. 
4. 	 The stakeholder analysis indicates that the principal perceived benefits of 
choosing CMlGC over DBB is a reduction in project risk and reducing the 
adversarial relationship between the project management parties. The 
17 
perception of reduced risk is not supported by the data analysis, which 
shows no difference in cost or schedule control metrics between the two 
PDS's. Since project risk is generally the risk of going over budget or 
beyond the schedule, CMlGC does not reduce those project risks. The 
perception that the adversarial nature of the relationship between the owner 
and the CMlGC, as compared with the owner-DBB contractor relationship 
is reduced was not testable given the data we collected. Based on the 
earlier work by Goldblatt and Septelka [99] and this research, we observed 
that owners and CMlGC contractors that are involved in the work have a 
higher regard for the benefits of CMlGC PDS than do the design 
consultants and the subcontractors. 
5. 	 The case study comparison of two nearly identical schools built for the 
same owner, designed by the same architect, and constructed within one 
year of another, where one used DBB and the other CMlGC PDS, showed 
that the DBB project was built for significantly less total dollars and 
experienced lower cost growth. Furthermore the DBB project was less 
costly in virtually all cost categories. However, the CMlGC project was 
fast-tracked and the DBB project was perfonned under nonnal construction 
time constraints. The analysis adds more confidence to the 
recommendation that exemptions should be based primarily on schedule 
and not cost issues. 
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1.8 	 Contributions 
The contributions ofthis research are as follows: 
1. 	 This research demonstrates that the current public policy used in Oregon to 
exempt public building projects from open competitive public bidding on 
the presumption of"substantial cost savings" to the public is not supported 
by the research. The research suggests that exemptions should focus 
primarily on schedule requirements. This research demonstrates CMlGC 
projects are more efficient than DBB projects when fast-tracking is 
required because the public pays no additional price in tenns of cost and 
schedule control for starting the job with less than complete information. 
2. 	 This research raises questions about earlier research in the field that found 
CMlGC PDS superior to DBB on nearly all projects based on project 
outcomes. 
3. 	 The Oregon database compiled for this research includes 407 projects, 215 
of which were used in the DEA model. This is the largest published 
database ofpublic building construction projects in the literature. 
4. 	 This research fills several gaps in the construction management and DEA 
literature, including proposing the use of DEA as a benchmarking tool for 
construction project performance, which had not been done before. 
1.9 	 Limitations 
Most all research has limitations and the same is true here. The first and probably 
most obvious limitation is that the study is limited to building projects in Oregon. This 
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means perhaps that the study cannot be generalized to the broader construction industry 
and to other states (although the state of Washington is discussed). Second, much of the 
data came from biased sources: owners and contractors, who support the continuation of 
the public policy for their own reasons. (However, half of the data was obtained directly 
from project files kept by owners.) Tbird, the Expert Panel members contributed much of 
the data used in this study. This was done on purpose because it was felt that, particularly 
construction industry members, would be more willing to participate in the research if they 
had a hand in helping to develop the metrics. FurthelIDore, the elicitation and derivation of 
the metrics process would serve as part "study education" that would streamline the data 
collection process. Finally, the projects are not a random statistical sample of the 
population of all projects, instead they represent all the projects that we could obtain data 
on. The Oregon database represents a convenient sample of the building construction 
projects in Oregon during the study period, but it is a rather large convenient sample. It is 
possible that the 193 projects in the Oregon database that were not used in the model could 
affect the outcome ofthe analysis. However, it should be noted that the group statistics for 
the Oregon database were substantially similar to those found in prior studies. 
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2 Literature Review 
This chapter is an examination of the previously published literature that forms the 
basis for this investigation. The chapter includes prior research in construction, bidding 
selections, negotiated procurements, DEA and includes references to prior studies in the 
area, which are found in the Appendix E. 
2.1 Overview 
There exists a great body of literature in the areas ofvendor selection, multi-criteria 
decision making, bidding theory, construction contracting and Data Envelopment Analysis 
(DEA). Here, the focus of the discussion is on the application ofdifferent techniques to the 
problem of public-sector construction contractor selection and post project evaluation. 
Until 1976 the public-sector in Oregon, like much of the country, had only one method for 
choosing a construction contractor on a public building project: lowest lump sum bid (LSB 
method) [37, 55, 79, 166]. Therefore, the discussion here will begin with a review of the 
literature on the construction industry and in particular auctions and competitive bidding 
theory as it applies to construction contractor selection. Some details such as an example 
ofbidder mark-up calculations are presented in the Appendix D. 
In recent years, in Oregon, the public-sector has experimented with "alternative 
contracting methods" such as competitive negotiation as a method of construction vendor 
selection as documented by Douthwaite [79] and substantially similar to the process 
described by Skitmore and Marsden [193]. This method requires the application ofmulti­
criteria techniques or scoring models. 
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A great effort has been made to obtain all of the prior reports of similar work 
prefonned by other researchers as well as project evaluation reports and audits by state and 
local auditors for specific projects. The Construction Industry Institute (ClI) at the 
University of Texas at Austin has been the most active single institution in perfonning 
these types of comparisons. A brief critical review of the crr work is found in this chapter 
with a more in-depth presentation found in the Appendix E. A comparison of the data 
analysis and results from the crr studies and this work is found in Chapter 4. 
Finally, project evaluation or "Benchmarking" and the application of Data 
Envelopment Analysis (DEA) to this problem are covered. DEA is a widely used tool for 
benchmarking and efficiency analysis, specifically in public sector applications. However, 
to date this tool has not been applied to the evaluation ofconstruction contractor selections. 
In his book, History o/Government Contracting, Nagle [154] states: 
"Much of this country's contracting history has been spent trying to find 
the best combination of three factors: the right contracting apparatus, 
the right government-contractor relationship, and the correct contract 
form itself." 
This study touches on all three of factors. In this chapter of the study, a review of 
the literature concerning the different fonns and contracting methods is reviewed. 
2.2 Taxonomy of Literature and Relevant Gaps 
Project benchmarking, project perfonnance, management and vendor selections are 
among the overlapping topics in the DEA and construction industry literature. However, 
while these are common themes in the literature, there is little crossover in the two 
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disciplines (meaning that DEA has rarely used to analyze construction industry 
performance). This overlapping of topics is graphically depicted in Figure 2 below. Five 
major gaps have been identified, labeled "A" through "E." This is not a complete list of 
the literature in either field, merely some of the main points discussed here (in fact both the 
DEA construction literature fields are quite voluminous with entire journals dedicated to 
construction and project management, as well as several journals that focus on DEA and 
the applications ofthe methodology). 
Constractor 5e ons 
Bidding 
Performance Based 
Construction Project Management 
Construction Project Performance 
Benchmarking 
Critical Success Factors 
Project DeJivery Systems 
Fixed Price 
Design Bid Build 
Design Build 
Cost Remibursable 
Construction Management 
CM@R&CM/GC 
PDS Selection & Comparison 
Industry Studies - CII 
Academic Journal Papers 
Case Studies 
Legal Environment 
Cases and ru 
Figure 2: Relevant Literature Gap Analysis 
0 
oCS 
>­0:: 0> 0 c: 
I 
c: a::: () 0 0 (I) (f) (I) U; () "U
"0 co E (f) E ,20
"U I O>c (I).r:::. c 
c 0 (I) -g ,2 (j) 0> 0 ~ 
.r:::. ctI0 (j) -'0 :':\! c 13 0 ;:: ~ 0> 'C (0 a. 
ft! :':\! U) (I) 2 Q (f) :':\!:§~ (;) c"S ,~ .9 '0~a::: c I/) 0 c ~ (f) (f) 0_ ~ (I) 0 0 :f c ft!0 0 E e--g, a. ;:: 0 o t5LL 
E 
'(i) ::J § 'e- (I) E (j) 8 "0:; ~ a. .cc m Co)"iii (I) a::: ..s~ Q. U)£: £:x Q.
'a G> W c( m
'C 
0 
Data Envelopment Analysis 

Literature 

23 
The gaps identified here are termed "relevant" gaps; there are numerous gaps in the 
DEA and construction literature intersection that are of no consequence or concern of this 
research. 
The gaps in the literature that are noted in Figure 2 are as follows: 
A. 	 While DEA has been used as a tool to help make selections, such as R&D 
project and investment selections among other things, its application to 
construction project selection has been limited to one unpublished report on 
roadway' construction and maintenance projects.10 While Cook et al. [60] 
(also found in [41]) evaluated highway maintenance crews using DEA, 
there is no application in the DEA literature that purports to evaluate 
construction project performance or selection ofconstruction contractors or 
construction project delivery systems. 
B. 	 There are many papers in the construction literature that discuss critical 
success factors and benclnnarking metrics, and there are literally hundreds 
ofDEA applications using input and output metrics. However, there are no 
papers in the DEA literature that actually give researchers guidance on how 
to derive metrics for DEA models. The application from [60] uses a 
formula that the authors derived, but no documentation is given why they 
used the metrics they used, except the fact that the data was available. 
10 This project was presented at the Fall 2000 INFORMS in San Antonio, Texas, by Dr. Timothy R. 
Anderson and this author. 
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C. DEA is a widely used benchmarking tool; however, there are no papers in 
the DEA literature on benchmarking in the construction industry generally, 
construction project performance or the wider general uses of bidding and 
negotiated procurements. Furthermore, only one previous study by 
Sanvido and Konchar [183] compares proj ect performance based on PDS. 
D. 	 There are no benchmarking studies in the DEA literature on construction 
project delivery systems. 
E. 	 There are no case studies in the literature that compare two nearly identical 
projects that used different project delivery systems in order to evaluate the 
efficiency ofthe delivery systems. 
F. 	 The DEA literature includes many methods to deal with scale differences 
and imprecise input and output data. However, currently there is no 
guidance given in the literature of how to deal with extremely non-linear 
and missing data that resides on one side of the DEA model. Nor has there 
been any pervious evaluation of the proper DEA formulation to evaluate 
the performance of construction projects or inelastic information has been 
made. 
In addition to these gaps, there is very little in the construction literature that 
directly compares project delivery systems by outcomes. That work is basically limited to 
a group ofstudies performed by the Cll, Design-Build Research Team.It 
11 Also, reportedly funded by the Design-Build Institute. 
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2.3 Construction Industry 
The construction industry is often referred to as the largest single economic sector 
other than government, and consequently the body of literature on the construction industry 
and construction bidding is quite large. It is generally found in the professional journals of 
the American Society of Civil Engineers and others. However, some of the earliest 
analysis of bidding is found in the areas of operations research, management science, 
economics and engineering management. 
Carty [37], Clough and Sears [54] and Halpin [102] provide very good overviews 
of the construction industry: its history and development, role in society as well as 
describing the major contracting methods evaluated in this study. Nagle [154] provides a 
history of Federal Government contracting, which focuses on arms procurement and mail 
contracts. A history of the Oregon construction industry, as it relates to the carpenter labor 
union, is presented by Wollner [222]. The construction industry legal structure is reviewed 
in the authoritative references prepared by Cibinic and Nashl2 [49] and Bednar, Braude and 
Cibinic [22]. Construction industry bidding law is documented by Cushman and Doyle 
[70] and updated by Rhodes [166]. In addition there are several texts on Construction Law, 
including bidding, both nationally [32, 71] and pertaining specifically to Oregon [31]. 
Carty [37] describes the different types ofconstruction contracts as: lump sum, unit 
price, guaranteed nlaximum price (GMP), construction management (CM) and design 
12 Professors Nash and Cibinc have written several authoritative works on contracting in the Federal 
Government system. They are both with George Washington University Law School in Washington 
D.C., where the Federal Circuit Court for the Federal Circuit, The Federal Court ofClaims, and all of 
the Boards of Contract Appeals are located. The Public Contract Law Journal is also published at the 
George Washington University Law School for the same reasons. 
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construct (also known as "design-build"). Gordon [101] and others [56] provide guidance 
on selecting contracting methods; however, in the public-sector in Oregon, only three of 
these methods are currently being used on a regular basis: lump sum, unit price and 
negotiated GMPI3 [79, 80]. Myers [152] evaluates design-build approaches elsewhere in 
COlUltry, but Design-Build has not been used extensively in Oregon. Also, it should be 
noted that unit price contracts are typically awarded on a lump sum basis (equal to the unit 
price multiplied by the estimated number of units) and are generally limited to 
transportation and utility construction contracts (such as: roads, sewers, waterlines and so 
forth). Here, the discussion is limited to "building" contracts. Building contracts differ 
from transportation and utility contracts in that they generally require the contractor to 
provide many specific items of work (often times several hundred) for one complete bid 
price. Transportation and utility contracts typically require fewer specific items to be 
provided by the contractor, but they require many more "units" of each item. In addition, 
the exact number of "units" of any specific item the contractor is required to furnish and 
install is typically defined to plus or n1inus a certain percentage of an estimated amount.14 
This requires the bidder to bid many individual unit prices and sum the product of the unit 
prices and estimated number of units to determine the total bid. There is a great deal of 
complexity associated with both lump Sun1 and unit price bidding. The fact that this study 
13 Design-Build, either negotiated DB or bid DB are not frequently used in Oregon, but have been used 
on at least two public projects, a parking garage and a maintenance facility, both for Tri-Met, a local 
transportation district, those projects, together with some DB highway projects have been executed 
since [80] was published. 
14 Contractors are generally required to prepare a bid on the estimated quantity, knowing that the actual 
pay quantity (unit price *number of units) may vary by some amount ( or percentage) prescribed in the 
contract. Unit price bidding has the effect of shifting the risk for quantity assessment from the 
contractor to the owner, meaning that the owner takes the risk of additional quantities of work actually 
installed. 
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focuses on lump sum building contract types is not to imply that they are more or less 
complex than unit price bids. 
2.4 Construction Industry and Bidding 
2.4.1 Bidding and Auction Theory 
Construction contractors have traditionally been selected on the basis of the lowest 
responsible competitive bid [101, 149]. Bidding theory is a rich source of published 
research dating back to the 1950's. The majority of this work was published in the 1970's 
and 1980's; however, a steady stream ofauction and bidding research continues to this day 
(for example: [66, 118, 173, 206] were all published in the past three years). There have 
been several bibliographies and surveys ofcompetitive bidding published since this area of 
interest within the economics and operations research communities was developed; some 
of the more complete surveys include Wilson [220], McAfee and McMillan [146], 
Milgrom [147], Milgrom and Weber [148], Engelbrecht-Wiggans [87], Rothkopf [173] 
and a recent book by Kagel and Levin [118]. More compact reviews can be found in 
Rothkopf and Harstad [174]. Though dated now, Stark and Rothkopf [197] and Stark 
[196] have published extensive bibliographies in the field. 
In the literature, competitive bidding theory is synonymous with, or considered a 
subset of, auction theory. An auction is an economic institution designed for the exchange 
of goods or services, where the exact selling or purchase price of the good or service is 
unknown prior to the auction [173]. The price of the exchange is established by bidding 
among parties wishing to either purchase or sell the good or service. Types of auctions are 
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distinguished by the rules detennined by the auctioneer (who could be either a third party 
or the principal buyer or seller). The various auction types in general use can be classified 
by following characteristics: highest or lowest bid, first or second price, private or common 
value, in combination with open (often oral) or closed (typically sealed) bidding. I5 The 
principal concern here is with the most common form ofbidding used in the construction 
industry, lowest bid, first price, common value, closed bidding auctions [174, 224]. 
2.4.2 Friedman's Basic Model 
While auctions have been around for centuries, a theory of auctions and 
competitive bidding was only established in the last fifty years. Most researchers16 credit 
Lawrence Friedman [91] for first analyzing the general bidding problem and formulating 
an expected value model for optimal bidding strategy. At about the same time as 
Friedman's work, Percus and Quinto [161] applied linear programming to the problem of 
"Competitive Bond Bidding," specifically, government bonded debt. However, most 
subsequent researchers use Friedman's model as the point of departure for future work. 
Friedman derived the expected value model: 
E(x) =p(x)*{x-C,) (2.1) 
15 By closed here we mean the bid itself is not disclosed prior to bid opening, not that the bidding itself 

is closed to a certain set ofbidders, which mayor may not be the case. 

16 One exception is Ibbs, [112] who cites a 1944 Columbia University thesis analysis of Competitive 

Bidding for Corporate Securities. 
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Where E(x) is the expected value of winning, P(x) is the probability of a bid ''x'' 
will be the winning bid and "C" is the estimated cost corrected for bias. Friedman's 
original work has been extended in many ways by many researchers. Hanssmann and 
Rivett [105] were among the first, extending Friedman's model to estimating the 
probability of winning and devising a method for analyzing simultaneous bids on several 
objects sought. Simmons [192], Wilson [219,221], and Rothkopf [171, 172] all followed, 
with Crowley [66] continuing the discussion regarding the different probabilities derived in 
the Friedman and Gates models. 
2.4.3 	 Bidder's Mark-up or Fee 
Mark-up or contractors' fee is an important part of any discussion of construction 
contract bidding as discussed in Curtis and Maines [68, 69] and Fuerst [92, 93]. The mark­
up is often considered to be the principal strategic component ofthe construction bid, and a 
considerable amount ofwork has been done to calculate the theoretical optimum mark-up 
in order to maximize the expected profit of any given bid [21, 35, 91, 132, 145, 153, 159, 
181, 201, 218]. These works consider several factors such as number of opposing bidders 
and variance in the value of the good sought. With respect to construction contract 
bidding, these sometimes simple analyses significantly understate the complexity in 
determining construction bids as demonstrated by Akinci and Fischer [5]. Beyond these 
theoretical developments, the determination of fee or expected profit from a project is 
obviously a principal concern to both the prospective contractors and those who pay the 
bill, since contractors must make enough to stay in business and owners and the general 
public don't want to pay too much in the form of exorbitant profits. Contractors generally 
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consider risk, market and return on investnlent when calculating mark -up and fee; an 
example ofconstruction company mark-up and fee calculation is presented in Appendix D. 
2.4.4 Auction Classifications 
Auctions are often classified by type, otherwise known as design or format by 
which the selling takes place. There are basically two types ofauctions that are executed in 
a number of different formats. These are Common Value and Private Value Auctions or 
bidding. Private Value Auctions occur when the bidders have a different private value for 
item sought, such as the value of artwork. Common Value Auctions occur when the value 
of the item, once won, is common to all of the bidders. These models include bidding on 
items for resale (such as the Dutch flower auctions), and as in the case of this research, 
construction project revenues. l7 Auctions can be executed in the open, oral form, or as in 
construction bidding, typically the closed, sealed bid form. The only auction type and form 
of interest here are closed sealed bid common value auctions as discussed by Kagel and 
Levin [118]. 
"Construction contract bidding is usually treated as a common value auction," 
according to Kagel [118]; this is because, theoretically, all of the bidders will experience 
the same cost basis to perform on the contract, but each bidder has a different estimate of 
what those costs are. The most optimistic or lowest estimator ofthose costs (or perhaps the 
most aggressive bidder) will submit the lowest price bid. Since the cost of production 
17 In short, that is what construction project bidding is all about, the contractor provides a bid for the 
revenues required to pay for the services purchased, often through subcontractors or his own labor and 
materials. These services are generally considered to cost all bidders the same amount, so the 
contractor that provides the lowest bid is in essence bidding the least expected difference between 
revenue and cost or bid amount and cost, which is the same thing. 
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remains relatively constant I8 , regardless of the bid price, the possibility for negative profits 
exists. This is generally referred to as the ''winner's curse." 
2.4.5 The Winner's Curse 
To paraphrase Landsburg [131] from his book The Armchair Economist on the 
subject ofwinners curse in a chapter entitled, "Cursed Winners and Glum Losers:" 
"Economic theory predicts that you're probably not liking this 
[dissertation] as much as you thought you would [when you agreed to 
read it]." 
Although he was being somewhat whimsical in his introduction to the subject, he 
does summarize much of the important characteristics of the winner's curse phenomenon, 
particularly as it applies to the construction industry. The idea was first brought into the 
literature by Capen, Clapp and Campbell [36] in their review ofhigh risk outer continental 
shelf oil and gas lease auctions. They conclude that, "[i]n conlpetitive bidding, the winner 
tends to be the player who most over estimates true tract value." They go on to show that 
the "law of averages" simply doesn't apply in common value competitive bidding, because 
with a sufficient number ofbidders, any bidder only wins ifhe or she over-values the item 
sought and in every bidding situation, some bidder will over-value the item. Which 
implies that competitive bidding must, over the long run, result in substantial financial 
18 This is particularly true in public construction where prevailing wages for workers are set by the state 
in Oregon. However, there may be slight differences in cost ofproduction for example if one of the 
bidders has developed a better, cheaper way to perform the work. 
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losses in those industries where it is practiced. However, Wood [224] gives an alternate 
interpretation: 
"The winner's curse is perhaps better defined not by the existence of 
negative average profits to the winning bidder, but rather Milgrom's 
necessary reassessment of value after winning, or by the observation 
that optimal bidding behavior in affiliated value situations generally calls 
for less aggressive bidding as the number of opponents or the bidder's 
own estimating uncertainty increases." 
Another interpretation common in the construction industry is to attribute the 
winning low bid to a "mistake" and deem the winner the bidder who made the biggest 
mistake. 
Winner's curse has spawned significant research in recent years, first in analyzing 
its existence [36] and predicting its magnitude in order to calculate an optimal mark-up to 
cover the anticipated costs or loss in revenue [83, 129, 192]. Harstad and Rothkopf [107] 
and Simmons [192] give methods to guard against winner's curse by allowing 
withdrawable bids and better estimating techniques. Cox [65] disputes the very existence 
of a winner's curse, or states that "if a winner's curse is a behavioral reality, then bidders 
are not generally using ex ante optimal strategies." Thiel [204] studied highway 
construction bidding in 33 states and detennined that the winner's curse is not a 
"significant problem in the highway construction industry." Although Thiel "believes that 
the winner's curse is at most a slight problem in [the highway construction] industry" he 
states that, "the data [may allow for] other interpretations." Thiel's conclusions are 
admittedly somewhat suspect, in that he incorporated the owner's estimate of the costs in 
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his determination of the magnitude of the curse, but that is a common technique also used 
in an Oregon highway construction audit by Lattimer [135]. 
Kagel and Levin [117] found that "in auctions involving a limited number of 
bidders (3-4), average profits are consistently positive and closer to the Nash equilibrium 
bidding outcome than the winner's curse hypothesis." However, with a larger average 
number ofbidders (5-6) they find a "reemergence of the winner's curse, with bar.akruptcies 
and negative profits." They supported these findings in later studies [119, 138]. 
Winner's curse is of particular concern in the public sector of the construction 
industry where most owners continue to use DBB as their primary PDS. Kagel [118] and 
others have studied common value auctions and the winner's curse in the construction 
industry and concluded that while experienced construction bidders are subject to winner's 
curse affects, the construction market attempts to correct for the curse by employing three 
strategies:19 withdrawal ofa low bid due to error, subcontractor buyout, and by overpricing 
change orders. Kagel also points out that there is a significant amount of "private 
information" in the bidding environment that is not accounted for by the plans and 
specifications, some of which can be characterized as "experience" of the bidders and 
reliance on "rules-of-thumb" in bidding. 
In Kagel's brief review of the construction industry for his research, he concludes 
that contractors rely primarily on the plans and specifications as the primary infonnation as 
19 Although, not necessarily by these names. 
34 
a basis for their bid. In fact, that proposition is solidly embedded in both federal and 
Oregon contract law.2o 
2.4.6 Mistake 
In any discussion of construction bidding, considering the complexity of the 
market, there is some an appreciable probability of a mistake in the bid. A mistake is not 
an error in judgment, such as choosing the wrong labor production rate or the wrong 
equipment to do the job [71]. A mistake is a clear objective omission. It is a generally 
accepted rule that a contractor may be allowed to rescind a bid if there is a mathematical 
error or omission that is "material" [29]. (Harstad and Rothkopf touch on bid rescission in 
light ofa mistake as "winner's curse insurance" [107], although that was not the main point 
of their paper.) There is less consistency on whether or not a rescinded bid will 
automatically result in forfeiture of any bid security (a bond or cash). Different 
government agencies have developed different policies in this regard, although the legal 
standard appears to be more certain [70, 71, 166]. 
While bid withdrawal may protect a bidder from a certain class of problems, 
specifically leaving out some major item of work or making a substantial mathematical 
error, it does not protect the contractor from similar but smaller mistakes that go undetected 
until the project is well underway. Another class of mistakes involves the subcontractors 
chosen for the project. At bid time, the estimators choose the low subcontractor bids to 
cover all sections of work specified in the contract documents. However, subcontractor 
20 See In United States v. Spearin, 248 U.S. 132,39 S.Ct. 59,63 L. Ed. 166 (1918), and Oregon, A.H. 
Barbour & Sons, Inc. v. State Highway COnmllssion, 248 Or. 247,433 P.2d 847 (1967); General 
Construction Company v. Oregon State Fish COnmllssion, 26 Or. App. 577, 554 P2d 185 (1976). 
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bids often include exclusions of one item or another within a specification section bid, and 
this can cause "holes" (items of work that get left out) and in some cases a "double-up" 
(where two subcontractor's include a specified item of work in their price). Holes in the 
bid reduce the general contractor bidder's profit, while the double-up serves to increase it. 
These types of problen1s (and the probability of mistake generally) are heightened in the 
DBB method because general contractors receive the majority of subcontractor bids in the 
final hours (someti~es final minutes) before the total bid from the general contractor is due 
by the owner. Bids that are received late, after the prescribed ''bid time," are rejected as a 
matter of law on public projects in Oregon, so there is a natural rush to finalize the number 
before bid time, which leads to a higher likelihood of mistake. In the CMlGC PDS, the 
CMlGC has the opportunity to take as much time as needed to both review the bids of 
subcontractors and perhaps more importantly, define the scope of work for the 
subcontractors, thereby reducing the probability of"holes" in the bid. 
2.5 Non-Bid Negotiated Contractor Selection Methods 
From 1935 until 1975, public agencies in the State of Oregon had little choice but 
use a lowest, lump-sum bid selection process. In 1975, the State Legislature passed an 
exemption to the public bidding law for "certain projects" or "certain types of projects." 
The use of bid exemptions to select construction contractors exploded in the period from 
1985 to 1996, accounting for more than $1.6 billion in public construction spending on 
more than seventy projects during that period. By 2002, when this study concluded its data 
collection efforts, more than $2.9 billion in public construction spending on more than 136 
projects had been exempted from the public bidding requirements. However, there is very 
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little in the construction project management or construction industry literature regarding 
non-bid negotiated procurements with the exception of guides for choosing method and 
how to use them effectively by the cn, OSU's Construction Engineering Management 
Program and others [56, 76, 101], and the cn Design-Build Research Team work authored 
by Sanvido and Koncher [127, 183] that provides the only prior analysis of PDS 
performance. 
The actual selection process used under the exemptions clause of the public 
bidding law has evolved from "no direction" at all in the early years to requiring the 
identification of selection criteria and weighting (or relative priority). Additionally, the 
1997 legislature placed further restrictions on the use of non-bid methods by requiring 
public agencies to hold public hearings to make public findings and provide a follow-up 
report of the actual project outcomes with respect to the original findings report. At the 
same time, however, the legislature exempted the Oregon University System and the 
Oregon Health and Science University from all public bidding requirements under Chapter 
279. 
2.6 ORS Chapter 279 Public Bidding and Exclusions 
Jervis and Levin [114] note that "in this country, competitive bidding is required by 
law on virtually all construction contracts that involve public funds. The competitive 
bidding requirement serves two primary purposes: conserving tax dollars and promoting 
fairness." The underlying assumption is ''that the lowest possible price will be received if 
the contract is awarded on the basis of open competition" involving a sufficient number of 
competitors. Secondly, as "strong as the need to conserve tax dollars is, the promotion of 
37 
fairness is an even more imperative purpose of the competitive bidding system, there is 
broad consensus in our society that public contracts should be awarded on the basis of the 
contractor's ability and willingness to offer the low price. Graft and local favoritism, must 
not playa role in the selection ofcontractors." Such concepts have given rise to the "rigid, 
formalistic structure of competitive bidding ...[ which is] designed to avoid not only 
impropriety but even the appearance of possible impropriety. In order to maintain public 
confidence ... [and] the integrity ofthe competitive bidding system" [114]. 
2.6.1 ORS Chapter 279 and Public Bidding 
Oregon Revised Statute (ORS) Chapter 279 is the State public bidding law. It 
came into being during the 1935 legislative session and remained virtually without 
amendment for nearly 40 years until 1975, when the section 279.015 was added by House 
Bill #2339, which took effect January 1, 1976.21 The original law required nearly all 
spending for public goods and services, not limited to construction projects, to be put out 
for competitive sealed bids. 
The sealed bidding process maintains objectivity and the integrity of public 
spending and is preferred by statute; however, mandated sealed bidding lacks flexibility. 
This lack of flexibility is particularly acute in times ofemergency and economic isolation.22 
The fundamental requirement of sealed bidding is that the Owner must be capable of 
specifying minimum performance for the public project. In an emergency situation, this is 
21 It should be noted that another major rewrite ofORS Chapter 279 began in 2002 in order to address 
the differences in procurement for "supplies," and that required of"services." 
22By "economic isolation" I am referring to a condition where an Owner has few, if any contractors to 
choose from to do the work. In these situations, it is highly likely that the Owner will pay more than the 
normal value or "goring rate" for the contractor's work. 
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clearly impossible. Arguably, it may also be impossible to specify minimum perfonnance 
in extremely complex projects and certainly those with significant design-build or fast­
track elements. 
2.6.2 ORS Chapter 279 and Non-Bid Procurement 
In 1975, the state legislature took action to rectify Chapter 279's lack of flexibility 
and adopted an exemption clause by authorizing HB #2339 and making it a subsection of 
the public bidding law: ORS 279.015. TIlls clause sets forth as a condition for granting any 
exemption from public bidding upon a finding that, "[i]t is unlikely that such exemption 
will encourage favoritism in the awarding of public contracts or substantially diminish 
competition for such contracts" and results in "substantial cost savings" to the public 
contracting agency and, by extension, the taxpayers. 
The use of bid exemptions was minimal and primarily limited to emergency 
situations and continuation of original supplier and maintenance contracts (such as 
elevators and mechanical controls) and on one occasion to extend a project bid deadline.23 
By the mid-1980's public agencies had begun using the bid exemption provision to exempt 
certain new major public construction contracts from competitive lump sum bidding. The 
use spread rapidly, and by 1996, public agencies had used this provision to exempt more 
than forty new major construction projects totaling nearly $1.6 billion in public spending. 
By 2002 the total exceeded $2.9 billion, as shown in Table 1 . 
.23 See Oregon Attorney General Opinion Requests: OP-6063, 6234, 5873, 8161 and 7992 
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Project Type CM/GC DBB 
Housing 15,504,677.72 22,396,317.4 7 
Library 81,481,218.05 108,105,178.31 
Major Remodel of Existing Bldg 174,304,811.42 62,863,526.83 
Mixed New and Remodel 596,077,946.22 118,040,458.01 
New Corrections, Jailor Prison 717,594,701.20 42,720,921.68 
New Hospital or Medical Building 94,143,069.84 92,002,502.14 
New Industrial 146,928,199.73 39,284,451.18 
New Institutional 278,374,899.29 285,382,671.99 
New Office Building 163,418,208.19 29,972,630.20 
New School Building 404,738,846.46 778,249,827.19 
Other 115,718,781.36 4,229,853.82 
Parking 26,328,393.32 62,106,850.50 
Sports Facilities 103,882,821.46 21,318,840.07 
Grand Total 2,918,496,574.27 1,666,674,029.39 
Table 1: Dollar Volume of Projects in the Oregon Database in 2002 dollars adjusted using the 
ENR index for Building Construction 
While several researchers have commented that the DBB method increases the 
adversarial relationship between the owner and contractor [45, 46, 94, 101], the only issue 
considered in exempting a project from competitive bidding is cost, specifically that the 
exemption will result in substantial cost savings to the public. The relevant sections of 
Chapter 279 are as follows: 
279.015 Competitive bidding; exceptions; exemptions. (1 ) Subject 
to the policies and provisions of ORS 279.005 and 279.007, all public 
contracts shall be based upon competitive bids or proposals except: 
... A public contract exempt under subsection (2) of this section. 
(2) Subject to subsection (6)(b) of this section, the Director of the 
Oregon Department of Adrninistrative Services or a local contract 
review board may exempt certain public contracts or classes of public 
contracts from the competitive bidding requirements of subsection (1) of 
this section upon approval of the following findings submitted by the 
public contracting agency seeking the exemption: 
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(a) It is unlikely that such exemption will encourage favoritism in the 
awarding of public contracts or substantially diminish competition for 
public contracts; and 
(b) The awarding of public contracts pursuant to the exemption will 
result in sUbstantial cost savings to the public contracting agency. In 
making such finding, the director or board may consider the type, cost, 
amount of the contract, number of persons available to bid and such 
other factors as may be deemed appropriate. 
(The entire statute is presented in Appendix C.) 
2.6.3 Litigation Concerning ORS 279.015 
A search of West Group publications,24 using the Lexis® computerized search 
engine in September 2003, netted surprisingly few (only eleven in fact) documents related 
to ORS 279.015 bidding exemptions. Of these, four (4) are Attorney General Opinions 
(Numbers 7476, 7546, 7648, and 7992) on specific questions related to the bidding 
requirements asked by public agencies. 250ther questions presented to the Attorney 
General involved the impact ofORS Chapter 279 provisions on the sale ofsurplus property 
and Federal Energy Policy and Conservation Act; none of these directly dealt with the 
construction sector, but show the broad application ofthe public bidding law and the policy 
intent ofthe state as it relates to purchasing through the competitive bid process. 
'Three of the court cases that referenced ORS 279.015 were not related to public 
construction contracts. Double Eagle Golf, Inc. v. the City of Portland involves the award 
concession contract to operate public golf courses in Portland. Photo-Art Commercial 
24 West Group is the official publisher of legal court documents and recorded cases in Oregon. 
25 For example, the Oregon Military Departments asked the Attorney General if "food concession 
contracts must be obtained through the Department of General Services?" (The answer was: "yes.") 
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Studios, Inc. v. E.S. Hunter, Deputy State Highway Engineer, involved a contract between 
the State Department of Transportation (ODOT), and a film producer and Dale v. Meyers 
and Sizemore v. Meyers, was a ballot measure dispute, involving contracting out 
government services to private entities. 
In the four construction cases in which the court was required to make a ruling 
regarding ORS 279.015, two, Taggart, Inc., v. Douglas County and Platt Electric v. JC 
Northwest and Polk County Housing Authority, do not present any issues related 
specifically to the exemption clause, but rather dealt with bonding issues. 
The two construction cases that required the court to rule on the exemption 
provision ofChapter 279.015, were: Morse Bros. Prestress v. City of Lake Oswego [1] and 
ABC v. Tri-Met [2]. In Morse Bros., the court held that the defendant, City of Lake 
Oswego Board: 
made findings and recited them in the preamble to the resolution adopting 
the regulations. The findings are phrased in the words of the statute and, 
although general in nature, are sufficient to support the regulations. 
This means that the "findings" requirement in the statute does not need to be 
supported by anything other than a recitation of the wording in the statute - a finding that 
other courts have subsequently relied on. 
The Associated Builders and Contractors (ABC), an association of nonunion 
construction contractors, brought suit against the Tri-County Metropolitan Transportation 
District (Tri-Met) and the Tri-Met Contract Review Board to ask the court to set aside the 
exemption of certain contracts for a light rail extension to the Portland Airport. Tri-Met 
had exempted the contract from public bidding in part to comply with the tenns of a 
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development agreement between Tri-Met and Bechtel, the developer builder. In short, 
Bechtel was awarded the contract to build the light rail line in absence of public bidding, 
pursuant to the specified findings under ORS 279.015. Bechtel in tum required all 
contractors working on the light rail project to be "union" or to sign project labor 
agreements (PLA) with the union. ABC and its non-union mernbers objected to the PLA 
requirement on a public project and challenged the exemption under the statute. The court 
held that: 
(1) [The] trade association had standing to challenge board's exemption 
decision; 
(2) [The] district was not required to use alternative contracting 
practices in exempting contract form competitive bidding; 
(3) [The] board was not required to consider [the] effect that awarding 
contract would have had on competition among subcontractors for 
work on the light-rail project; and 
(4) [The] board's findings were sufficient as to form and were supported 
by substantial evidence. 
In summary the court ruled, among other things, that the requirement in the statute 
to make a finding that the exemption would not "encourage favoritism" or "substantially 
diminish competition" was relevant only to the contracting parties that have privity: the 
agency and their contractor, and does not extend down to the subcontractors. ABC v. Tri-
Met is the most significant challenge to the exemption clause to date, and in that case, the 
court sided solidly with the public agency's right to exempt construction contracts from 
public bidding, following the statutory "findings" without giving any consideration to the 
non-contracting parties, the subcontractors. This is important because many agencies that 
have exempted contracts from bidding use as a basis for their finding that "the exemption 
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will not diminish competition" or "encourage favoritism," the fact that they will bid out the 
subcontract portions ofwork. This ruling renders those considerations moot. 
2.7 Alternative Selection Models Considered 
Most of the CMlGC selections to date have used some form of scoring model 
where points were awarded to proposers based on their response to the established criteria 
[80]. 
Several alternative scoring models are discussed in the management SCIence 
literature [53, 198]. The selection of an appropriate model for the particular application 
depends primarily on the level of project complexity and rigor of the decision required. 
One ofthe more complex and rigorous applications is the Analytic Hierarchy Process using 
pair-wise comparisons [125, 178-180], which in fact has been used on a at least three 
occasions to select construction contractors. Less complex models include: Simple Rank 
Ordering, Simple and Probabilistic Scoring Models and Queue Sorting. DEA has been 
suggested as a possible multi-criteria decision model [81]; however, to date that application 
has not been made in the construction industry and is not considered here. An advanced 
analysis of multi-criteria methods is given by [208]; however, here again, the complexity 
and rigor ofthe decision required heretofore has not required such advanced techniques. 
2.7.1 CM/GC Selections, As Practiced: 
A survey of 19 CMlGC projects shows that public managers generally use simple 
ordinal scoring models to evaluate proposals for construction contractor selection. The 
study found that the selection models used were substantially similar to one another, with 
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the majority of evaluations considering similar common selection criteria [10]. For the 19 
projects surveyed, a total of29 different selection criteria were used. The following Table 
lists various criteria found conunon to several projects: 
Criteria: 0/0 Projects Used Ave. Weight 0/0 
Qualifications of Key Personnel 95 19.2 
Proposed Work Plan 79 14.9 
Company Experience 74 19 
CM/GC Fee 63 12.9 
Ability to Perform 47 24.3 
Value Engineering Capabilities 42 9.5 
Table 2: CM/GC selection criteria used 
While most projects used similar selection criteria, the study was unable to find a 
significant correlation between project type and criteria used for contractor selection, 
meaning that the selections appeared not to reflect the particular challenges of the specific 
project, but were more generally looking for a "good" contractor. One of the problems 
with this approach is that it sets fixed weights in the determination of a "good" contractor 
and how a project should be managed. (For instance, if a specific weight is given to safety, 
the model is prescribing a certain amount of management attention be given to safety as 
opposed to quality ofwork or reducing costs.) 
For some projects the actual judges scoring sheets were obtained, comparing 
specific contractors. An analysis of the scoring showed that various criteria scores were 
highly correlated. A high score on "key personnel," for instance, was found to predict a 
high score on "ability to perform". Likewise, a high score on "experience" predicted a 
high score on "proposed work plan". In addition, and more disturbingly, some judges 
scoring sheets appeared to reflect biases for or against particular contractors. This was 
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evidenced in one instance where a judge gave one contractor extremely low scores (on a 
zero to five scale) for all criteria under consideration while every other judge rated the 
specific contractor the best of the competition. This in effect vetoed the contractor from the 
competition. 
2.7.2 ORS·279.103 Reports and Secretary of State Audits 
In 1997 the Oregon legislature enacted ORS 279.103, which reads as follows: 
279.103 Evaluation of certain public improvement projects not 
contracted by competitive bidding. (1) Upon completion of and final 
payment for any public improvement contract in excess of $100,000 for 
which the public agency did not use the competitive bidding process, 
the public agency shall prepare and deliver to the Director of the 
Oregon Department of Administrative Services or the local contract 
review board an evaluation of the public improvement project. 
(2) The evaluation shall include but not be limited to the following 
matters: 
(a) The actual project cost as compared with original project estimates. 
(b) The amount of any guaranteed maximum price. 
(c) The number of project change orders issued by the public agency. 
(d) A narrative description of successes and failures during the design, 
engineering and construction of the project. 
(e) An objective assessment of the use of the alternative contracting 
process as compared to the findings required by ORS 279.015. 
(3) Evaluations required by this section shall be made available for 
public inspection. 
(4) The evaluations required by this section must be completed within 
30 days of the date that the public agency accepts the public 
improvement project. 
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An evaluation ofall known evaluation reports is included in Appendix F. It is clear 
from our review of the existing reports that public agencies largely ignore both the spirit 
and intent of the statute. While at least 65 CMlGC projects have been completed since 
1997, the total number of reports is fewer than ten. ill fact, while the statute directs public 
agencies to deliver the report to the Oregon Department ofAdministrative Services (DAS), 
no one in DAS, including the director, knew who was supposed to collect these reports and 
where they may be filed. ill fact, no one is specifically tasked to oversee and handle the 
reports. Consequently, few reports are being done, and those that are being done do not 
meet the requirement that they be an "objective assessment" of the project. One done by 
Central Oregon Community College (COCC) barely meets the requirements of the statute 
by simply repeating verbatim the language in the exemption order in the affirmative. 
The Oregon Secretary of States' Audit Division has audited several CMlGC 
projects, including the major prison projects and the library at Oregon State University 
(OSU). One audit found that the CMlGC contractor had over charged the state and or 
misspent millions of dollars on their project. None of these facts were included in the 
Department of Corrections (DOC) evaluation reports, which raise questions about the 
objectivity ofthese assessments. 
There is no evaluation report on the OSU library project to compare to the state's 
audit because the Oregon University System (OUS) and its member institutions have since 
become exempt from n10st parts ofChapter 279, including section 103. 
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2.8 Prior PDS Research 
Sanvido and Koncher [183], working for the Construction Industry Institute (ClI), 
perfonned what appears to be the only comprehensive studies that compare project 
outcomes on the basis ofPDS. Their study was based on data from crr members and was 
heavily weighted toward private industry with very few building projects, and fewer still 
public building projects. The data used in [183] was also used in [126] and [75] (in fact 
[183] is a summary report of [75]), and Vanden Bosch's presentation at the fall 1999 
Northwest Construction Consumer Council [210] appears also to be based on the same 
dat~. 
These reports all concluded that Design-Build (DB) was superior to CMlGC 
(which they call CM@ Risk, CM@R and CMR at different times) and both are superior to 
Design-Bid-Build (DBB). But these conclusions are based on weak analytical foundations. 
The principal statistical comparisons for cost and schedule growth are not statistically 
significant. Their "Construction Speed" and "Delivery Speed" statistics are significant but 
have little meaning in this context because speed is related to fast-tracking, and DBB 
projects are by definition not fast-tracked. The comparison is akin to comparing marathon 
runners against milers and then both against sprinters on the basis of how long their races 
take to run and finding sprinters superior because they finish in a shorter amount of time 
than either milers or marathoners! Furthennore, no data is presented and the statistical 
analysis does not include the variance or standard deviations of the data. In the Cost and 
Schedule Growth comparisons the reports compare medians because that method reduces 
the effect of outliers, but they fail to point out that the DB projects appear to have greatest 
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range of outcomes, both over and under budget, which presents the greatest total risk. In 
addition, they also fail to point out that 75% of both the CMlGC and DB projects 
experienced cost growth; yet they make a point of stating that 900/0 of the DBB projects 
experienced cost growth. 
Sanvido and Konchar [183] also compared the PDSs' on the basis of "Quality" 
perhaps in part because DB projects have historically been thought of as delivering lower 
quality results. They conclude that: 
"It is clear from these results that design-build projects achieved equal 
if not better quality results than other projects studied. In particular, 
design-build offered significantly better quality results than design-bid­
build in all categories except that of interior space and layout. Oesign­
build significantly outperformed construction management at risk in only 
one area, operation and maintenance cost." 
But in fact the differences were quite small and there is no statistical data to show 
that the differences were statistically significant, in spite of the statement above. More 
importantly, however, is what Sanvido and Knochar [183] actually measured. Instead of 
using an objective measure, such as the "number of punch list items" or "dollar volume of 
warranty work," they asked owners to rate the quality on a relative scale: "perceived actual 
quality" compared with the "level ofquality expected." This meant that if the owner had a 
low expectation of project quality and the project turned out only half as bad as expected, 
he'd rate it quite high. However, if the project was expected to be the highest possible 
quality, the highest score that the proj ect could achieve is "as expected" (a 5 on the 10 point 
scale used) and from there, the scores can only go down. The conclusion that the DB 
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projects deliver higher quality based on this test is misleading because they simply did not 
measure "Quality." 
Gordon [101] and the Construction Engineering Management Program at OSU 
[56] have provided guides on how to select a PDS and Mulvey [150] has provided "A 
Contractor's Assessment" of project delivery trends, but there are no other analytical 
comparisons of PDS' s based on project perfonnance in the literature. The crr has 
perfonned benchmarking studies [207], but the most recent study [51] did not include any 
reference to PDS. 
In another study, Henry and Brothers [108] compared DBB projects with indefinite 
delivery indefinite quantity (IDIQ) contracts used by the US Air Force under a system 
I 
called SABER. However, these projects were all under $1 million and generally were in 
the $10,000 to $100,000 range, and often were small repair projects like Repair Latrine, 
Repair Showers and so on. Results from [108] are not comparable to this research. 
2.9 	 Benchmarking 
Benchmarking is a relatively new discipline, having been fonnalized at the Xerox 
Corporation by Robert C. Camp in the early 1980's and only brought into the academic 
literature in the late 1980's and early 1990's [194, 213]. Since that time, the field has 
grown rapidly and touched nearly every industry, including the construction industry. 
Organizations like the Associated General Contractors and American Building Contractors, 
routinely offer courses in Total Quality Management in construction that include 
benchmarking. The Construction Industry Institute located at the University of Texas, 
Austin, has made benchmarking one 	of their major areas of interest [207]. Jackson, 
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Stafford and Swart [113] provide a bibliography ofbenchmarking books and papers, with a 
particular emphasis on the construction industry. Various others have used benchmarking 
techniques to analyze client satisfaction [4], the effectiveness ofpre-project planning [103] 
and other applications [89, 130, 151]. 
The most intensive attempt to apply benchmarking in the construction industry has 
come from the Construction Industry Institute. Their study was of 203 projects from 22 
owner companies and 25 contractor companies, for a total construction volume of 
approximately $11.5 billion [207]. This study focused on es~blishing "Best Practices" in 
the industry, such as "team building," "constructability," "safety," and "pre-project 
planning." The analysis in the regression model used project scores (on 'these metrics) as 
the dependent variable and "cost growth," "schedule performance," and "safety 
performance" metric scores. Unfortunately, many of these regressions account for a small 
portion of the variance in the data, with adjusted R2 rarely greater 'than 25%, and in several 
cases, in the range of 10%-14% and lower. In some fields Adjusted R2,s of this magnitude 
are acceptable; however, in the public policy making environment on construction 
spending, where billions of taxpayer dollars are at stake, a decision based on a course of 
action that only accounts for 10% ofthe variance ofthe outcomes maybe hard to justify. 
2.10 Benchmarking in the Construction Industry 
Benchmarking in the construction industry began in the early 1990's as an adjunct 
to Total Quality Management programs [89], and as one means to improve the contractor's 
standing with their principal customer, owners [44]. The Associated General Contractors 
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ofAmerica (AGC), the construction industries' trade association, defined Benchmarking in 
a 1992 educational report as follows [3]: 
Formal benchmarking is the relatively new practice of identifying other 
companies, which have mastered a process and are world-class 
performers worthy of imitation. It has been described as "finding and 
implementing best practices." This business concept simply suggests 
that you look around and find success stories and learn from others. 
In one report by AGe [3], they stated that the construction industry "has lagged 
behind other industries in implementing TQM." However, they continued, "part of that is 
the perception that TQM is for manufacturing only." Other authors [34, 160] have seen the 
situation in more dire terms, noting that, "the construction industry is still characterized by 
low productivity, fragmentation, divided responsibility, and conflicting objectives." Since 
then, several researchers have proposed models and nletrics for evaluating and improving 
construction project performance. 
Fisher [89] proposed quality management in the construction industry using the 
following measures to be benchmarked in the construction process: 
Actual versus authorized costs 
Schedule: actual versus estimated 
Scope changes 
Engineering rework 
Construction labor: actual versus estimated 
Field rework 
Worker-hours per drawing 
Project cost distribution 
Field defects 
Percent of rejected welds 
The metrics used in the cn Benclnnarking study by Tucker [207] included the 
following "critical few metrics:" 
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Cost Perfornlance 

Budget factor 

Cost growth 

Phase cost factor 

Schedule Performance 

Schedule factor 

Schedule growth 

Phase duration factor 

Safety Performance 

Recordable Incident Rate (RIR) 

Lost Workday Case Incident Rate (LWCIR) 

In more recent versions by the ClI, including the 2001 Benchmarking Report [51], 
the organization has focused on the basic cost and schedule growth performance metrics 
and is no longer providing the regression analysis that was part oftheir 1997 study. 
Ahmed and Kangari [4] list the following factors in their benchmarking study of 
"Client-Satisfaction Factors in the Construction Industry:" 
Time 

CI ient orientation 

Communication 

Cost 

Response to complaints 

Quality 

Tam and Harris [199] propose a model for assessing past building contractor 
performance and predicting future performance using mUltiple regression techniques. This 
model was quite complex and included the following factors: 
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Internal Factors 
Staff training program 
Plant ownership policy 
Size of the company 
Quality of the management team - professional qualifications 
Quality performance of the project manager 
Past performance of the project manager 
Contractor's experience in the type of job 
. Contractor's workload 
Contractors past performance or image 
Number of years in business 
Origin of the company (domestic or foreign) 
Amount of directly employed labor 
Listed on the stock market 
Decision making centralized in head office of de-centralized to the site 
Contractor is client's subsidiary firm 
External Factors 
The architect/engineer 
Architects of client's supervision and control of the quality of the work 
progress 
Punctuality of payment by the client 
Complexity of the project 
P rofita bility 
Jackson, Safford and Swart [113] provide a bibliography of "Current 
Benchmarking Literature," which appeared in a construction industry journal; however, it 
had no specific emphasis on the construction industry. Lema [137] gives a background 
perspective of benchmarking in the construction industry. Other construction industry 
applications include Kumaraswamy's [130] evaluation of mega-project performance, 
Hamilton's [103] benchmarking evaluation of pre-project planning and Munns and 
Ahmed's [4, 151] evaluations of project stakeholder relationships. Finally, Edwards [86] 
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presents a guide to evaluating contractors past performance on federal projects, which is 
also considered by Nash and Cibinic [50, 155]. 
Chua et ai. [48] studied critical success factors for construction projects, which 
built on the earlier and broader strategic factors considered by Sanvido et ai. [182] and 
conceptual project management success factors ofPinto and Selvin [162]. Chua et al. [48] 
used a three level Analytic Hierarchy Process model that included 67 separate "success­
related factors" in four broad "project aspects" that included: project characteristics, 
contractual arrangements, project participants and interactive processes. These four project 
aspects contributed to: budget performance, schedule performance, and quality 
performance. Ultimately these three measures contribute to project success. Cheng, Li and 
Love provide "Objective Measures ofPartnering Outcomes" in [46] that include: 
Cost -effectiveness 

Quality 

Schedule 

Scope of work 

Profit 

Construction process (which includes safety and rework) 

And, Others (which includes litigation) 

ill a separate benchmarking study, Brunso, et al. [33] used benchmarks: cost 
growth, schedule growth, and performance evaluations (quality) to benchmark project 
performance. 
Gordon evaluates success factors differently in [101] by considering different 
"project drivers," such as the need for fast-tracking and allocations of risk, to select an 
appropriate project delivery system. 
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These benchmarking metrics, project success factors, and project drivers provide a 
starting point for our analysis ofconstruction project performance. However, it is clear that 
with the large number of attributes in some studies, and sn1all number in others, that there 
is not universal agreement on how to measure construction project performance nor is there 
agreement on which are the most important. Separating out the most important metrics and 
factors from those ofless importance will be an important aspect ofthe research at hand. 
2.11 The Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) Methodology 
DEA is widely used as a benchmarking tool in practice [19]. Its use is owed to the 
fact that DEA was developed as a tool to compare the efficiencies based on multiple inputs 
and outputs. The principal result of a DEA study yields efficiency scores, performance 
targets and criteria weighting schemes that are ideal for use in analyzing performance of 
specific operating units (defined in DEA as ,DMUs for Decision Making Units [42] - in the 
present research, construction "projects" are'the DMVs). 
2.11.1 Development of DEA 
Charnes et al. [42] originally devised DEA as a method to derive relative 
efficiencies of different organizations or activities using multiple inputs and multiple 
outputs. The focus on comparative efficiency using multiple inputs and outputs was 
generated by the desire to measure factors other than financial performance. Early on, the 
methodology was thought to be particularly valuable in measuring public sector 
performance and other non-money-generating activities, since DEA can readily compare 
financial as well as non-fmancial data [42] (and combinations thereof [41 , 200]). 
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Chames, Cooper and Rhodes' original work [42], and Rhodes' dissertation research 
in the education field26, were extensions of earlier single-input, single-output analysis by 
Farrell [88], and other methodological developments by Debreu [72], Koopmans [128] and 
others, including Chames [38]. Seiford [186, 187], in tracing the evolution ofDE A, found 
methodological formulations greatly similar to modem DEA, as far back as 1966.27 
According to Seiford, the intent ofthese earlier papers was to: 
"(1) Summarize Farrell's ideas; (2) provide LP formulations and efficient 
computational procedures for a variety of problems in technical 
efficiency including the multiple-output case; and give illustrative 
applications to (3) steam-electric generating plants and (4) aggregate 
census data." 
However, from 1966 until 1978, the field of multiple attribute efficiency analysis, 
what is now DEA, went into a dormant phase until, Chames, Cooper and Rhodes [42] 
brought the term Data Envelopment Analysis or D EA into the literature. In addition, they 
introduced another common DEA term: Decision Making Unit or DMU, to describe the 
different entities in the analysis. DMUs are the basic itenl being compared in the DEA 
model and have included: schools, banks, hospitals, and even professional baseball players. 
(However, before the current research, construction projects have not been used as DMUs 
in aDEA study.) 
26 The basis for which was laid in [43], as reported in [186, 187]. 

27 Seiford references the "Proceedings ofthe 3f1h Annual Meeting ofthe Western Farm Economics 

Association, " where four papers recalling "Farrell's approach" to measuring technical efficiency were 

presented. 
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2.11.2 History and Background 
The history and development ofDEA has been documented by both Seiford [187] 
and Tavares [200], with bibliographies now stretching in excess of 3,200 citations. In 
brief, however, the five-year period following [42] witnessed a rapid expansion in the use 
ofDEA to evaluate efficiency. This work was predominately in the education field [24-28, 
40, 43, 164, 165, 195], medical field [14, 156, 190, 191] and other public sector and non-
income producing activities [30, 39, 40, 52, 74, 140]. These early applications fostered a 
broad acceptance of DEA as an Operations ResearchiManagement Science tool in the 
academic community. 
2.11.3 Mathematical Development of DEA 
The original fonnulation of DEA proposed to measure the efficiency of any 
Decision Making Unit or DMU, "as the maximum of a ratio of weighted outputs to 
weighted inputs subject to the condition that the similar ratios for every DMU be less than 
or equal to unity." This "Ratio" model is expressed mathematically, in the fonn of: 
s 
LUrYr,Q 
Max H 0 : -,-r:,-=-1 ­
"v.x· oL..J I,1 
i=1 
s 
LUrYr,j 
. r=l < 1 \-I' - 1S•••T m - V) - ...n (2.2) 
"v.x..L...J l,Jl 
;=1 
Ur ' Vi ~ 0; r =I. ..,S; i =1, ...,m.. 
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In the model, the xij, Ytj, are the known inputs and outputs of the jth DMU and the 
ur's and Vi'S are the variable (or criteria) weights to be determined by the solution of the 
linear program. That is, DEA allows each DMUo, the specific DMU under consideration, 
to pick the weighting scheme that maximizes its efficiency score relative to all other 
DMUs, subject to the constraint that any other DMU, with an identical weighting scheme, 
cannot achieve an efficiency score greater than 1. 
This formulation is non-linear; the linearization occurs by multiplying out the 
denominator ofeach inequality constraint and by adding a normalizing constraint (equation 
2.3 below) to eliminate the ratio in the objective fimction. For details see [8]. 
m 
LVjXiO =1 (2.3) 
;=1 
This addition yields the following formulations: 
r=1 
m 
S.T. : L VjXW =1 
;=1 (2.4) 
s mLUrYrj ~L Vjxij Vj = 1, ... ,n; 
r=1 ;=1 
Ur , Vi 2:: 0; r =I. .. ,S; i =1, ... ,m. 
This formulation has been shown to be the linear programming "Dual" ofwhat has 
become known as the input oriented CCR envelopment model formulation: 
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Min: () 
n 
S.T.: LYr,jAj ~Yr,o r=l, ... ,s; (2.5) 
j=1 
n 
" x....1. ::;; {)x. 0
.i..J I,j j I, i = I, ...m; 
j=l 
Its complement, the output oriented CCR fonnulation, is given by: 
Max: tjJ 
n 
S.T.: LX;,jAj ::;; x;,o i =I, ... m 
j=] (2.6)
n 
LYr,jAj ~ tjJYr,o r = I, ... s 
j=l 
The variable A in these fonnulations is the vector of linear combinations ofefficient 
DMUs used to construct the ''virtual'' efficient DMU for an inefficient DMUo under 
consideration. 
The virtual targets resulting from DEA reveal pathways for improvement of the 
DMU under consideration to reach relative efficiency (i.e., reach the efficiency frontier). 
Figure 3 below depicts a one input two output, two-dimensional model. In this case the 
outputs are identified as only "Output Y 1" and "Output Y 2," and for the purposes of this 
example all of the inputs are assumed to be 1.0. Note the line denoted as the "Efficiency 
Frontier," which in this example is created by two DMUs. The DMU under consideration, 
DMUo, is not on the efficiency frontier, therefore DMUo is technically inefficient. The 
"virtual target" for DMUoor "virtual DMU" is where DMUo would intersect the efficiency 
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frontier using its current strategy of producing outputs in tenns of the ratio of output X to 
output Y. This can be visualized in a two output DEA model shown below in Figure 3: 
Efficiency Frontier 
o 
o 
N 
>­
---.......----- Virtual for DMUo 
Output Y1 
Figure 3: Example of a Virtual DMU in a two-dimensional DEA model 
The A vector for DMUo is made up of the linear combination of the only two 
efficient DMUs in this example. The efficiency of DMUo in the above example can be 
calculated as the ratio of the distance from the origin to DMUo, to the distance from the 
origin to the virtual DMU located on the efficiency frontier. 
In a constant returns to scale (CRS) DEA model, both input and output oriented 
models will give the same results (however, they will be reciprocals of one another). This 
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is not true with all other DEA models such as Banker, Chames and Cooper's [17] variable 
returns to scale (VRS) method. 
2.11.4 Extensions of DEA 
The original DEA model has been extended to allow for scale differences, to 
incorporate judgment, and recently to accommodate missing and imprecise data. Banker et 
al. [14, 17] first provided a method for comparing DMUs that were on vastly different 
scales (such as comparing a large "box" store like Home Depot or Costco in the same set 
as a small convenience store like a 7-11). The method, termed BCC (for Banker, Chames 
and Cooper, the authors) results in a variable returns to scale or VRS model. 
The next major contribution was the incorporation of judgment in the form of 
weight restrictions. That is, restricting the amount ofweight, the magnitude ofur's and vi's 
in the model. This was originally brought into the DEA literature by Dyson et al. [84]. 
Roll et al. [167], Golany [98], Cook et al. [57-59], Ali et al. [6] and others provided 
extensions to this work that included the incorporation of weak and strong ordinal 
relationships. Thompson et al. [205] added the concept of "Assurance Regions" through 
multiplier bounds, and Wong and Beasley [223] formulated relative upper and lower 
bounds for inputs and outputs. Finally Allen et al. [7] provided a method for overcoming 
the problem of weakly efficient DMU by the addition of non-observed DMUs in the data 
set. 
The preceding methods essentially limit or place boundaries on the basic DEA 
model. One of the reasons for implementing these methods is that the data or information 
may in fact be imprecise. Cooper et al. [62] was the first to publish a study with the term 
62 
"imprecise" in the title; however, Golany [97] and others [61, 111, 141, 158] have studied 
"chance constrained" and "stochastic information" models since 1985. Cooper et al. 's [62] 
work expanded on the earlier methods, generalizing them for bounded imprecise inputs and 
outputs in the presence of assurance regions or AR-IDEA (Assurance Region hnprecise 
Data Envelopment Analysis). The basic problem Cooper et al. [62] addressed is the fact 
that the underlying assumption in DEA that all the data are in the form of specific 
numerical values is simply not always true. Some data may only be known to be bounded 
within some range, while other data may be ordinal: good, better, best, for example, where 
we know that best> better> good, but we don't know how much difference there is. Still 
other data may be known only to exist between certain bounds, such as: USDOT gas 
mileage evaluations for certain types of automobiles: city driving the auto should get 
between 15 mpg and 18 mpg, and freeway driving the same auto is expected to get 
between 20 mpg and 24 mpg. Cooper et al. [62] used scale transformations and variable 
alterations to linearize the resulting IDEA model in the presence of ordinal and bounded 
information. This work was expanded in [63] using a dummy variable, the Column 
Maximum DMU or CMD. 
Zhu [225] maintained that when weight restrictions are present, the reSUlting model 
in [62] remains non-linear. "Consequently, some of the efficiency results ... need to be 
revised." (This observation was in fact acknowledged in [62] and again by the same 
authors in [63].) In [225] Zhu gives a different method for incorporating imprecise method 
by converting bounded, weak ordinal, strong ordinal and ratio bounded data into exact 
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data. Finally, Zhu shows that certain weight restrictions are "redundant and can be 
removed" in his transformed model. 
These methods allow a researcher to incorporate data that may only be known 
within a certain range and both weak and strong ordinal preference structures. However, 
the fact that data may only be known to exist within certain bounds, such as the USDOT 
gas mileage estimates, in reality, a specific automobile will achieve a specific rating. 
Another method for evaluating bounded imprecise data, proposed by Anderson and 
Williams [9], is to evaluate DMUs for their worst and best possible efficiency ratings by 
simply comparing each individual DMU under four alternative formulations: 
Max DMUo Max DMUj V i ¢O Optimistic Structure 
Max DMUo Min DMUj V i ¢O Benevolent Structure (yields.highest 
rating) 
Min DMUo Max DMUj V i ¢O Malevolent Structure (yields lowest 
rating) 
Min DMUo Min DMUj V i ¢O Pessimistic Structure 
Table 3: Imprecise Formulations by Anderson and Williams [9] 
The terms Max DMUo and i and Min DMUoand i are rules to maximize and minimize 
the DMU data where missing data are present. For example, in the case ofMax DMUO, if 
DMUo is missing an output datum, the missing datum would be replaced with the 
maximum amount found in the peer group. If DMUo is missing an input datum, the 
missing datum would be replaced with the minimum amount found in the peer group, 
thereby maximizing the DEA score for DMUo. 
In the "Optimistic" formulation, all DMUs are given the benefit of the doubt, and 
when data is missing, the missing metric is replaced with the best data for that metric (the 
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largest nun1ber output and minimum number of input) for each found in the peer data set. 
This fonnulation assumes that all DMUs do the best possible in all missing data metrics. 
In the "Benevolent" fonnulation, DMUo, the DMU under consideration is given the 
"Optimistic" data for all missing data metrics, whereas the comparator DMUs are all given 
the opposite or minimum data for each missing data metric. This fonnulation will result in 
the highest possible score for DMUo because while it assumes DMUo has the maximum 
value for each missing data metric, the comparator DMUs all score the worst possible in 
the missing data metrics. In the Malevolent fonnulation, DMUois given the minimum data 
for each missing data metric, whereas the comparator DMUs are given the maximum. 
This will give the lowest possible score for DMUo and is essentially the opposite of the 
"Benevolent" fonnulation. Finally, the "Pessimistic" fonnulation assumes that when data 
is n1issing, the DMU is assigned the largest possible inputs and the lowest possible output 
data (including zero output.) 
In the case of this research we know from the architect members of the Expert 
Panel that the boundaries of the imprecise inputs are roughly as follows: 
Conceptual Design 10% to 40% 
Schematic Design 300/0 to 700/0 
Preliminary Design 600/0 to 900/0 
Final Design 90% to 100% 
Table 4: Experts Design Classification Ranges 

Which can be represented graphically as in Figure 4 below. 
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10 20 30 40 60 70 80 90 100 
Percent Complete of Plans and Specifications 
Figure 4 Design Stages in Percent Complete of Plans and Specifications 
We can now perfonn a simple one-input one-output example uSIng of the 
imprecise data fonnulation given above, using the data obtained from the Expert Panel and 
assuming a single output of 1.00. Since there is only one input and one output there is no 
need to use the DEA computer model, we simply need to calculate the high and low input 
scores for each DMU under the different conditions (noting that the outputs remain the 
same) as given in Table 5. 
MODEL INPUTS 
DMU Design Completion Low Input High Input Output 
A Conceptual 0.10 0.40 1.00 
B Schematic 0.30 0.70 1.00 
C Preliminary 0.60 0.90 1.00 
0 Final 0.90 1.00 1.00 
Table 5: Example of input-output data for the imprecise model described above 
Next, calculate the efficiency scores by dividing each DMU by the highest DMU 
score . for the specific fonnulation. The benevolent and malevolent fonnulation DEA 
scores for each ofthe DMUs in the example above are given in Table 6: 
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DMU Design Completion 
Best 
Score 
O/llow 
Lowest 
Score 
011 high 
Benevolent 
Efficiency 
Score 
Malevolent 
Efficiency 
Score 
A Conceptual 10.0 2.50 1.00 0.75 
B Schematic 3.33 1.43 1.00 0.14 
C Preliminary 1.67 1.11 0.67 0.11 
0 Final 1.11 1.00 0.44 0.10 
Table 6: DEA scores for DMUs presented above 
We learn from this example that the fonnulation given by Anderson and Williams 
[9] is sensitive to the range of the imprecise data. In this research, the output data is 
constrained to a range ofplus or minus eight to ten percent, an imprecise input must have a 
smaller range in order for this model to have much meaning. Since this is not the case with 
the construction building data, the fonnulation above cannot be used here. 
In addition, the model presented above prescribes a method for comparing DMUs 
when one or more data types is missing entirely. The proposed fonnulation compares 
DMUo which has some missing Xi'S or yr's against the set ofDMUj's also missing the same 
Xi'S or yr's. This is another fonn of the "Benevolent" fonnulation where DMUo is given 
the benefit of the doubt, and whatever the missing Xi'S or yr's may represent, the 
comparator's perfornlance on those metrics are not used against DMUo. Other variations 
suggested by Anderson and Williams [9] include replacing the missing Xi'S or yr's with 
either the minimum or maximum values of those xi's or yr's in the data set. These are 
"Optimistic Benevolent," and "Pessimistic Malevolent" fonnulations consistent with the 
plan are presented in Table 3 above. 
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2.12 	 DEA Compared to Regression Models 
In discussing confidence intervals for efficiency estimates comparing DEA with 
statistical methods like regression, Horrace and Schmidt [110] state that "deterministic 
approaches (e.g., DEA) produce efficiency measures, while statistical approaches produce 
efficiency estimates." By this, they mean that DEA produces a measure of technical 
efficiency that is measured against a virtual target, or efficient producer, that lies on the 
linear production frontier and utilizes the same weighting strategy as the DMU under 
consideration. However, unlike stochastic methods, DEA does not. directly yield an 
estimate of the accuracy of the measurement in terms of confidence limits, which was 
addressed by Horrace and Schmidt [110]. More importantly, the idea of measurement 
accuracy versus statistical estimate is a key difference in benchmarking approaches using 
DEA versus Regression and other statistical methods. 
The virtual targets resulting from DEA reveal pathways for improvement of the 
DMU under consideration to reach relative efficiency (i.e., reach the efficiency frontier). 
Figure 3 above depicted a one input two output, two-dimensional model. In that example 
the outputs are identified as only "Output YI" and "Output Y2," and all of the inputs are 
assumed to be 1.0. 
The virtual DMU tells the analyst what DMUo needs to do to improve the 
efficiency frontier. The distance from DMUo to the efficiency frontier at the virtual DMU 
is also used to calculate the efficiency of DMUo(here DMUo's efficiency is calculated as 
the distance from the origin to DMUo divided by the distance from the origin to the Virtual 
DMU). 
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Figure 3 also illustrates an important difference between D EA and statistical 
methods like regression in that the virtual target is determined by strategy employed by 
DMUo, which may be quite different from the strategy employed by any other DMU. In 
addition, from DEA we can evaluate different strategies that may allow us to reach the 
efficiency frontier. In Figure 3, for instance, DMUo may decide that instead of pursuing 
the current strategy, perhaps he should simply concentrate on increasing one or the other 
outputs (X's or Y's). 
In a construction setting, the project or company manager may determine that she 
should shift her strategy, for example: to pay more attention to quality or safety, perhaps 
even at the expense of cost or schedule performance, . in order to reach the efficiency 
frontier. 
Benchmarking is defined as the "search for industry best practices ..." [137], and 
some of the drawbacks to regression analysis for benchmarking are that: while the factor 
weights are derived from the data, as in DEA, the resulting regression model prescribes 
only one ''best practice." The regression model results in a single linear extrapolation ofall 
the data points, which is used in comparing the performance of individual entities in the 
analysis. 
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Percent Design Complete vs. Cost Growth 
Respondent Class: Owner and Contractor 
Cost Categories: All Industry Group: Hvy. Ind. 
Project Type: Chem. Mfg. & Oil Ref. Project Nature: All 
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Figure 5: Regression of Cost Growth v. %Complete Design (207] 
In Figure 5, the benchmark model for Percent Design Complete vs. Cost Growth 
prescribes only a single trade-off between the two metrics (Cost Growth % = 10.9 - 0.25 x 
Percent Design Complete) that all projects are compared against. DEA allows for a wider 
range of trade-offs between input and output variables, reflecting the wide range of 
strategies practiced by individual organizations. 
Secondly, the ''best practice" linear extrapolation includes in its derivation both the 
best and the worst producers, whereas DEA compares all producers against only the best. 
By including poor perfonners so intimately in the model, the benchmark is inherently 
weaker. To say that a project performed above the benchmark line in Figure 5 is merely 
saying that the project beat out half its competitor's! In DEA, the statement that the project 
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perfonns at or near an efficiency of 1.0 means that the projects is clearly perfonning at the 
top or near the top of all competitors in the analysis. These are vastly different statements 
about project perfonnance. 
Finally, as seen in Figure 5 below, from a crr benchmarking study [207], these 
methods fail to account for a significant differences in perfonnance. That is, the adjusted 
R2 in several cases was very low, on the order of 13% as shown in Figure 5, with a wide 
and unexplained variation in data points. According to Givens [95] this problem is a great 
concern of the Construction Industry Institute and has caused them to rethink their 
benchmarking approach. 
2.12.1 DEA Compared with other Production Efficiency Measuring Methods 
Linear regression models are not the only methods used to evaluate efficiency; they 
are perhaps the most widely used, and particularly in construction industry benchmarking 
studies in the literature [3,4, 199,207]. The second most commonly used methodology for 
benchmarking in the construction industry involves presentation of simple statistics of the 
base data such as histograms [89] and box plots [103]. Others have used fixed weight 
functions [130], correlation analysis [12], and ANOVA [4] to further analyze construction 
industry data. However, each of these methods has drawbacks with respect to the goals of 
benchmarking and estimating production efficiency, the principal drawback being that the 
poor perfonners have the same influence on the models as the best perfonners do. DEA on 
the other hand does not suffer from this problem, nor is DEA susceptible to problems with 
covariant metrics in the model because they have no effect on a DMU's technical 
efficiency score. 
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As noted above, since benchmarking is the "search for industry best practices ..." 
[137], the best way to do so is to compare the entity under consideration against the best 
performer [89]. By contrast, statistical methods generally include all performers, the best 
as well as the worst, in the analysis as discussed in 2.12 above. This inclusion of poor 
performers in the analysis is likely to cause the model to underestimate the production 
efficiency of high performers and overestimate the efficiency of low performers. Also, 
Thanassoulis [202] found that DBA did a better job of estimating production efficiency 
than regression models; however, he also found that "regression analysis offers greater 
stability ofaccuracy." 
As a method for estimating relative production efficiency among different 
producers, DBA has been found to be superior to other multi-variate techniques [16, 18]. 
These studies utilized simulated data from underlying stochastic production fimctions and 
tested DBA against Corrected Ordinary Least Squares (COLS) analysis for different 
sample sizes and five different production functions. They found that "DBA performs 
better for all non-classical inefficiency estimates, even with relative high measurement 
errors" and "DBA provides sutprisingly accurate estimates for the snlall sample sizes for 
all cases in the experiment" [18]. DBA was further compared against more common Ratio 
Analysis tools for performance measures (such as financial ratios) and DBA was found to. 
be superior for setting targets for improving performance of operating units [203], which is 
in essence what benchmarking concerns itself with. 
Simulation was used as a data generating process for testing relative performance 
of DBA and regression techniques by Banker et al. in two separate studies [16, 18]. 
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Simulation is a technique that could be used in benchmarking studies if the underlying 
production functions were well understood. Unfortunately, the process of management 
decision making on construction projects is not known in the rich detail required for 
simulation. Furthermore, the structure of the contract or contracting method, the specific 
nature of the project and the demands of the owner will influence the behavior of the 
managers and decision-makers, making the process extremely difficult to model. DEA, by 
contrast, evaluates the ex -post decision-making and management processes. 
2.12.2 Current DEA Application Areas 
As noted earlier, Seiford [186] and Tavares [200] have traced the evolution ofDE A 
and provided comprehensive bibliographies of DEA papers. Tavares [200], which is the 
more recent and includes papers presented at conferences as well as research publications, 
books and dissertations, contains more than 3,200 individual entries. In addition, [200] 
includes both author and key word statistics. The keyword section documents the DEA 
applications in the various industries, organizations and economic sectors. The 
construction and building industry applications are limited to just a handful of citations 
including building sector research [184], road construction vehicle management [109, 157] 
and nuclear power plant construction times [189]. None of these applications proposes to 
evaluate construction contractor efficiency or performance benclunarking. None of the 
references in [200] appear to be applications of construction contractor performance 
evaluation. Only one paper is listed with the key word "competitive bidding" (a paper that 
deals with electrical utility contracts in Japan) and another under ''bidding'' (a paper 
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entitled "Bidding Efficiencies for rights to car ownership in Singapore"), neither of which 
are construction related studies. 
This study is the first application of DEA to construction project perfOlmance. 
Furthermore, while the vendor selection references cited above do present certain 
similarities to this proposed study, [214] is situated in the JIT manufacturing environment 
and [122] is an application of technology selection in the high-technology sector. 
However, it is interesting to note that in one application by Weber [214] on vendor 
selection in manufacturing, the principal factors considered in the study were price, quality 
and delivery time, which are consistent with those used to measure construction project 
performance in several studies, as noted above. 
2.13 Statistical Methods Using DEA 
Statistical validation and hypothesis tests using DEA efficiency scores has been an 
area of interest within the DEA literature for some time [15]. This is perhaps an obvious 
concern, given that efficiency scores (in the input oriented case) vary from 0 to 1.0 and 
therefore cannot be normally distributed and in fact have been found to be "significantly 
non-normal" [188]. Some, like Gong and Sickles (100], have even labeled DEA to be 
"non-statistica1." However, [15] surveys the literature concerning the evolution of 
statistical methods in DEA and develops an inefficiency estimator that can be used to 
construct statistical tests. Other researchers have simply accepted the fact that DEA 
produces non-normal distributions and apply ordinary least square (OLS) regression 
methods to the data using a dummy variable [188]. 
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2.14 Non-parametric Comparison Methods 
Since DEA is a non-parametric method that produces results that are not normally 
distributed, this research will use non-parametric methods to compare the DEA model 
efficiency score results. 
Non-parametric methods were devised to provide statistical tests for non-normally 
distributed and more generally, distribution-free populations [77]. 
The Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney rank sum method tests if two random samples taken 
from populations that are not normally distributed could have come from populations with 
the same median [78]. The Kruskall-Wallis rank sum method tests ifK random samples 
could have come from K populations with the same median. These methods could be used 
to test hypotheses that the two sets of projects are drawn from different populations by 
using the mean ofone group to test the other. 
The Speannan rank correlation test IS a method used "to investigate the 
significance of the correlation between two series of observations obtained in pairs" [120]. 
In this method, observations obtained in pairs, Xi and yi, are assigned rank numbers 1,2, ... 
n in order of increasing magnitude. The differences in the rank numbers of the pairs are 
then used to produce a test statistic (either Z for n ~ 10 or r, otherwise) that can be used to 
determine the significance ofthe correlation between the two groups. The limitation to this 
method is that it also assumes that the groups are drawn from continuous distributions and 
that the observations are taken in pairs. These limitations also hold true for the Kendall 
rank correlation test (paired observations) [120]. 
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The limitation that the groups of observations are drawn from continuous 
populations is not necessarily a fatal flaw that voids their potential use; in fact, DEA does 
produce continuous population results that are bounded by 0 and 1. Several researchers 
have used statistical methods with much stronger assumptions of normality in DEA 
analysis as noted in Section 2.13 above. The important point is that we need to understand 
and deal with the effect of discarding the continuous and non-normality assumptions. 
These effects are generally that the confidence intervals will differ from the nominal levels 
specified in the analysis [77]. We acknowledge this to be the case and may have to set 
higher than normal confidence limits in order to justify rejecting hypotheses based on these 
tests. 
2.15 Multiple Perspectives and Stakeholder Analysis 
Section 2.12.1, states that the construction management decision making process is 
not known in rich and sufficient detail to allow us to simulate the production process or 
prescribe a production function (or set of production functions) to evaluate project 
efficiency. However, this is not an uncommon problem as Linstone [142] points out: 
Decision making inherently involves organizations and individuals, 
whose perspectives are very different from those of "rational" system 
analysts. 
In order to understand the decision making process, Linstone recommends going 
beyond the technical perspective that our quantitative models help us to understand and 
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evaluate also personal and organizational influences that weight in the management and 
decision-making processes. 
Jones [116] states that the essential premises stakeholder theory is as follows: 
• 	 the [public contracting agency] has relationships with many constituent 
groups ("stakeholders") that affect and are affected by its decisions; 
• 	 the theory is concemed with the nature of these relationships in of both 
process and outcomes for the [agency] and its stakeholders; 
• 	 the interests of all (legitimate) stakeholders have intrinsic value, and 
one set of interests is assumed to dominate the others; 
• 	 the theory focuses on managerial decision makin.g. 
Construction projects affect and are affected by a number of stakeholders both 
directly and indirectly. These include contractors, subcontractors, designers, politicians, 
bureaucrats, and the public taxpayer to name a few. The managerial choice ofwhich PDS 
to use on a specific project, while guided by statute, is a managerial decision that has 
consequences for the stakeholders. The attitudes and opinions expressed by the 
stakeholders (by effective lobbying) can impact the agencies' decisions, and regardless, 
their interests as they see them "have intrinsic value," especially when reconciling the data 
analysis with the actual decisions made. 
It is clear that the choice ofPDS may be influenced by personal preferences as well 
as organizational and stakeholder pressures and in spite of the fact that the statutory 
construction requires cost to be the major (essentially only) decision factor. For example, a 
construction manager for a public agency might have significant organizational pressure to 
avoid conflicts or litigation, and therefore may choose CMlGC rather than a DBB on the 
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belief that it will result in fewer claims. Also, it is possible that personal attitudes and 
biases can affect contractor selection method choice, in particular, the desire to hire or veto 
participation by one or more specific contractors. 
Eliciting honest perspectives from the project players is difficult [13], particUlarly 
in this situation because public managers may have reasonable fears that disgruntled 
contractors would use any information about a selection process to discredit the official and 
overturn a selection decision or even sue the official under Oregon law. Furthermore, one 
Expert actually stated that his company's main concern was making sure that the option to 
use CM/GC as a PDS on public projects remain available to public agencies, pretty much 
regardless of the data indicates, because they believed in the process and believed that it 
resulted in better projects, regardless ofwhat the data analysis shows. Another stakeholder 
noted that the principal benefit ofnegotiated procurements is that they don't have to work 
with people they don't like. 
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3 Research Design and Data Collection 
In this chapter we discuss the research design and data collection required to 
address the principal research questions: is one PDS superior to the other, and if so, under 
what circumstances. We document the many steps and many of the challenges that were 
encountered both internally. and externally while trying to extract the proper information 
for that part ofour analysis. The data collection for the stakeholder and project comparison 
research questions is contained in their respective chapters. 
3.1 	 Research Models 
The first order of business is to agree on a basic model that can be constructed to 
test the research questions. DEA was chosen as the methodology for this study because 
DEA allows for a wide variety of inputs and outputs of a system and assumes no specific 
method for transforming inputs into outputs. Therefore, the model for construction project 
management is a process of taking inputs or resources and managing them to produce 
outputs. Chua [47] proposes a similar model for management decision making in the 
construction bid market, where the inputs are both external and internal factors, and the 
output is the bid markup_ Chua [47] lists 51 possible input factors in his model some of 
which were selected by the Expert Panel in the model proposed used in this research. 
3.1.1 	 Contract Information Model 
The diagram in Figure 6 shows inputs on the left side and outputs on the right. 
Inputs can include a number of things such as resources and information. The public 
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construction industry uses a legal construct that assumes that all the infonnation necessary 
to bid a project is contained in the plans and specifications supplied by the owner [175] at 
page 11-32 (along with common general knowledge of the project site, the owner, the 
designer, and weather patterns during the course of the project). The applicable 
competitive bidding theory assumes that the various bidders have the same infonnation 
upon which to base their bids, and that the actual true project costs will likewise be 
equivalent. It is generally assumed for the purposes of theoretical analysis that this 
infonnation is generally symmetric, that is that all bidders have access to the same 
infonnation prior to bidding, but this is only partly true. Some bidders will know the owner 
agency and its management style better, while others may have personal experience with 
the site or the designer. In any case, for the purposes ofthis discussion, we assume that the 
infonnation presented to a contractor at the time of developing his contract price for the 
different PDSs can be thought ofas depicted below. 
DEA Model Input 
Figure 6: DEA Construction Project Management Sequence Diagram 
Figure 7 thorough Figure 10 depict different theoretical sets of infonnation in the 
public construction contracting environment. 
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COMPLETE INFORMATION 

Figure 7: Complete Information for a Prospective Project 
STATE OF Information provided by the Owner NATURE 
Theoretical Contract Model 
Figure 8: Theoretical Information Models as a basis for Contract Price 
STA-rE OF Information provided by the Owner NATURE 
Competitive Bid Contract Model 
Figure 9: Competitive Bid Model as Experienced in Practice 
Information provided by STATE OF 
the Owner NATURE 
Negotiated Procurement Contract Model 
Figure 10: Negotiated Procurement Contract Model 
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The amount ofinformation available to a construction contractor at the time pricing 
or selection is required is never complete. Figure 7 indicates complete information, which 
includes knowledge of future states of nature as well as no errors in interpretation of the 
data by the contractor; clearly, this ideal is never achieved. 
Figure 8 depicts the theoretical DBB competitive bid model of information upon 
which virtually all contracts and construction law are based. It provides that the basis for 
all competitive contracts or scope of work for all competitive contracts is based solely on 
information provided by the owner (typically by and through their consultant architects and 
engineers) and the State ofNature (SON). The SON concept is based on an acceptable or 
typical performance of the SON, usually meaning the ''weather'' but also includes such 
things as normally expected underground and hidden conditions. The amount of 
information regarding the SON can be increased by expending time, effort and funds to 
make better predictions about the SON, such as paying for the consultants to perform 
underground soils investigations. This will reduce the size of the SON arrow since is 
reduces the unknown portion of the SON with known "information." But some SON's, in 
particular the weather far off in the future, are outside the bounds ofinvestigation, which in 
particular affects long term projects that are the subject of this study. The standard in the 
construction industry is to use the "average" SON as a benchmark for what the bidders 
should expect to encounter. Only if the actual SON of the weather is abnormally adverse 
will there be an amendment to the contract. 
Figure 9, the "Competitive Bid Contract Model," more accurately reflects the 
actual state of information in the competitive contract method, where the actual 
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information provided at the time of pricing is less than complete information, by both the 
SON and "Errors and Omissions" in the information provided by the owner. This leads to 
the contractual provisions in most construction contracts that allow for amendments to the 
contract based on errors or omissions. 
Figure lOis the CMlGC model where the amount of information presented at the 
time of selection or pricing is admittedly less than complete than that which is provided in 
the DBB model. This model recognizes the construction contractor's ability to exercise 
judgment and requires him to fill in the gaps between the amount of information given and 
what is required to derive a contract price. The owner is able to reduce the amount of 
information required at the time the price is agreed on directly proportional to the increase 
in information supplied by the CMlGC contractor. However, in order to obtain Building 
Permits and Certificates of Occupancy from local building officials, the plans and 
specifications for the building under this model must still meet the rigorous standards set 
by the building code officials. This means that the owner will very likely spend just about 
the same amount of money for the design work, and perhaps even more, than he would 
under the DBB PDS, but the DBB PDS requires that the plans and specifications be 
complete prior to selection ofthe contractor [56]. 
3.2 Survey Instrument 
The first major challenge was to design a survey instrument that would be accepted 
by the sources, easy to use and fill out, and provide all ofthe information that was sought in 
the study. 
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3.2.1 	 Expert Panel Work - Defining Success Measures & Constraints 
As we had proposed to do, we recruited a panel of industry experts to help define, 
"what makes a good project good?" "How is it measured?" And ''what challenges must a 
contractor overcome in order to produce a good project?" The underlying process was 
similar to a Delphi method [13, 143], modified to two rounds, with an initial set ofpossible 
attributes to consider. In the second round, the initial responses were aggregated into like 
groups by the author and the Experts were asked to confirm or reject these synthesized 
attributes in a process described by [13] at page 247 and [48]. 
The Expert Panel consisted of roughly ten architect/engineers, ten owners, and ten 
construction contractor representatives (see Appendix B). All of the project participants 
were senior level management personnel, project managers, attorneys, partners, company 
owners and two elected officials. The members were selected and recruited because they 
represent a large segment of the industry that has a lot of experience in both DBB and 
CMlac project delivery methods. In addition, we recruited construction contractors to 
participate in this part of the study in order to help educate them and make them a part of 
the data collection phase. Our intent was clear: if we could get a few very influential 
construction firms to give us this information, we could probably leverage their support to 
obtain the support from others in the state. 
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3.2.2 Initial Measures Data Collection 
On September 22nd, 1998 a package was sent to each of the Expert Panel 
member's.28 This package contained a cover letter thanking each member for their 
participation and explaining the study goals and what data we sought from them at this 
point; a detailed 24-page explanation ofData Envelopment Analysis and benchmarking in 
the construction industry, drawn from the literature review; and two data collection sheets 
and return envelope. The data collection at this point was relatively straightforward; we 
asked them to indicate what they considered to be "Construction Project Outputs or 
Success Measures" and "How Best to Measure the Project Output" on one sheet and what 
are the "Construction Project Inputs or Project Resources or Constraints" and "How Best to 
Measure the Project Input" on the other. 
The Experts were advised that they need not fill out the entire table often rows, but 
to "only include the attributes you feel are important in measuring a construction project's 
efficiency." In addition, check -off boxes at the bottom of the page entitled "Contractor," 
"Consultant," and "Owner" were included to evaluate the responses on a stakeholder basis 
(but no other identifying marks were requested or taken, so that the responses would be 
anonymous). 
Of the thirty packets that were sent out, fifteen were returned by mail, two were 
hand delivered and four participants sent email versions of the request back. Three other 
packets were returned because they did not have the correct address, two of these three 
were corrected and sent out but not returned. The other final packet, which was to have 
28 See Appendix B for a complete list of Expert Panel Members 
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gone to a Seattle based national contractor's vice president of estimating and purchasing 
was returned too late to be re-sent. 
An analysis of these initial responses produced a mildly surprising set of results: 
there was no significant difference between the different stakeholder groups 
(architects/engineers, owners and contractors) as to the measures ofperformance, and only 
very little difference as measures of resources and constraints. One of the more unusual 
consistencies was that all groups felt contractor profit and minority contractor participation 
were both positively correlated with project performance and efficiency. It is not intuitive 
that owners and architects would care much about contractor profit on a project, since 
neither would benefit from that increased profit. Likewise, it is not intuitive that 
contractor's unanimously felt minority participation was an important output to measure, 
given that social policy is typically outside their business considerations. 
We do not nlean to imply that every response from every participant was the same, 
however, and so the next step was to focus the Expert Panel on refining the metrics and 
agreeing on how to measure each metric. 
3.2.3 Second Expert Panel Survey 
The following table reflects the second step in referring the metrics work with the 
Expert Panel. 
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Construction Project Outputs 
Metric Measure Include? Rank 
Financial Performance 
• Budget Performance 
• Project Profitability 
% over/under Budget 
% profits 
Yes No 
Yes No 
Schedule Performance 
• Project Completion Original Planned / Actual 
Schedule 
Yes No 
• Milestone Completion Original Planned / Actual Performance 
Yes No 
Quality of Work 
• Workmanship 
• Materials & Equipment 
• Met Performance 
Criteria 
Number of Punch List Items 
Amount of Warranty Work 
Rating on 1 - 10 Scale 
Yes No 
Yes No 
Yes No 
Minority Participation 
• Met Project Goals % Participation / % Goal Yes No 
Satisfaction of Project 
Participants 
• Owner Satisfaction 
• Consultant Team 
Satisfaction 
• Contractor Satisfaction 
Ask to Rate 
Ask to Rate 
Ask to Rate 
Yes No 
Yes No 
Yes No 
Other: 
Table 7: Second Output Metric Data Form 
A second sheet, in a sintilar fonnat for Construction Project Inputs, and a third 
sheet, which is shown below and is an example of a completed fonn, was included in this 
survey. 
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EXAMPLE OF COMPLETED METRIC RATING FORM (FYI) 
Measure Include? Rank 
Financial Performance 
Yes 
Metric 
I% over/under Budget 
• Budget Perfonnance 
· 
• 
· 
% Profit 
Schedule Performance 
Project Completion 
·
Add: Profit Performance 
Yes 2
·
Original Planned / Actual Schedule 
· 
Quality ofWork 
Workmanship Yes 3I· Number ofPunch List Items. 
Minority Participation 
Yes 5
·
% Participation I % Goal
·
Met Proiect Goals 
Satisfaetiefl efPrej eet Parti eip8flts 
~A. .n No 0
·
Plsl. ie R:ale 
· 
Safety Performance 
Safety Perfonnance Yes 4
·
# ofAccidents or Claims 
Other Items not listed above that you 
feel are important: 
• 
· YES 6• AlA AWARDS, %OCCUPIED• PUBLIC ACCEPTANCE 
• · 
• · 
• · 
· • •
• 
• · 
· 
• 
Figure 11 Picture of an example of a completed data collection sheet 
Note that the rankings were initially intended to be used to restrict weights of the 
inputs and outputs; however, this approach proved unsuccessful and was not used in the 
final modeL 
A smaller proportion of these forms were returned compared to the first survey, 
and a further step of taking the form directly to Expert Panel members over lunch was 
necessary to better define the metrics, the measures. From these one-on-one meetings, 
ideas emerged regarding how to deal with the sensitive profit and safety data discussed 
below. Following this step, we had a pretty clear picture of what the initial DEA model 
would look like, and what our data collection survey instrument would have to include. 
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3.3 Project Data Collection 
3.3.1 Projects Sample 
It was the intent ofthis research to obtain data on as many projects as possible, with 
an ultimate goal of identifying all proj ects built in Oregon during the study period and 
obtaining data on each. It was never the intent of this study to obtain a statistical sample of 
the population of all projects, and that is a limitation of the research. However, 407 
projects meeting the study requirements were identified (215 were actually used in the 
model) which, for a small state like Oregon, probably represents the majority of public 
building projects constructed during that period. While it's quite difficult to determine with 
certainty the exact number of projects built during the study period, we were able to 
perform a number of checks to confirm the rationale for our assumption that the Orego,n 
database does in fact represent the majority of large public building projects during the 
study period. These include the following: 
• 	 We sought data from every building contractor in Oregon whose bonding 
capacity and public sector work history would suggest that they could and 
would perform the type and size ofprojects ofconcern in this research. 
• 	 We sought data from every city, school district and public agency in Oregon 
that would normally have the ability to fund projects of the size concerned with 
this research.29 
29 It should be noted that Oregon's population is concentrated in ten of its 36 counties and 50% of the 
population resides in the tri-county metropolitan area of Portland. Of the ten largest cities in Oregon, 
only two are located outside the Willamette valley, and both of those cities and their respective school 
districts were contacted for this study. 
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• A cross-check was made between the Oregon database, that was obtained as 
described above and the state of Oregon's bonded capitol improvements 
program funds authorized by the Legislature for the 1989 biennium through the 
2001 biennium and all 14 of the 14 funded projects were accounted for in the 
Oregon database. 
• 	 Finally, for this study to have missed a large proportion or majority of the 
projects of similar size and type used in the study, we would have had to have 
missed more than a billion dollars in public construction3o, in a state that only 
received tax revenues of $4.66 billion in total for 2001 (exclusive of property 
taxes), with the largest proportion of these funds going toward K-12 Education, 
Human Services, and Public Safety [216]. 
Based one these observations we conclude that we have in fact obtained the 
majority oflarge public building projects constructed in Oregon during the research period. 
3.3.2 Types of Data to be Obtained 
Nearly all of the data that was sought could be considered "Public Information" 
and likely could be subject to the Oregon Freedom of Information Act (ORS Chapter 192), 
but it was clear that we would meet with resistance from the contractors on certain 
questions about the amount of profit earned on the project and project safety, which was 
not public information. While both profit and safety metrics were unanimously considered 
important project outputs from all Expert Panel members these are obviously sensitive 
30 The smallest projects in the database were about $2.5 million and missing 400 projects would be $1 
billion in public spending. 
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questions for businesses to answer, especially if they thought the infonnation would be 
used against them by their competitors in the future. And while we may have been able to 
obtain inside company records through the Oregon Secretary ofState's office (by invoking 
the audit clause included in most if not all public construction contracts) or by filing a 
request under ORS Chapter 192, that kind of aggressive approach would have been time 
consuming, costly and would likely have evaporated any support the study would have in 
the construction community, therefore we dismissed it as a possible strategy. 
In order to obtain sensitive infonnation from the contractors, our strategy was first 
to recruit several senior management from construction finns to serve on the Expert Panel. 
This would allow them to tell us how to collect the infonnation in a way that would be 
most palatable to them. Secondly, and perhaps most importantly, we offered complete 
confidentiality of all project infonnation we received, and furthennore that all the project 
identification would be randomized so that no person or organization outside our research 
team would be able to decipher the data associated with a specific project. Finally, 
working with the contractor Expert Panel members, we devised a way to portray the 
infonnation without asking revealing sensitive infonnation. This was done by asking 
contractors to give us final profit numbers relative to expected profit at the time the contract 
price was established. 
The same approach was followed with cost and schedule control metrics, asking 
what was the original total budget divided by the final amount actually paid to the 
contractor (cost control) and what was the original project time divided by the actual 
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performance period (schedule control).31 In general, this worked fairly well; however, 
some contractors did not fill in all of the information, and it was clear from they way they 
did answer the questions that they were confused. Some answered by giving us the 
original and actual performance periods, for example: original: 1011196 to 1211197, actual: 
1111/96 to 2/15/98. That information allowed us to calculate the correct metric. Others 
answered by stating simply: On Time (which yields a metric of 1.0); or by stating some 
amount of time late or early, which made the calculation more difficult without additional 
information. 
31 In the case of costs we actually asked what the original and final costs were. We did this for two 
reasons, first as a check on the source's math and second because we would later use the final cost 
figure to calculate cost per square foot measures. On the schedule control metric, we later found that 
we would probably have been better off simply asking the questions: what was the original contract 
period and what was the actual performance period - we received the information in that form from 
several contractors and it provides better information to us in any case. In fact, when we performed the 
data collect by going to owners' archives and searching the files ourselves, we collected the data in that 
form. 
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Proiect:«Project Name» Architect:«Architect» Year: «Year» 
Project J:Yl!e (check all that apply) 
~()ffice Building New School Building Major Remodel of Existing Bldg 
New Hospital or Medical Bldg New Industrial Mixed: New and Remodel 
New Corrections: Jailor Prison New Institutional Other 
Did the Owner hire a separate Construction Manager: Yes No 
Project Size: sf Original Budget: $ Final total billing: $ 
Contract Type: Lump Sum Bid or Negotiated Procurement (CM/GC) 
Metric 1 Measure How to Calculate Response 
Financial Performance % over/under Budget (Original Budget or Bid)frotal Final Billings 
· 
Budget Performance 
% profits (Qrigil!al Budg'-l or Bid Profit)/~
· 
Project Profitability 
Schedule Performance Original Planned / Actual 
· 
Project Completion Schedule Original # of~ I Actual Project Da~ 
Quality ofWork & Management Number ofPunch List ltems Actual # of Items on the Architect's punch list at 
· 
Workmanship SU2ijtantiai !:;o!!J!letion 
Amount ofDispute Items Total $ Value of Claims at Project End, ifany. 
· 
Disputes 
# days, Substantial to Final Actual # of Proiect Days from Substantial CO!!J!letion to
· 
Finalizing Construction Completion FinaIPa~~ 
Minority Participation % Participation $ Value ofMinorily Contracts/Total Value of the 
Contract Work 
· 
Met Project Goals 
Satisfaction of Project Participants Letter ofRecommendation, Did the OwneT provide a letteT ofrecommendation or Yes or No 
· 
Owner Satisfaction Repeat work did the Owner give the Contractor repeat work? 
· 
Contractor Team Satisfaction Peer Rating/Advancement in Did the Contractor's project manager receive a ~ Yes or No 
Company internal review andlor advancement within the 
· 
Community Satisfaction Company? 
Complaints from Project Did project neighbors make any fOllllal written Yes or No 
Neighbors complaints about the construction work or project? 
Project Safety # Lost time or Recordable time Actual number, regardless oflength of time. 
· 
Safety Performance Accidents $ Value of Accident Total $'s paid out by the Contractor or the Contractor's 
insurance carrier for accident claims 
Figure 12 Picture of Project Output Data Collection Form 
The actual Project Output Data Collection fonn given to contractors is presented in 
Figure 12above, and the Project Input Data Collection fonn is presented in Figure 13 on 
page Error! Bookmark not dermed. below. 
3.3.3 	 Output Metric Definition 
The next step in this project was to focus on defining the input and output metrics 
in a way that could be obtained, would make sense within the context, and could easily be 
calculated. 
93 
The three most common measures of construction project performance are: Cost, 
Time and Quality_ As discussed above, the financial and schedule measures, cost control, 
profit and schedule control would be proportional figures, a ratio of the planned and actual 
performance. Both cost and schedule control are calculated as Planned! Actual, and the 
Profit is calculated as ActuallPlanned. The reason for these differences is probably 
obvious, but for the sake of discussion, the schedule and cost control metrics are measures 
of control, meaning that the contractor's ability to cut costs and beat the schedule are 
positive perfonnance characteristics. Since it is important for an output to increase in value 
relative to the desired outcome, our metrics had to increase with the decrease in cost and 
time perfonnance characteristics, therefore we chose cost and schedule control, calculated 
as the Planned! Actual perfonnance. 
Profit, on the other hand, was calculated as ActuallPlanned because the contractor's 
ability to increase profit was positively correlated with perfonnance. 
"Quality of Work" and "Project Management" perfonnance metrics had to reflect 
the contractor's work perfonnance in some objective manner.32 Volpe [211] defines a 
Punch List as a "list ofuncompleted or corrective items ofwork to be done to complete the 
contract. These lists are prepared by the architect after an inspection of the project at 
substantial completion?3" One measure of the contractor's perfonnance is the number of 
items on the architect's Punch List. However, since the number ofpunch list items would 
increase with the size of a project, the metric would eventually have to be made relative to 
32 Note the discussion in Appendix F regarding the ell metrics for quality ofperformance. 
33 Substantial completion is "the point of completion at which the owner may beneficially occupy the 
project" or in other words, when the project is completed and ready for its intended use [211]. 
94 
project square footage. For the data collection instrument, the data that was needed was 
fairly straightforward: Number of Punch List Items at time of Substantial Completion. 
Also, our Expert Panel chose: Total dollar value of Disputes or Claims at the Project End, 
if any; and, the Number of days from Substantial Completion to Final Payment as 
measures of project quality. The dollar value ofdisputes or claims is probably an obvious 
measure of quality of management, or at least of the relationship between the project 
parties; if there are a lot of claims or large claims and disputed items, the relationship 
between the parties is poor. Alternatively, if the parties are able to work out their 
differences during the project and settle all disputes and claims, then the relationship 
between the parties is very likely to be working fairly well. 
Finally, the contractor's efforts to close out the contract and finalize all work were 
considered a positive measure of performance. None of the parties in a construction 
project wants the project completion to drag out for long periods of time. Contractors lose 
money because they have to manage the completion process and that takes away from time 
their project manager could be devoting to profitable ventures; architects have to spend 
their time, some times un-reimbursed, to inspect and re-inspect the contractor's work; and 
owners have to put up with a less than complete building. None of these are popular or 
positive prospects. Therefore, the amount of time the contractor spends from the 
substantial completion to the point in time where the punch list is competed and the final 
paymene 4 is made is an important measure. 
34 Final payment is most likely the release of retainage, the money withheld from progress payments to 
insure the work is actually completed to the Owner's and Architect's satisfaction. 
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In addition to the cost, profit, schedule, and quality metrics, it was important to 
obtain other information about the project, such as the type ofproject and its size in square 
feet.35 For the most part, it was felt that these data would be less sensitive than the financial 
(in particular Profit) data requested, with the possible exception of "Claims" because no 
business likes to be thought ofas "Claim Oriented." But, that data is public information on 
these Public Projects, and not entirely the fault of the Contractor. Nevertheless, the 
"Claims" question was generally ignored except to state: ''None'' in most cases. 
Minority Participation, which was identified by all Stakeholder Groups in the 
Expert Panel as being an important measure of project success, was asked as a proportion 
of the total contract value. This is also the way it is generally required under most public 
contracts/6 however, it must be pointed out that these rules are constantly changing with 
court rulings on both the State and Federal levels. 
The Satisfaction of the project participants was identified as a project success 
measure yet how "satisfaction" should be measured was not precisely defined by the 
Expert Panel members. A subjective rating scale measure could be used; however, where 
possible it was thought that objective measures should be obtained. The Expert Panel 
35 Here size in square feet is only concerned with the square footage of the building itself, or the portion 
ofthe building, in the case of major remodel projects, that is actually being worked on. A lot of 
projects, especially school projects, are built on large sites. This fact also makes it difficult to compare 
the cost per square foot ofprojects since neither contractors nor owners precisely break out those costs 
from an overall lump sum or GMP. It may be possible, especially with GMP's to break out the building 
costs, but then some kind of assumption would have to be made regarding the proportion of overhead 
and profit was associated with the site and building work. 
36 In a succession ofUS Supreme Court cases beginning with J.A. Crosson v. Richmond, and 
concluding recently with Adarand v. Minetta the US Supreme Court has struck down most race based 
minority set aside or preference programs. Oregon has adopted a "Good Faith Effort" standard under 
several Agency Administrative Rules (or OAR's) and the Model Contract Rules promulgated by the 
Department of Justice. 
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suggested that project satisfaction could be obtained by noting whether or not the 
contractor received a letter of recommendation or commendation from the project owner, 
whether or not the project received any architectural awards and if the project team 
members received commendation or promotion within their organizations. Finally, the 
Panel suggested a measure relating to the community or proj ect neighbors; whether or not 
any complaints were received by the project neighbors. 
We decided that that these measures could be n1easured satisfactorily with YeslNo 
measures. (Rating on a 1-5 or 1-10 scale would be difficult and possibly embarrassing to 
the project team.) Furthermore, rating an owner's letter of recommendation or 
commendation would be highly subjective and probably would tend to be very high (all 
tens for example, because what possible reason could be given for a low rated letter of 
recommendation?). Architectural and Engineering Awards were rejected because very few 
projects actually receive awards, and some awards are substantially more prestigious than 
others. Also, any award mayor may not have anything to do with the contractor's 
performance architectural design awards, for example, are given for the architect's 
performance, not the contractor's. The point of this research is to evaluate the different 
outcomes of project performance based on PDS, and a design award may not have any 
relationship to the PDS used. 
''Project Safety" was the final project performance measure suggested by the 
Expert Panel. However, the contractor panel members pointed out that various contractors 
may measure safety performance in different ways. The most common way ofmeasuring 
"Safety" is in "Lost Time Accidents.'~ But since "Lost Time Accidents" can be "gamed" in 
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order to hide accidents on the job, it may not be a reliable indicator of project safety. 
Another way to measure Safety is in "Recordable Incidents" as required by Oregon 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA). Recordable incidents include all 
accidents not considered as "first aid" and generally requiring medical attention. The 
records required by OSHA distinguish between accidents that cause an employee to lose 
work entirely from those where the employee returns for work in a "modified" or different 
capacity_ Another way ofmeasuring safety performance is in total dollar value of accident 
liability. However, as it turned out, contractors would not release that information, and the 
owner simply did not require it. While safety information is required by Oregon OSHA, 
Oregon OSHA is not disposed to release that information to the public, much in the same 
way the IRS is not disposed to release individual tax returns. 
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3.3.4 Input Metric Definition 
Construetlon p to eet I nputs andCompany Ptofil1 e 
Metric Measure How to Calculate Response 
Contractor Capacity 
This is a measure of the 
Contractors' project 
management capabilities 
# Years Experience 
Project Manager's years ofConstruction Experience at 
the time ofthe' project? This is meant to be management 
experience, and includes years as a Field Engineer, 
Project Engineer, Scheduling Engineer, Superintendent, 
· 
Team Experience 
Project Manager and/or Project or Company Executive 
Project/System Constraints 
This is a measure of the 
':(q k0!!mlete @ Bid 2r QMf Your estimate of% complete of the plans al the time of the Bid or GMP 
obstacles to the Contractors # o(RFI's (Reguests f2f lnfonnation} Actual # ofRFI's issued by the Contractor? 
performance in terms ofquality 
ofdocuments, difficulty finding 
trained Jabor, physical 
constraints of the site and the 
available time and budget 
ex.pectations of the owner. 
· 
Design Completeness 
· 
Design Quality 
· 
Labor Markel & Quality 
· 
Adequate Access to Site 
· 
Adequate Time allowed by Owner 
· 
Adequate Budget allowed by 
Owner 
Lab2r Union Employment Level 
Rating ofAccess from Difficult to Easy 
Owner's project time expectations 
relative 12 Indum Standard fQ[ ~~e & 
~
Your estimate, based on "nonnal" labor market 
conditions and your ability to attract experienced, 
quality tradesmen for the job: on a scale of 1·5, with I 
being: No problem and 5 heinl(: very difficult 10 attract. 
Your estimate on a scale of 1-5, ofhow difficult the 
project site was to access, amount ofspace available for 
storage and parking: Easy Access = I; Average; 
Difficult Access =3; Extremelv Difficult Access =5. 
Your estimate on a scale of 1-5, of the Owner's 
expectations about the amount oftime allowed to 
perform the work: easy to achieve = 1, about average fur 
the work =3, very aR2fessive schedule = 5 
Your estimate of the Owner's budget expectations on a 
scale of 1-5: Unrealistic and Inadequate for the work 
Scale 1·5 
Scale 1-5 
Scale 1-5 
Scale 1-5 
Owner's budget relative to M~ans requested = I; A bit low. but not unrealistic = 2; 
Standard fur ~~ & ~ work Adequate to do the work and cover some contingencies 
=3; mqre than adequate = 4, budget never a 
consideration/concern = 5 
Owner's Project Team Actual # of revision drawings issued by the Architect to 
This is a measure of how 
prepared the Owner's team was 
# ofArchitect Revi~i2n~ correct design errors, flaws or unexpected conditions in 
the work. 
to assist the Contractor in the 
performance of the project 
· 
Owner's Ability to define project 
· 
Experience ofOwner's Team 
· 
Responsiveness to $ & Time 
issues 
Years Exmlrience & Training 
A ver!!ge # days to resJ1Qnd lQ issu~s 
Your estimate ofthe Owner/Architect's team level of 
experience in Construction ofthis type on a scale of 1-5: 
Low = I, Average = 3 or High = S? 
Your estimate ofOwner/Architect's response to time 
and money issues on a scale of 1-5: Slow to respond= I; 
about average for this type ofjob=3; very responsive5. 
Scale 1-5 
Scale 1-5 
Figure 13 Picture of Project Input Data Collection Sheet 
Two different Project Input Data sheets were given to Contractors at the beginning 
of the data collection phase this research. Figure 13 above is the project input data 
collection sheet, and the other data collection survey instrument was used to describe the 
overall company resources: personnel, bonding capacity, and total volume ofwork. 
The key player in any project is the project manager whose experience, 
background, and training as well as his or her ability to anticipate problems and solve them 
in a timely manner is critical to project success. The Expert Panel felt that one way to 
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measure this resource would be the number of years of professional construction 
management experience. 
Other inputs were described as: "obstacles to the contractor's perfonnance" and 
included: Design Completeness, Design Quality, Labor Market, Access to the work, 
Amount oftime allowed under the Contract and Adequate budget for the work. 
The intent was to characterize the amount of infonnation that was available to the 
contractor at the time of the bid or fonnation of the guaranteed maximum price (GMP) ­
noting that the amount of infonnation would fall somewhere between no infonnation and 
perfect infonnation. Design completeness is one way to evaluate the amount of 
infonnation and could be measured as the percent complete of plans and specifications at 
the time of the bid or GMP. On a Design-Bid-Build project, it is generally assumed that 
the plans are 100% complete in spite of the fact that is almost never the case, and of course 
even 100% complete plans and specifications fall short of what would be considered 
"perfect infonnation." However, unless otheIWise noted by the contractor or architect or 
other data source, 100% complete plans and specifications would be assumed on all 
projects.37 Architects differ in how they rank levels of design and at what precise 
percentage complete each level of design actually achieves. In general, the levels are: 
planning, conceptual design, design development, schematic design, and working drawings 
or final design. Recall from Table 4 planning and conceptual design are on the order of 10 
to 40% ofthe final completed drawings, schematic design ranges from 30% to 70%; design 
37 This would be true for both CMlGC and DBB projects, although it is normally the case that CMlGC 
projects are authorized as "fast track" the uses less than complete plans to start the work. Since 100% is 
the maximum number it would be conservative relative to the model, to assume 100% unless otherwise 
noted, because this would neither reward nor substantially penalize a proj ect' s efficiency score. 
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development ranges from 60 to 90% complete but usually is on the order of75% complete, 
and working drawings range from 90% to 100% range. 
Another way to evaluate "information" is to look at the quality of finished plans 
and specifications this can be accomplished by obtaining the number or Requests for 
Information (RFI' s) or questions regarding the work from the contractor, and number of 
architects' revisions or Proposal Requests instigated by the architect to clear up confusion 
in the plans and specifications. 
3.4 Data Collection Phase 
The data collection phase began in the summer of 1999 with the issuing of the data 
collection survey instrument. 
3.4.1 Contractors 
Based on our experience in the construction industry, we expected that contractors 
would be the best source of data for this research. A contractor's profit on competitive 
lump sum bid projects, for example, would never be known by the owner or architect on a 
project. Items like the total profit realized as a proportion of the amount initially 
anticipated at bid time could only come from the contractor themselves. In addition, items 
like the number ofRFI's (Requests for Information), the Number of Punch List Items, and 
Schedule performance would be more readily accessible to the contractor, who is more 
likely to track of these items in his management information system. 
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3.4.2 Making Use of the Expert Panel Members 
The strategy adopted early on was to solicit the support of the contractor's 
management persormel to serve as expert panel members. It was expected that if they 
served on the Expert Panel and helped to arrive at the metrics measured in the study, they 
would be more likely to provide the data that they determined was important to measure. 
In addition, the strategy was to gain the support of the largest and most influential general 
contractors in the state and those with the most experience in both CMlGC and Design­
Bid-Build contracting methods: Vice Presidents, Chief Estimator's and Senior Project 
Managers from Hoffinan Construction Company, J.E. Dunn, Andersen Construction, 
Lease Crutcher Lewis, and Baugh Construction Oregon, the five firms with the majority of 
early CMlGC experience and three (Andersen, Dunn and Hoffman) of the oldest general 
contractors headquartered and doing business in Oregon. These five firms performed 
approximately $1.8 billion of the $5 billion in construction documented in this research ­
one contractor, Hoffinan accounted for $1.1 billion of this figure; therefore, in order to 
have a credible study, their participation was considered key. 
Unfortunately, in spite of our successful strategy to recruit and capitalize on 
contractor Expert Panel members, the acquisition of data from contractors did not go as 
swiftly as planned, nor did it yield the amount of data that we had hoped. The five initial 
contractors provided us with approximately 180 projects, but these were heavily skewed 
toward CMlGC projects with only about 30% being DBB. As one Expert Panel member 
told me, his company's main concern was making sure that this research did nothing to 
diminish the use of alternative contracting methods and specifically CMlGC; therefore, 
102 
they would only provide us infonnation on CMJOC projects and only those that were 
considered superior proj ects. 
The data collection from contractors started in the summer of 1999 and was 
completed in February 2002 with a total of approximately 180 projects; however, not all 
projects were useable in our model. Some did not contain enough of the required data, 
while others were not "public projects;" but rather were private CMlOC jobs. 
3.4.3 Non-Expert Panel Member Contractors 
The Expert Panel member companies, while being among the largest public 
construction contractors, certainly were not the only companies that perfonn a substantial 
amount ofpublic building projects in Oregon. One of the larger sectors in public buildings 
is the public school sector which had been dominated by a number of smaller general 
contractors, principally Robinson Construction Company headquartered in Hillsboro, 
Oregon. However, we were less successful in obtaining data from non-Expert Panel 
member companies. For example, Robinson's chief estimator agreed to provide data for 
the research, but left the company prior to working on that effort. Subsequently, the Vice 
President that oversees construction promised to have someone work on the data collection 
but never found the time (nevertheless we did obtain several Robinson Construction 
projects through other sources, principally owners and the DJC). Yet another contractor, 
Emerick Construction, simply refused to provide any infonnation or data for our study 
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because the president of the company felt the study was biased against CMlGC 
procurements.38 
We were successful in obtaining information from a number of non-Expert Panel 
contractors, either directly or through owners. Kirby Naglehout, headquartered in Bend in 
central Oregon provided data on several projects as did several central Willamette Valley 
contractors including Pence-Kelly Construction in Salem, Ramsay Gerding Construction 
Company9 in Corvallis and Wildish Construction in Eugene. Some of this project data 
was incomplete, but by combining it with project data obtained from owners, architects, 
and the Seattle Daily Journal ofCommerce (DJC), we obtained enough project information 
to be able to use many ofthese projects in the model. 
3.4.4 Contractor Websites 
The World Wide Web has become an amazing source of information of all types 
including information on construction projects. Nearly every one of the contractors in our 
database of projects has a website with past project information. This information was 
typically limited to data on project type, size, often times the final project cost, architect, 
and owner. This information could then be cross checked with architect's and owner's 
websites for accuracy and completeness. Using all of these sources together, combined 
with data from the Daily Journal of Commerce, it was often possible to piece together 
enough information on a project that it could be used in the model. 
38 Some of the early data collected by the researcher for the dissertation proposal that simply 
documented the growth in CM/GC projects in Oregon and the distribution of contractor's performing 
that work was introduced in a hearing before the Oregon Legislature considering a rewrite ofbidding 
requirements and again in a Marion County Court hearing by a group of contractors opposing a CMlGC 
award to Emerick. 
39 Now, T. Gerding Construction. 
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3.4.5 Owners 
There are literally hundreds ofpublic owners in Oregon; however, the vast majority 
ofpublic building pr?jects that fit our model criteria are constructed by a surprisingly small 
number of government entities. These include: Oregon University System (and its seven 
member universities), Portland and Clackamas Community Colleges, the Cities of 
Portland, Salem, Eugene, Beaverton, Tigard and Gresham, school districts in these same 
cities, The Oregon Department of Administrative Services, The Oregon Department of 
Corrections, The Oregon Military Department, and the Port of Portland. While these 
owners don't track all of the data that we would like to have obtained, they do track and 
keep infonnation on costs, change orders, schedule, punch lists, claims, and RFI's in their 
archives.40 
The Oregon University System (OUS) was the most fertile and (generally 
speaking) most open to allowing access to their files of any groups that were approached. 
Portland State University (PSU), Oregon State University (OSU), the University of Oregon 
(U of 0) and Western Oregon University (WOU) granted complete and uncensored access 
to their construction project files. The U of a even supplied a summer intern student to 
assist in finding and pulling project files in their vast archive. Only Oregon Health Science 
University (OHSU) initially refused access to their project records, claiming that they were 
exempt from public disclosure laws under current statutes. OHSU's corporate counsel 
40 The final change order on a project was the single best source of data because it typically would list 
the original contract amount, original schedule requirements, and all changes to those requirements. As 
noted earlier, this is standard on public projects in Oregon, because a project manager and state agency 
must have a legal contract amendment in order to pay a contractor more than the original bid amount or 
otherwise risk severe penalties under the law. 
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detennined that they were in fact not exempt and did provide some infonnation on a few of 
their projects. 
Each ofthe major universities, PSU, OSU and the U of 0, provided this study with 
between ten and twenty projects each. WOU, a smaller campus located in Monmouth, 
Oregon contributed another five. We contacted Southern Oregon University (SOU), 
Eastern Oregon University (EOU), and Oregon Institute of Technology (OIT), but only 
SOU had recently built a project that met our research guidelines, and it was under 
construction when we contacted them. OIT and EOU had built sizeable projects in the 
past, but none in the most recent 20 years. 
The Cities of Portland, Salem, Eugene and Beaverton all contributed multiple 
projects data for this study, as did Portland Conlffiunity College, Portland and Beaverton 
School Districts, the State of Oregon Departments of Corrections, Administrative Services 
and the Military. 
The data obtained from project owners could generally be retrieved from a small 
number of project files. Most owners keep files on the original project contract, change 
orders, correspondence, and close-out. The original contract file nonnally documents such 
data as the project description (including size in square feet), original contract schedule, 
and cost. The Change Order file will give the final contract amount.41 The correspondence 
file often either contained or referenced the number of RFI's on a project; alternatively, 
many owners keep a separate RFI log file as well as a proposed change order file. The 
41 All public contracts in Oregon authorize the expenditure ofpublic funds and limits that amount to the 
amount of the contract as amended by change order. In order to pay a contractor more than the original 
contract price a proper change order or contract amendment must be executed (see WE Group v. State 
of Oregon.) 
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project close-out file usually docwnents the date of substantial completion, fmal payment 
and may contain the architect's punch lists; some of these data may be in their own 
separate files or found in payment or correspondence files. On the CMlGC projects, some 
profit information may be found in the owner's files ifthere was a project audit performed. 
Few owners actually maintained websites that were of much help to this work. 
One exception was PSU, whose facilities department actually has plans and descriptions of 
every campus building on their website. These were extremely helpful for gathering data 
on floor areas. 
The owners also contributed the ORS 279.103 post hoc reports on CMlGC projects 
discussed more fully in Appendix F. These reports were required by the Oregon 
Legislature following the 1997 session as discussed in Section 2.7.2. As noted earlier, 
these reports vary in completeness from agency to agency, but regardless of the quality of 
the particular agency reports, they all provided the minimwn amount ofproject data (with 
the possible exception of the COCC report which required other information sources 
including the DIC, the world wide web, and contractor input) required for the projects to be 
used in the model. 
It is interesting to note that the Oregon University System and OHSU are exempt 
from ORS 279.103, and project personnel at OHSU, OSU, WOU, U of 0 and PSU do not 
have to prepare these post hoc Evaluation Reports, and so far as we were able to determine 
they have not prepared them. 
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3.4.6 Architects 
After finding a number ofprojects on contractor's websites, the next step taken was 
to search the major architecture firm's websites. This resulted in the acquisition of several 
projects for a number of firms. Unfortunately, architects generally don't track the type of 
infonnation that was necessary for this study, so the architect's website project information 
became both a back-up for confinnation and ajumping offpoint for acquiring data. 
3.4.7 Seattle Daily Journal of Commerce On-line Database 
On August 15th, 2002 the Seattle Daily Journal of Commerce (DJC) granted us 
unlimited and free access to their on-line database of projects which dated back to 1994 
and contained more than two hundred Oregon public projects. A sample ofthe information 
contained in the DJC reports is presented in Figure 14. 
Construction of the Eugene Public Library 
Eugene, OR, #2001-1001 
Bids due: 4 pm Oct 11,2000 Extended from Oct. 4. Subs due 11 :30 am, Oct. S. 
1-3 addenda 
Estimated cost: $22.7 million 
Owner: City of Eugene Public Works Dept, Facility Management Div, 210 Cheshire Ave, Eugene, OR 
97401, 541-682-2689 
Printer: Central Print & Blueprint, 47 W 5th Ave., Eugene, OR 97401,541-342-3624, fax 541-345-3286 
Submittal Docs: $200 non-refundable from Owner 
Bids to: Owner 
Invitation #: 2001-1001 
DJC Ref #: 0008290013 
Bond: 10% 
Notes: The bidder must be registered with the Construction Contractors Board. Sub-bidders and suppliers 
may purchase documents from the printer. 
Pre-Bid: Conference lOam, Sept. 13 at St. Mary's East Main Hall, 1062 Chamelton St., Eugene, are. 
Scope: City Job No. 50160: Construct a 5-level, 160,000 sf library and office building, consisting of 1­
level below grade parking, 3 floors of library, and 1 floor of general office space. Project includes site 
work and public improvements. 
Apparent Low Bidders 7 bid(s) received 
John Hyland Construction, Eugene, OR jensmitMijhconst.com: 26,525,100 
Robinson Construction Co., Hillsboro, OR 26,705,800 
JE Dunn Construction, Portland, OR 27,004,800 
Figure 14: Text from DJC database 
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Many of the DJC reports contained valuable infonnation for our study, including 
the name of the owner and architect, the date the project was let, the type of the project 
(CMlGC or DBB), the scope of the work (typically including the square footage and type 
ofproject - in the above case a new library), and in most cases the original bid price, award 
price (if it differed from the lowest bid) and sometimes the initial GMP, if known. On 
several projects the perfonnance period was given as well as infonnation on project 
contacts such as phone numbers or email addresses ofthe owner, Architect or Contractor. 
3.5 Data Available for the Analysis 
Through all of the different sources we were able to identify over 500 public 
projects, 407 of which generally fit the size and complexity criteria for this research. We 
did include a few projects that were smaller than we had originally wanted to use, however 
it was determined that they were all sufficiently complex enough to include in the analysis. 
Of the 407 projects, we obtained some cost infonnation on 367 projects, ranging in cost42 
from a $175,591 (CMlGC) fire station project to a $189,859,282 (CMlGC) airport 
expansion project; totaling $5,050,962,407 ofpublic construction between 1986 and 2002. 
We were not able to get final project costs on a large number of the projects we obtained 
from the DJC website, and some of the projects we obtained from architect's and 
contractor's websites did not tell us what PDS was used. A summary of the 407 projects 
by PDS is contained in Table 8: 
42 These costs are adjusted to 2001 using Engineering News Record's Construction Cost Index obtained 
from their website at: http://enr.construction.comlfeaturesiconEcoicostIndexes/collstIndexHist.asp . 
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Project Number with 
Delivery Number Smallest Largest Unknown Financial 
System Information 
8 with no $ data CM/GC 136 $175,591 $189,859,282 
1,400 SF 1,000,000 SF 
$112,497,017 
17 missing some $ data 
2 with no $ data Design-Bid­ 191 $663,325 
Build 4,600 SF 569,000 SF 89 missing some $ data 
Unknown 80 $223,166 $35,211,963 2 with no $ data 
11,300 SF $270,000 SF 78 missing some $ data 
Total 407 
Table 8: Summary of Oregon database Projects by PDS 
Note that the final model included 215 projects, III of the 136 CMJGC jobs and 
104 of the 191 DBB projects. We obtained a higher proportion of the CMJGC projects 
principally because the infonnation on a large number of the DBB projects from the period 
ofthe 1980's through 1995 no longer exists, as noted earlier. 
A total of 71 different Construction Contractors were represented43 in the Oregon 
database obtained. The top six Contractors by total sales are listed in the following table: 
CMGC DBB 
Contractor No. Total $ No. Total $ Total 
1 Hoffman Construction 42 1,490,850,578.18 3 134,662,229.86 1,625,512,808.04 
2 Dunn I Drake Construction 10 281,124,745.46 15 176,474,011.61 457,598,757.07 
3 Baugh Construction Oregon 18 334,845,361.45 1 883,949.85 335,729,311.30 
4 Robinson Construction 6 37,947,953.39 14 122,554,258.92 160,502,212.32 
5 Kirby Nagelhout 3 21,421,521.39 10 106,540,769.06 127,962,290.45 
6 Lease Crutcher Lewis 11 124,723,971.16 0 - 124,723,971.16 
Table 9: Top five contractors by total sales in the Oregon database 
A total of seventy different architecture finns44 are represented in the Oregon 
database, and the ten Architecture finns with the greatest number of projects in our study 
are shown in the table below: 
43 This number includes two Joint Ventures as separate companies from their parents. 
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Architect 
c 
~ 
0 
c 
.:tt:. 
c 
::) 
0 
CJ
-:E 
0 
CD 
CD 
c 
CG
-~ 
1 Dull Olsen Weekes 0 13 48 61 
2 ZGF 4 9 5 18 
3 BOORIA 1 1 12 14 
4 SRG Partnership 2 4 8 14 
5 Malhum Architects 1 7 5 13 
6 gLAs Architects 2 3 7 12 
7 YGH 1 7 3 11 
8 Arbuckle Costic 2 1 7 10 
9 Soderstrom 2 2 6 10 
10 Barber Barrett Turner 1 0 7 8 
Table 10: Architects in Oregon database 
The table of architects shows that there were 106 projects where the project 
architect was not known, and this was the largest single groups ofprojects in the database. 
The firm of Dull Olsen Weekes and Associates (DOW A) provided the study with the 
largest number ofprojects. DOW A, as they are known, specializes in school construction 
and nearly all of the 61 DOW A projects are elementary, middle and high schools in 
Oregon. 
3.6 Adjusting the Data for the Model 
In this section, we discuss how we dealt with the data and prepared for the actual 
analysis. 
44 Note that some firms have changed names over the years; we have attempted to count a firm only 
once if it added or lost partners along the way. However, Joint Venture firms were counted separately 
from their parent organizations consistent with our treatment of contractors. 
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3.6.1 Transferring the Data and Data Reduction 
The process of taking the data from the Access Database and running the nlodel 
was not a trivial procedure. The first step was to take all of the data and copy it into an 
Excel spreadsheet; this spreadsheet was given the name "Base Data." Two data 
transformations were performed on the Base Data sheet: first, a Look -up operation was 
performed to inflate the "fmal billing" amount to end of the year 2001 base dollars using 
construction cost index figures obtained from the ENR website. Secondly, the cost control 
metric was recalculated as a cross check to make sure no calculation errors h~d taken place. 
After these two operations were complete, the Base Data Sheet was generally never 
touched again, except to reference. 
The next step was to copy the main "Base Data" spreadsheet to a new spreadsheet 
named 1st Reduction. The data was transferred from the Base Data sheet where some of 
the numerical data in the Access Database transferred over as text. At this point we 
corrected all text errors and architect and contractor name inconsistencies.45 All data 
transferred from the Base Data Sheet to the 1 st Reduction Sheet were copied and pasted 
using the "Paste Special" function in Excel that allows you to transfer over only the 
"values" and exclude formatting and functions. 
2ndOnce the 1st Reduction sheet work was completed, it was copied into a 
Reduction Sheet. This sheet was used primarily to perfonn pivot tables in order to obtain 
the information shown in the tables in Section 3.5 above. 
45 In some cases architecture firm "XYZ" may have included the word "Architect" or "Architect's & 
Planners." Names for contractors likewise may have included the word, "Contractors," "Builders," or 
"Construction Company." 
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At this point another sPreadsheet was opened and named 3rd Reduction. This is the 
first point where we began deleting projects from the data in order to perform the analysis. 
The process began with the sorting ofthe project data in ascending order by: Project Size in 
Square Footage, Final Project Cost and Original BidlGMP. Thirty projects in the 
spreadsheet contained no information on any of these measures and therefore could not be 
analyzed in the model. The next ninety-seven projects had no information about either 
Project Size in Square Footage or Final Project Cost and were therefore eliminated at this 
~ 
point, and eight additional projects contained no information on both final and original 
costs and the schedule control metric necessitating their elimination from the spreadsheet. 
Finally, fifty-nine of the remaining projects had no information on the two principal output 
metrics ofcost and schedule control and were therefore eliminated. This left a total of215 
projects in the spreadsheet for analysis; of these, 111 were known to be CMlGC and 104 
were known to be Design-Bid-Build projects. 
The final step is to prepare the "DATA" spreadsheet to be used in the analysis. 
This requires transforming the information contained in the 3rd Reduction sheet to fit the 
input and output model described below. 
3.6.2 	 Model Inputs 
The inputs for the model include two input metrics intended to reflect the amount 
of information the contractor would have at the time of preparing his price, which are % 
Complete ofPlans and Specifications and Total SF/(RFI + AP) issued during the course of 
the work. The first metric is rather straightforward; it is simply a measure ofhow complete 
the plans and specifications are. The second measure is intended to try and measure the 
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quality of the plans and specifications. It is assumed that a poorer quality set ofplans will 
produce a larger number ofRFI's (for clarification sake) than a higher quality set of plans, 
and also would require more Architects' Proposal (AP) requests to deal with deficiencies. 
While we stand by this assumption, we acknowledge that the issuance of RFI's can 
become something of a game for contractors, design professionals, and owners. RFI's can 
be used in a number ofways to document problems the builders encounter in the plans and 
specifications. In addition, on several projects perfonned before 1990, we found that 
several Contractors did not use specific "RFI" fonns; instead they used project 
correspondence, often tracked by "serial numbers" to document problems and change order 
requests. 
Since the assumption made earlier was that number of (RFI + AP)' s increases as 
the quality of the plans and specifications decrease, we needed to find a way to express this 
data so that it confonns to the model input requirements that a large number should 
indicate a large resource with which to produce outputs. A small number reflects a limited 
resource that inhibits the production of outputs. In addition, we observed that very large 
projects would naturally have more RFI's than very small projects, and that a large project 
would not be as constrained as small projects with the same number of RFI's. In order to 
reflect this relative resource and constraint, we divide project size in square footage by the 
sum ofthe RFI's and AP's. 
3.6.3 Missing Data in Model Inputs 
Missing Data in Model Inputs had to be dealt with at this stage because several 
projects lacked RFI and AP data. Since that would result in a zero resource on the input 
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side of the model (which would result in an infinite output/input ratio), we would have to 
adjust that data in the most reasonable way possible without harming the rest of the 
project's efficiency performance measurement. The most reasonable way to do this, we 
concluded, was to assume that every project would have at least one RFI issued during the 
course of the job, which seems a reasonable assumption, given that every project that did 
include data on RFI's and AP's had at least one RFI (in fact the lowest number was 9). In 
doing so, we are assuming a near perfect set of plans for the level of completeness 
estimated by the project team. This would insure also that the "quality" input would not be 
used by any ofthe DMU's and it was not. 
For the other input, % complete of plans and specifications, 100% complete was 
used as the default ifdata was missing. 
3.6.4 Model Inputs That Were Not Used in the Model 
The Expert Panel work, described in Section 3.2.1, resulted in six measures for 
model inputs that were not used in the initial DEA model. These were scaled subjective 
ratings (1-5) that attempted to evaluate the difficulty of the "construction environment" 
during the course of the project. These included: skilled labor recruitment, access to the 
work, owner's schedule expectations, owner's budget expectations, owner team's level of 
experience, and architect's timeliness of response to issues as they occurred. Another 
metric not initially used was the number of years of experience of the contractor's project 
manager. 
These data were obtained from the contractors with relative consistency; however, 
remarkably few architects or owners ranked their projects on these metrics. This was 
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probably due to the fact that few owners would know precisely what the market conditions 
for labor employment were actually like and would only be able to guess at the project 
manager's experience. It's likely that the owner would think his budget and schedule were 
adequate regardless ofwhat the contractor thought. These missing data tended to skew the 
results with an enormous amount ofmissing data. 
3.6.5 Model Outputs 
The basic model outputs were consistently agreed upon by all of the stakeholders in 
the Expert Panel: Financial Performance (both budget and profit), Schedule Performance, 
Quality of the Work (workmanship, disputes, and fmalizing construction), Minority 
Participation, Project Safety, and Satisfaction of the Project Participants. They are similar 
to the measures used by Sanvido, Konchar and the crr [75, 76, 126, 182, 183], although 
modified for the DEA model. 
Some, like Ruskin [176], have proposed an "earned value" metric; however, while 
this is a recognized tool for tracking the project performance, it provides no advantage over 
the metrics used here for post project performance derived by the Expert Panel or as used 
by the crr supported studies (cited above.) 
Note again that for the DEA model, outputs are considered "goods" whereas inputs 
can be considered "bads" in the sense that increasing these will either make the efficiency 
score increase (good) or decrease (bad). Therefore, the input and output metrics had to be 
mathematically arranged to reflect this arrangement. For example, the metric used in the 
model for project budget and schedule performance are "cost control" and "schedule 
control" instead of the more common reciprocals: cost and schedule over-run. TIlls is 
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because if we were to use cost or schedule over-run as an output, the more the cost and 
schedule exceeded the contract cost and schedule requirements, the better. Obviously, this 
is counter to the goals of a project (to reward the project for being more over budget)! 
Therefore, the metric used for budget performance: cost control, is equal to: (Original 
Contract Cost)/(Actual Amount Paid). A similar formulation is made for schedule 
performance or control. Alternatively, profit is the reciprocal, that is, the more profit the 
better, so the profit metric is equal to: (Actual Profit)/(Contract or Bid Profit.) 
3.7 Output Metric Two-dimensional Plot 
One example that is commonly used to explain the DEA and frontier analysis 
generally is to plot the results in a two dimensional scatter plot. This can easily be done in 
cases where there are either no inputs or one single input for the DMUs and two outputs as 
shown in Figure 15. 
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Figure 15: Two Dimensional Scatter Plot of the Output Metrics from the Oregon Database 
If there were no inputs, and the only outputs were schedule control and budget 
control, then the envelopment of this data, shown as a dashed line above, would give us an 
efficiency frontier, and the technical efficiencies of the projects would be calculated as the 
relative distance from the origin to that frontier. From the plot, it appears that the minimum 
efficiency would be in the range of 0.70 or 700/0, Again, however, the important thing to 
note is that the data is not broadly distributed, but instead it is rather tightly grouped around 
the 1.0, 1.0 intersection. In fact, only just slightly more than 13% (29/218) of the projects 
with non-zero data points fall outside of plus or minus 20% of the 1.0 measure in either 
1.4 
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direction. If DEA had been run using this data, it appears that just three projects would 
form the efficiency frontier, but the model used in this research does include inputs and 
additional outputs to consider. 
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4 Data Analysis 
This chapter presents the data analysis used to answer the first three research 
questions regarding project perfonnance, project efficiency and benchmarking. The 
objective in this section is to detennine, through quantitative methods, if the public policy 
that allows public agencies to select construction contractors on the basis of past 
perfonnance instead of lowest responsible bid should be continued and to detennine if 
there are "best practice" applications ofthe two PDS' s. 
The DEA model was analyzed using the EMS software developed by Holger 
Scheel (Version 1.3 2000-08-15). This program uses an Excel spreadsheet to store the 
input and output data, which greatly facilitated the data processing. 
4.1 Project Performance Statistical Analyses 
Project perfonnance is analyzed using the principal output statistics cost and 
schedule control. Here we test the hypotheses: 
HA1 : Negotiated Procurement, Construction Manager/General 
Contractor (CM/GC) method of Project Delivery System (PDS) 
results in projects that outperform the traditional Design-Bid­
Build (DBB) PDS method on cost and schedule control metrics. 
H01: There is no significant difference between CM/GC and DBB 
projects with respect to cost and schedule control metrics. 
Figure 16 is a single frequency histogram of the output metric Budget 
Perfonnance, which we defined above as the total final cost divided by the initial bid or 
contract guaranteed maximum price. Note the average Budget Perfonnance is 0.947, with 
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a standard deviation of0.07. The figure indicates that the data is generally well distributed 
with one outlier at the extreme left-hand side of the figure. 
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N =213.00 
Figure 16: Budget Performance Metric Histogram 
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Figure 17: Schedule Performance Metric Histogram 
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Figure 17 is a single frequency histogram of the Schedule Perfonnance metric, 
which indicates a much broader distribution than the Budget Perfonnance metric. This 
stands to reason because time is a more available resource than money in most situations, 
and exceeding planned perfonnance time is more likely and less costly than exceeding the 
project financial resources. It's far more likely to allow a project to run longer by 100% of 
the original schedule, resulting in a Schedule Perfonnance Metric of 0.50, than increase by 
double the cost. An increase in total cost ofdouble would in fact only occur in projects that 
undergo a "Cardinal Change 46" and therefore, by definition, the original contract value is 
irrelevant because it does not reflect the intent ofthe contracting parties. 
4.1.1 Population Independence 
The principle purpose of this research was to determine if the different project 
delivery systems resulted in better projects based on certain output metrics as determined 
by the Expert Panel. 
Project Delivery 
System N Mean 
Std 
Deviation 
t-value 
p 
Budget Control: DBB 
CM/GC 
101 
112 
0.9382 
0.9541 
0.0766 
0.0718 
1.686 
0.093 
Schedule Control: DBB 
CM/GC 
97 
102 
0.9400 
0.9310 
0.1293 
0.1321 
0.451 
0.653 
Table 11: Group Statistics for the Oregon database47 
46 A Cardinal Change, in construction contract law, is a change that exceeds the magnitude or limits 
allowed by the contract or implied warranties, thereby allowing the contractor to seek compensation on 
the basis of"quantum meruit" or the "value of the work" provided [71] 
47 The reader will note that the numbers ofcases are not the same for each Metric; this is due to the fact 
that some information is missing in some of the cases and zeros have been omitted from this statistical 
analysis. In the case of the DEA analysis that follows, zeros are included in the output measure. 
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Table 11 above presents the Group Statistics for the two populations: DBB and 
CMJGC projects. What this analysis tells us is that while there are differences in the 
population, they are slight and not statistically significant. The important thing to note here 
is how little variance there is in the principal output metrics. 
4.1.2 Validation and Comparisons with Other Studies 
In this section the statistical analysis of the principal output metrics from this study 
are compared with the other studies identified in Chapter 2, principally: [75, 99, 183] and 
the crr Benchmarking Study update. In order to do this, we convert the data into the 
format used by the other studies.48 A summary ofthe studies is given below in Table 15. 
48 Note that for the purposes of the DEA analysis this study used cost and schedule control, defined as 
the planned divided by the actual performance. In the en studies, the statistic used was [(actual­
planned)/planned]*100, which gives a % difference (increase or decrease) from the planned 
performance. 
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Study 
Number of 
Projects CM/GC DBB 
Total: 
(CM/GC ­ DBB) 
Cost Schedule Cost Schedule 
Mean SO Mean SO Mean SO Mean SO 
Oregon Database 215 (111-104) 5.35 8.14 10.46 22.18 I 7.77 14.6 9.40 22.37 
Washington Data 
i [99] 
16(16-0) 7.19 7.09 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Median49 Median Median Median 
OreQon Database 215 (111-104) 4.00 0.00 4.90 0.00 
CII [183] 176 (72 ­ 104)50 3.37 0.00 4.83 4.44 
All Projects 
Cost Schedule Cost Schedule 
Mean SO Mean SO Median Median 
Oregon Database 215 (combined) 5.88 7.49 9.98 22.24 4.9 0.00 
CII Benchmarking 
Study [511 
26 (unknown) 7.9 10.4 4.9 11.0 7.2 2.9 
Table 12: Summary comparison of different study results on the common project performance 
metrics cost growth and schedule growth, given in percentages. 
Table 15 is a summary ofthe Oregon database results transfonned from the metrics 
used in this study to the metrics used in the crr and state of Washington studies on PDS 
perfonnance. The comparisons reveal that the Oregon database results are substantially 
similar to the earlier studies. As we noted in Chapter 1, the only metric comparison whose 
difference is greater than 5% is the comparison between the schedule perfonnance in the 
err Benchmarking Study [51] (which included only 26 projects) and the Oregon database 
on schedule perfonnance. However, the standard deviations of both populations is 
significantly larger than the difference in the means (cr ~ 11 % in the err data and 22% in 
the Oregon database) .. It is interesting to note the difference in the mean and median 
schedule perfonnance metrics in the comparison of the en Benchmarking data and the 
49 In [183] reported the Median and not the Mean for both cost and schedule increase; data from the 
Oregon Database is presented likewise for comparison. 
50 There were 315 projects total in the CII study ([183] at p. 68), but only 176 of those were DBB or 
CM/GC, 44% (139) of their projects were Design-Build. The ClI Study does not break down the data 
by project type, e.g.: buildings as opposed to bridges or chemical/industrial plants. 
124 
Oregon database. While the means are slightly more than 5% apart (4.9% compared to 
9.98%), the medians are a lot closer; just under 3% apart (2.9% compared to 0%). It is 
also interesting to note that the Oregon database has a higher mean but lower median than 
the crr data. This is due, of course, to the large number of "on-time" projects (a lot of 
which are schools) in the Oregon database (and there are no schools in the ClI data.). 
Sanvido and Konchar state in both [183] and [75] that they used the median 
measure because it would reduce the impact of outliers in the data, and we see here that 
their concerns are at least partly borne out. Ofcourse, the problem with using the median, 
as discussed earlier, is the fact that it does not reveal much about the population, such as the 
variance of the da~ whlch is very important to project owners. While it is helpful to have 
a median cost growth of zero, if the variance is very great, the actual probability of 
realizing zero cost growth may be quite small and the risk of going greatly over budget or 
under budget may be quite high.51 
The comparisons with the other studies in the literature validate the Oregon 
database results and data collected. 
4.1.3 Study Results on Schedule Performance 
In this and the following section the project output statistics are given in graphical 
box-plots in order to visually compare the different studies. This research project is 
51 For example, assume that there are 101 projects in the database, 50 achieve cost growth of minus 5%, 
one has cost growth of 0% and 50 have a cost growth of 100%. The median of this data is 0% cost 
growth; however, the likelihood that the owner will achieve 0% growth is less than 1 %, while his 
likelihood ofhaving his costs less by5% are slightly less than 50%, and the likelihood of his costs 
increasing 100% are likewise approximately 50%. In fact, the owner's expected increase is not 0%, but 
rather a 47% increase in cost. 
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presented first, followed by [183], and [51], which does not present the data by PDS, but 
nevertheless is useful infonnation for comparison. 
PDS Type N Mean Std. Deviation Median 
DBB 96 9.4% 22.37% 0.00 
CM/GC 102 10.46% 22.18% 0.00 
Table 13: Oregon database mean, SD and median for Schedule Performance over-run% the 
metric used in the CII studies for comparison purposes 
Note that Table 13 indicates that there is schedule perfonnance data missing for 
some projects in the Oregon database as was discussed earlier, in Chapter 3 . 
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with the Oregon database 
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Figure 19: Project Schedule Growth from ell Benchmarking Study (51). Note here that 
Schedule Growth is given as a decimal, not a 0/ and represents all projects in the 0 , 
study, regardless of I PDS 
The scales ofthe graphical representations are clearly not similar, and therefore it is 
difficult to make direct comparisons; however, the output graphics and descriptive statistics 
do provide valuable infonnation about schedule growth. The Oregon database results 
collected for this research indicate a mean schedule growth for CMlGC of 10.46% and 
9.4% for DBB. These figures cannot be compared directly with any of the other studies, 
since none of the other studies reported mean and standard deviation data by PDS. 
However, when CMlGC and DBB jobs are combined, the overall project schedule increase 
of 9.940/0 with a standard deviation of 22.24% compares with the cn Benchmarking study 
[51] for all domestic building projects, which indicates a 4.9% mean schedule growth with 
a standard deviation of 11%, on a population that was a small fraction of the sample size 
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data collected for this research. Given the data from the en study [51], it would not be 
possible to reject the hypothesis that the en Benchmarking Report data was drawn from 
the same population as this research. 
The median schedule growth reported by the en in [183] of 0.0% for eMlGC and 
4.44% for DBB compares with 0.0% for eMlGC and 0.00% for DBB from the Oregon 
database. One possible reason for the difference may be the popUlations themselves. In 
the Oregon database, the DBB jobs include a large portion of school buildings that, for the 
most part, opened on time. Approximately 55% of the DBB jobs in the Oregon database 
reported 0.0% schedule increase. In the eMlGC projects 47% of the jobs reported 0.0% 
schedule growth. With such a large proportion of "on-time" jobs, it is unlikely that the 
median would be anything other than 0.00/0. But, as discussed above, the project owner is 
not necessarily as concerned with the median ofthe popUlation data as she may be with the 
variance in the popUlation and the expected value and probability of going over budget and 
beyond the project's contractual schedule requirements, because that represents the project 
risk that has to be taken into consideration when the contract for construction is signed. It 
should be noted also that the Oregon database includes some extreme outliers in the 
schedule performance metric in both the eMlGC and DBB populations; that does not 
appear to be the case in the en studies. 
When the Oregon database results for schedule growth are plotted in a Box & 
Whisker plot using the mean, standard deviation and 95%, instead of the median, 25%, 
75%, and maximum range of the data, the two popUlations are hardly distinguishable from 
one another. Furthermore, the graphical effect ofthe outliers is greatly ameliorated. 
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Figure 20: Box & Whisker Plot of the Oregon database using the CII study metric % Schedule 
Growth, graphing the Mean, Standard Deviation, and 95% data ranges 
4.1.4 Study Results on Cost Performance 
In order to compare data from this research study with that of the Cll, the data was 
converted to percent increase ([Final Cost-Original Cost]/Original Cost). The group 
statistics results from this study are given in Table 14 below. 
PDS Type N Mean Std. Deviation Median 
DBB 100 7.77% 14.6% 4.00 
CM/GC 110 5.35% 8.13% 5.00 
Table 14: Oregon database mean, standard deviation and median for Cost Performance 
over-run%, the metric used in the CII studies for comparison purposes 
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When the same metrics the cn studies [75, 76, 183] are used to compare budget 
perfonnance, the CMlGC projects show a 5.35% increase on average, whereas the DBB 
projects realize a 7.77% increase, but the difference is not significant. 
A comparison ofthe box plot Figure 21 from this research actually shows that while 
the mean of the CMlGC projects is slightly lower, the DBB project data is more compact 
than the CMlGC data; however, DBB appears to include more extreme outlier cases than 
CMlGC, which represents greater expected risk as noted earlier. 
Box &Whisker Plot: CILBLID 
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Figure 21: Box and whisker plots of the Oregon database results using the CII cost performance 
metric, Cost Growth as actual/expected, for comparison with the CII results 
Figure 21, compares to the % Cost Growth Box Plot found in [75, 183] from the 
Cll, here Figure 22: 
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Figure 22: % Cost Growth from CII Studies 
Also, the CII Benchmarking Study BMM2001-1 [51] analysis for all domestic 
building projects without regard to PDS is given below in Figure 23: 
Project Cost Growth 
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Figure 23: Benchmarking Study Figure #1310, Cost Growth for All Domestic Buildings 
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The crr Benchmarking study [51] for all domestic buildings, regardless of the 
PDS, has a mean schedule growth of 7.90/0 with a standard deviation of 10.4% and a 
median of 7.2%; however, this part of the crr study included only 29 projects. The results 
from Goldblatt and Septelka [99] for CMlGC projects is found in Appendix E; again, as 
with the crr Benchmarking study, [99] had a very small sample population. Nevertheless, 
a similar mean cost growth of7.19% and Standard Deviation of7.10% was recorded. This 
data is presented graphically in Figure 24 . 
N= 	 16 
1.00 
VAR00003 
Figure 24: Box Plot of Cost Growth from the Washington data in [99] 
4.1.5 	 Summary of the Comparisons 
In order to make direct comparisons between the Oregon Research Data, the crr 
studies [51, 75, 183], and Washington state report [99], the data from this study had to be 
transformed into consistent measures. When this was accomplished, a comparison 
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between the different studies could be made. A summary of those comparisons is 
presented in Table 15. 
The most striking observation from these comparisons is how similar the results of 
the different studies actually are. The only significant difference is the median schedule 
growth reported in [183] of 4.44% compared with the Oregon database, which yielded a 
median of 0.00%. However, as pointed out above, the Oregon database was exclusively 
public buildings, whereas [183] was heavily weighted toward industrial projects. In the cn 
Benchmarking Study [51], where the comparable data was found to be construction 
contractor reported and domestic building data, the study used only 31 projects (although 
not all 31 projects were used in each analysis,) where this research collected data on nearly 
seven times that amount. Nevertheless, the differences in the project data analyses are not 
significantly different. 
The most interesting observation is that in spite of the fact that these data analyses 
are not significantly different, the cn [183] found that the CMlOC PDS delivers projects 
faster and controls growth better than the DBB PDS claim that is then repeated in [76]. 
4.1.6 Results of the Analysis Research Question 1 
The analysis shows that we reject the hypothesis that CMlGC projects out-perfonn 
DBB projects on schedule and cost control metrics. However, a valid interpretation of this 
analysis is that the CMlOC is not better than DBB, but it likewise is no worse, and that the 
public pays no additional price in tenns of cost and schedule growth for starting a project 
earlier by using CMlGC. But the analysis does call into question the public policy that 
requires CMlGC projects to provide the public with "substantial cost savings." 
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4.2 Research Question 2: Efficiency Analysis 
The scatter plot presented in Figure 15 is a useful representation of project 
outcomes when inputs are not considered. Our research was intended to consider both 
inputs and outputs. However, the important thing to note from Figure 15, and from out 
statistical analysis presented above, is that the project outputs are not dramatically 
dissimilar. In fact, while there is quite a range of outputs, particularly in the schedule 
perfonnance metric, the vast majority of the projects had perfonnance outputs that were 
substantially similar, with few truly outstanding and few truly horrible projects and no 
standout or single dominate project. Even those projects that did poorly on one of the two 
metrics appear to have made up for it in the other 
In this section we seek to detennine if, when both inputs and outputs are 
considered, CMlGC projects are more efficient than DBB projects. To do this we test the 
hypotheses: 
HA2: CM/GC projects are more efficient than DBB projects, 
where efficiency is defined by a DEA model that considers both 
inputs and outputs from the construction process model. 
Ho2: There is no significant difference between CM/GC and DBB 
projects with respect to efficiency scores where efficiency is 
determined by a DEA model that considers both inputs and 
outputs from the construction process model. 
4.2.1 Initial DEA Model Analysis (CRS and VRS Models) 
The nonnal method for evaluating DMUs in DEA is by application of either a 
Constant Returns to Scale (CRS) model or a Variable Returns to Scale (VRS) model. 
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These models have been used throughout the literature and applied in a number ofdifferent 
industries and economic sectors. However, neither the traditional CRS or VRS models is 
well suited to the evaluation of the data set in this research. This is because of the peculiar 
fact that the inputs vary so substantially but the outputs do not, which is the distinctly non­
linear relationship between inputs and outputs in the mode. Traditionally, when a 
researcher wanted to evaluate a data set of DMUs with extreme differences in input and 
output metric values such as comparing grocery stores and including mini-marts, 
traditional mainstream stores, and warehouse stores in the same data set, the researcher 
would apply a VRS model; however, this would not work in our case because it is a 
distinctly different type ofnon-linear relationship.52 
To check this assumption, we ran the VRS model which resulted in only 130 of 
215 total projects with greater than 50% efficiency scores, and 48 of215 with better than 
90% efficiency score is depicted in Figure 25 below. These results do not correspond to 
either the results of the statistical analysis (Table 11 above) or the output scatter plot 
depicted in Figure 15, nor do they match the perception of the Expert Panel Members who 
uniformly maintained that, except in rare cases, projects should fall within a narrow range 
ofresults. 
52 In the grocery store example the mini-mart has small inputs and small outputs, the warehouse store 
has large inputs and large outputs. However in this research we have projects with small inputs and 
medium outputs and those with large inputs and medium outputs. 
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VRS DEA Scores 
120.00% .,.----------------------------­
100.00% 
80.00% 
60.00% 
40.00% 
20.00% 
0.00% 
1 9 17 	 25 33 41 49 57 55 73 81 89 97 105 113 121 129 137 145 153 161 169 177 185 193201 209 
Figure 25: VRS DEA Scores - Base model with efficiency score on the Y axis and projects 
plotted on the X axis.53 
It is probably intuitive, but the results of a CRS model are even worse than the 
VRS model. The CRS model resulted in only 16 of 215 projects with efficiency scores 
above 90% and only 87 of 215 with scores better than 50%. It should be obvious from 
these result~ that the application of either a CRS or VRS model without significant 
modification does not shed any light on the analysis of this construction project data. 
4.2.2 	 Modifying the DEA Model for the Non-linear Construction Project 

I nformation Data 

It is apparent why the VRS and CRS models result in the distribution of scores as 
they do; it is because the outputs lay within a rather narrow range and the inputs vary from 
53 Note that in order to produce this histogram the output oriented DEA scores in the VRS model had to 
be inverted. 
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0.25 to 1.0 (or 25% to 1000/0 complete plans and specifications). Nearly all of the projects 
with plans and specifications of 100% complete will have efficiency scores below 50% ­
which is exactly what happens in this model. The problem comes in the evaluation of 
those input metrics. Recall that above we stated that there is no fixed standard for 
evaluating percentage complete, and the method we used was simply to ask the various 
parties to assign a number based on their past experience. This results in extreme non­
linear relationships between the principal inputs and outputs. While there is basic 
agreement that "conceptual design," is less complete in terms of "0/0 complete plans and 
specifications" metric than "schematic design" or "preliminary design" the precise 
estimates of these values varies. In other words, what one project manager means by 25% 
complete may be considered 35 or 40% complete by another. 
The generic economic production model used in the Data Envelopment Analysis 
(DEA) methodology assumes a linear relationship between inputs and outputs even though 
we are unaware of precisely how those inputs are converted to outputs. The VRS model 
allows for economic comparisons among a relatively narrow range; however, the basic 
assumption that underlies the formulation remains the linear relationship between inputs 
and outputs, and the VRS model does not handle problems where there are extreme non­
linear relationships between inputs and outputS.54 
There are a number of commercial institutions where the economic transactions 
can be characterized by non-linear relationships between inputs and outputs in particular, 
54 Some have suggested transforming the data using logarithms or other methods, but these 
transformation methods would require a strong theoretical foundation and none is known for this 
situation. 
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those where there are limiting boundaries for either measure or endogenous effects that 
cannot be fully captured. This is particularly true with professional services where input 
resources like "information" and output measures "time" and "cost" have definite fixed 
boundaries. One example is weather prediction. Given very little information such as the 
desired location and having some idea of the historical climate, it is easy to predict the 
weather at the location within a given range. For example, we can say that the temperature 
in Portland, Oregon tomorrow will range between 50 Fahrenheit and 1050 F. We can say 
this no matter what the time of the year that the most extreme temperatures ever recorded 
in Portland fall within these boundaries. With a little more information, such as the day of 
the year requested, we can narrow that range significantly. But no matter how much 
money we invest, we know that we cannot exactly predict the weather six months from 
now. Therefore, there is a distinctly non-linear relationship between the amount of 
information paid for and obtained as an input, and the accuracy of the prediction of the 
weather as an output. 
The same relationship can be said to be true in the construction sector of the 
economy. Since we know that the cost of construction is finite and exists within some 
approximate range, say between $10 and $500 per square foot, a very broad estimate on 
any building project can be made with little or no information. The amount of information 
collected by the owner and transmitted to the contractor narrows the range of costs 
considerably, but more information simply cannot eliminate the variability or range 
entirely, in part because the building environment exists in nature, the state ofwhich cannot 
be reliably predicted well out into the future. The question many owners want answered is, 
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"how much infonnation should I pay for in order to reduce the uncertainty in the pricing 
and how much infonnation is simply a waste ofresources, given a limited budget?" 
It is also important to note that the analysis set forth in Table 11 and described in 
Figure 15 supports Kagel and Levin's point [118], and our conclusion that the amount of 
actual "Infonnation" provided is not fully captured by the metric "% complete plans and 
specifications" in spite of the fact that the Expert Panel recommended it. This is because 
the metric fails to take into account the economic reality of the industry and the amount of 
training and experience of the estimators and managers of the construction companies 
involved, which is substantiaf5. This is perhaps better visualized in the Process Model 
suggested by Figure 26. 
Owner Provided 

Information Inputs 

Plans & Specifications 

Figure 26: 	 DEA Model revised to reflect the Construction Industry setting where the amount of 
information provided by the owner is greatly complimented by the contractor's own 
knowledge and experience 
55 One reason for limiting the projects to a certain size, larger than $5 million, was because we knew 
that only construction firms with substantial resources and experience can qualify for Miller Act, 
perfonnance and payment bonds, for that size of work. 
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We know both from our own study and from industry standards that the cost per 
square foot of public buildings ofvirtually all types resides within a relatively small range. 
For example, RS Means Building Construction Cost Data estimating guide provides a 
section that provides per square foot cost estimates for approximately sixty different type 
buildings from apartments to warehouses. This data includes estimates at the 25 percentile, 
median and 75 percentile ranges. Furthermore, while these data are determined by national 
averages, the guide also provides regional indexes to convert the average costs to a cost for 
a specific area. Portland, Oregon, for example, has a weighted average ofabout 1.06 times 
the national cost average for buildings, according to Means [212]. 
Armed with a commonly available estimating guide and experience in the local 
construction market, it is possible, easy in fact, for a construction estimator to narrow the 
range of possible costs far tighter than an input of 25% to 1000/0 would imply. So, for the 
purposes of a DEA model, is it possible to account for this base of knowledge that is an 
additional "resource" (or enhances the Information provided resource) that results in 
"production" from the model? And the answer to that question is, probably, though 
probably not to a level of certainty that makes the evaluation meaningful. Also, while we 
did collect data on the different construction companies, none of the data we collected as a 
proxy for experience (including number of years in business, bonding capacity, project 
team experience and so on) could be reliably tied to a single input metric for "knowledge" 
that would differ significantly from company to company. This, again, would make the 
input meaningless (if, for example, all the companies had the same input value). 
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In situations where the inputs and outputs are not directly linearly related and the 
exact relationship is unknown or not captured by known inputs, a possible approach would 
be to apply a "categorical" variable model. If applied here that would mean that projects 
for which only "conceptual design" has been completed would not compete directly with 
projects that have complete or "final design" complete jobs. They would only compete 
with other projects that have projects whose plans and specifications are similarly in the 
conceptual phase. However, that would render meaningless the point of this research, 
which is in part to compare the PDS by outcome against one another and determine if one 
type is significantly superior to the other. 
Another possible approach would be to use ordinal categorical values, such as A > 
B > C, where all members of category A are compared against both the members of 
category A, and also category B and C. Merrlbers ofcategory B would only be compared 
against members ofB and C, and members ofC are compared only against themselves. 
The decision was made to apply a modified ordinal categorical model using 
successive data sets that included: 1) all project data; 2) only projects with higher than 40% 
complete plans and specifications; 3) only projects with higher than 75% complete plans 
and specifications; and finally, 4) only projects with higher than 95% plans and 
specifications (in other words, only those that had the design complete). 
This process can be visualized as in Figure 27 below: 
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Figure 27: Conceptual structure of the modified ordinal categorical DEA model, where DEA 
scores for concept design are derived in a comparison against all categories, schematic 
design projects are compared against only schematic, preliminary and final design 
category members, preliminary design members are compared against preliminary 
and final design category members, and final design category members derive their 
DEA scores in a comparison solely within the final design category members. 
In the first run of the model, the "conceptual design" projects actually compete 
against all other projects for their technical efficiency scores and once these scores have 
been detennined the "conceptual design" projects are dropped from further analysis. In the 
next rOlUld, "schematic design" level projects compete with all of the remaining projects in 
the Oregon database for their technical efficiency scores. Once they have been detennined, 
these projects are removed from the model and the process is repeated for the "preliminary 
design" level projects. Finally, the only projects that are left are the "final design" level 
projects, which compete only against themselves for their technical efficiency scores. 
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The controlling direction of the analysis was guided by state statute. In Oregon, as 
nearly every other state, on public building projects, the state gives priority to open public 
bidding and discourages closed negotiated procurements except when it can be shown to be 
a substantial benefit to the public. The relevant portions of the particular Oregon statute, 
ORS 270.015 are as follows: 
279.015 Competitive bidding; exceptions; exemptions. (1) Subject to 
the policies and provisions of ORS 279.005 and 279.007, all public 
contracts shall be based upon competitive bids or proposals except: 
(2) Subject to subsection (6)(b) of this section, the Director of the 
Oregon Department of Administrative Services or a local contract 
review board may exempt certain public contracts or classes of public 
contracts from the competitive bidding requirements of subsection (1) of 
this section upon approval of the following findings submitted by the 
public contracting agency seeking the exemption: 
(b) The awarding of public contracts pursuant to the exemption 
will result in substantial cost savings to the public contracting 
agency. In making such finding, the director or board may consider the 
type, cost, amount of the contract, number of persons available to bid 
and such other factors as may be deemed appropriate. 
(3)(a) Before final adoption of the findings required by subsection (2) of 
this section exempting a contract for a public improvement from the 
requirement of competitive bidding, a public agency shall hold a public 
hearing. 
It is clear from these sections of the statute that the Oregon Legislature intended to 
make the option of exempting from bidding and negotiating public building contracts a 
difficult and well reasoned alternative to open competitive public bidding, but certainly an 
option. Since the state has established the baseline PDS to be DBB, then the negotiated 
procurements, the CMlGC projects, must be considered the "challenger." Therefore, the 
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challenger, which is disfavored in the statute, has the burden to show it is superior against 
the baseline, whereas the baseline has no such burden. It is reasonable to argue that this 
being the case, there is no need to evaluate the different levels of information in terms of 
the Percent Complete metric, rather, simply run all CMlGC jobs categorically against all 
competitors, and then run only the DBB projects to establish their efficiency scores. While 
this obviously can be done, we wanted a finer break-out from the analysis. 
4.2.3 Results from the Modified DEA Model 
We did not recode the existing computer software, but instead the Modified DEA 
Model was run using EMS® Software from project data, stored in an Excel® spreadsheet. 
Four passes were made on the data each using a Constant Returns to Scale (CRS) input­
oriented model as described above. (We note that the proper theoretical model for this 
application is the output oriented DEA model, however we used the input oriented model 
for ease in reporting the efficiency scores. Since we used the CRS model (in absence of 
weight restrictions), we can make use of the fact that the DEA scores in the input and 
output oriented CRS formulations are merely reciprocals ofeach other [64] and provide the 
same results. By using the input oriented model, we simply save one step ofcalculations.) 
The results of this process are depicted in Figure 28 below: 
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Figure 28: Modified Model Efficiency Scores 
The DEA efficiency scores from the Modified model range from approximately 
67% to 100% and have an arithmetic mean of91.52%56 and a standard deviation of7.76% • 
Also shown is a single frequency histogram of the DEA efficiency scores from the 
Modified Model, presented in Figure 29. 
56 DEA scores are known to be non-normally distributed bounded by: 0.0 and 1.0; however, both the 
arithmetic mean and the standard deviation do provide us with valuable information about the 
distribution of the DEA data, 
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Figure 29: Histogram of all DEA efficiency Scores from the Modified Model reflects a common 
DEA distribution, a relatively continuous distribution with a local maximum, above at 
about 920/0, and a large number of 100% efficient DMUs at the far right. 
The results obtained by the Modified Model are more consistent with the Expert 
Panel's intuitive understanding of construction project performance than the results 
obtained in the earlier DEA models depicted in Figure 25. Fifty-seven of the 215 projects 
in the final data set were determined to be 100% efficient, and 140 projects scored 90% or 
higher. 
4.2.4 Model Verification 
To verify that the DEA model could be used to analyze construction projects in the 
manner prescribed by this research, we reviewed projects that were both rated highly 
efficient and those rated inefficient to determine if these ratings accurately reflect the 
project performance. (We did not review each and every one of the projects.) Verification 
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was accomplished in several steps, and these included using super-efficiency methods and 
analysis to the comparators to explore project dominance in the peer groups. (See [226] for 
a discussion on Super Efficiency on page 217.) The analysis of comparators is 
accomplished by reviewing, what the EMS software tenns as ''benchmarks,'' the efficient 
DMUs, which all inefficient DMUs are compared to and all virtual DMUs are constructed 
from. The super efficiency method was helpful in "debugging" the initial model runs and 
finding data that was suspect. (Most importantly was dealing with missing data on the 
input side of the model for specific projects.) In the final analysis, the super efficiency of 
the most-used benchmark project was 1580/0, and the highest super-efficiency score was 
3090/0 on a project that was used by 49 others as a benchmark. The latter project earned a 
high-quality output score while starting with project information at 40%. 
Of the DBB project data, the top five efficient projects were used as benchmarks in 
the following order: 95, 72, 26, 18, and 9 times by the inefficient projects. The top two 
jobs were used as benchmarks significantly more often than any others. These jobs were a 
new construction higher education building and a remodel of another higher education 
facility. The former project completed on time and was under the original bid amount, 
while the remodel project experienced both cost and schedule growth but achieved a low 
cost per square foot in spite ofhaving a low input level and quality ofinformation. 
The CMlGC projects had a more efficient project than DBB, and the distribution of 
comparators or benchmarks was found to be more dispersed. The top five efficient 
projects were used as benchmarks for the following number ofprojects: 176, 154, 137,85, 
81 and 76. The first project was a new high school project with both the architect and 
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contractor estimating the plans and specifications to be no more than 15% complete at the 
time the GMP was agreed upon. While the project incurred significant cost growth, the 
project was completed within the contract period, opening in time for the school year to 
begin. The second project was a new corrections facility that started with 75% complete 
plans and specifications and finished on time, on budget and earned the contractor his 
expected fee. 
The reason the CMlGC jobs are used as benchmarks by 176 and 154 projects, as 
opposed to 95 and 72 for DBB jobs, is due to the way the modified model was constructed. 
Most DBB projects were started after final design was complete and therefore their 
benchmarks were established principally using only other DBB projects, whereas most 
CMlGC projects were compared against all 215 projects in the data set. 
The lowest rated projects among both the CMlGC and DBB jobs were those that 
either had missing data, thus reducing the number of pathways to the efficiency frontier, or 
were at the high end of the amount of information (input) in their peer group, an aspect of 
non-linearity that we were not completely able to eliminate. (However, this drawback 
would not affect the outcome ofthe analysis as demonstrated in the following section.) 
Based on the above analysis, we conclude that the modified model adequately 
reflects the building construction environment, and the model scores can be used to 
compare the performance of the PDS' s. 
4.2.5 Evaluating the Project Delivery Systems 
The next step in our analysis was to evaluate the two project delivery systems, 
DBB and CMlGC based on their DEA technical efficiency scores. This was done by 
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applying nonnal statistical methods, reserving, of course, the same caveats about statistical 
analysis of DEA score distributions that was previously discussed. Both the group 
statistics and the tests for independence are presented in Table 15 and Table 16 
respectively. 
PDS N Mean Std. Dev 
CMGC 111 92.50% 8.59% 
DBB 104 90.48% 6.64% 
Table 15: Group Statistics of DEA Scores from the Modified Model 
Note from the analysis in Table 15 the difference between the means of the two 
populations is just over 2%, with CMlGC projects having a slightly higher mean technical 
efficiency score. However, Table 16 below indicates that the difference in the two 
populations is not quite statistically significant at the 95% level (although it is quite close 
with p = 0.056). 
Levene's 
Test for 
Equality of 
Variances 
t-test for Equality of Means 
F Sig. t. df Sig 
(2-tail) 
Mean 
Diff 
Std 
Error 
Diff 
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
Upper Lower 
Score: 
Equal 
Var. 
Assm'd 
9.89 0.002 1.92 213 0.056 2.020/0 1.050/0 -.052% 4.10% 
Score: 
Equal 
Var. 
not 
Assm'd 
1.93 205.7 0.054 2.020/0 1.04%, -.0360/0 4.08% 
Table 16: Test for Independent Populations for PDS based on DEA Scores from the Modified 
Model 
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This statistical analysis of the DEA scores gives similar results as that produced on 
the base output data analysis presented in Table 11. That is, in spite ofthe fact the CM/OC 
negotiated procurements have a slightly higher average, the difference between CM/OC 
and DBB is not statistically significant in terms ofDEA scores from the modified model. 
One interesting note is that the CM/OC projects have a greater range in efficiency 
scores than the DBB jobs. Levene's test for equality ofvariances shown in Table 16 finds 
that the variances, and therefore the standard deviations ofCM/OC and DBB projects, are 
significantly different. These results indicate that while the means may not be statistically 
different, the CM/OC projects n1ay pose the greater risk in terms of cost and schedule 
growth. It also indicates the owner has a greater range ofpossible project savings. 
4.2.6 Nonparametric Methods of Comparison 
Since DEA is a non-parametric method and the DEA scores are distinctly not 
normally distributed, another way of evaluating any difference in the two populations is to 
actually look at the distributions and apply non-parametric techniques. Observing these 
two populations ~e note that the CM/OC projects have a higher proportion of 100% 
efficient projects than do the DBB jobs. In fact, 41 of 111 CM/OC projects were 
determined to be 100% efficient, whereas only 15 of the 104 DBB jobs were determined to 
be 100% efficient. However, this difference becomes less distinct when you compare all 
projects with 90% or better efficiency scores; in that case, 64 of the 104 DBB jobs scored 
better than 90% efficient, while 74 of the 111 CM/OC projects scored 90% or better. And, 
on the other end of the spectrum, six of the 111 CM/OC projects scored less than 75% 
efficient, whereas only one of the DBB jobs scored lower than 75%. This is probably due 
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to the fact that infonnation provided in the DBB projects is more consistent (since nearly 
all DBB jobs have 100% complete plans and specifications), whereas the CMlGC 
population of projects have a broad variation in the amount of infonnation (ranging from 
15% to 1000/0 complete plans and specifications). 
Section 2.14 discusses different types of nonparametric statistical methods for 
evaluating populations that, like DEA scores, are not nonnally distributed. One of those 
tests is the Mann-Whitney and Wilcoxon tests (which give the same results through two 
different methods). 
PDS N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks 
DBB 104 95.86 9959.00 
CM/GC 111 119.47 13261.00 
Total 215 
Table 17: Mann-Whitney Nonparametric Rank Method Analysis 
The test statistic Z of -2.82 and level of significance at 0.005 indicates that the 
DEA scores are not from the same population, and in this case the difference is significant. 
The DBB projects have a lower rank, but in this case, since the DEA technical efficiency 
scores range from 1.0 down, it means that the CMlGC projects in fact have a higher mean 
technical efficiency score, which is better. From this analysis, we can state that the CMlGC 
projects have a higher mean technical efficiency score, and that the difference is 
statistically significant. 
In summary, the nonparametric analysis of the DEA technical efficiency scores 
results in a statistically significant difference between the two populations, whereas the 
nonnal parametric Wlvariate statistical analysis did not. Since the DEA technical efficiency 
151 
scores are distinctly non-normal, the nonparametric analysis is more appropriate. From the 
nonparan1etric analysis, it can be said with some confidence that the CMlOC projects 
achieve higher DEA technical efficiency scores than DBB projects, and that the difference 
is statistically significant. 
4.2.7 Results of the Analysis Research Question #2 
Using non-parametric analysis to test the hypothesis: 
HA2 : Negotiated Procurement, Construction Manager/General 
Contractor (CM/GC) method of Project Delivery System (PDS) 
outperforms the traditional Design-Bid-Build (DBB) PDS method. 
We cannot reject the hypothesis that the CMlOC projects outperform the traditional 
DBB PDS method projects in terms of overall project technical efficiency. However, one 
question that remains is, if the CMlOC projects do not outperform the DBB jobs in terms 
outputs but do in overall efficiency, can we determine why this occurs? (This question will 
be addressed below.) 
4.2.8 No-input Model 
Figure 15, the scatter plot ofthe Oregon database presented in Section 3.7 above, is 
similar to a two-dimensional DEA model that assumes no inputs, or where all ofthe inputs 
are equal to some number (in the specific case 1.0). A final run of the DEA model using 
1.0 as the only input while using all of the outputs as in the previous model, in the same 
graduated method as before, was done. This model yielded fewer efficient projects, 
twenty-three (23) total; with eleven (11) DBB and twelve (12) CMlOC. Statistical and 
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non-parametric tests were perfonned on these model results and indicated that while there 
were differences in the populations of projects by PDS, the differences were not 
statistically significant. 1bis was probably to be expected given the earlier analysis of the 
output metrics discussed in Section 3.7. 
The one important observation from this alternative model and analysis is that the 
significant advantage that CMlOC projects obtain in the DEA model accrues principally 
because ofthe inputs, in particular, the percent complete ofplans and specifications. 
4.2.9 	 Summary 
In summary, the nonparametric statistical analysis of DEA technical efficiency 
scores showed that the CMlGC projects have, on average, higher technical efficiency 
scores, and the difference between the CMlOC and DBB populations is significant based 
on the non-parametric statistical analysis. We reject the null hypothesis that CMlOC 
projects do not result in projects that have a higher technical-efficiency score, and we 
accept the hypothesis that CMlOC projects are more technically efficient than DBB 
projects. Furthennore, the analysis shows that a higher proportion of CMlOC projects are 
"technically efficient" (with '41 of 111 CMlOC projects compared with 15 of 104 DBB 
technically efficient jobs). Also, 55 ofthe 111 CMlOC projects had DEA efficiency scores 
of 95% or above, whereas 25 of the 104 DBB projects achieved DEA efficiency scores of 
95% or above. Finally, the advantage that CMlOC projects enjoy accrues principally from 
the inputs, in particular the percent complete plans and specifications. This is the strongest 
evidence that fast-tracking of projects is the primary benefit of using the CMlOC PDS, 
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since fast-tracking is one principal difference between the two PDS's (along with pre­
construction services offered to the owner by the CM/GC). 
There is no way to precisely detennine if one method is more cost effective than 
the other, but theory and empirical study (such as: [135]) would suggest that on average, 
CMJOC projects are more costly than competitive bid projects due to the absence of other 
competitive bidders. This will be explored in more depth in Chapter 6 which is a case 
comparison oftwo similar projects. 
The analysis of the DEA model input and output weightings gives some clues as to 
how the two populations maximized their DEA scores and made it to the production 
frontier. The difference between the two populations is slight but generally consistent with 
the comments made by the stakeholders in the stakeholder sUlVey found in Chapter 5, 
specifically a greater focus on quality but a lower focus on schedule control. Looking at 
the data in another way, the slacks indicate the improvement required to reach the 
efficiency frontier given the weightings of the virtual DMU. There is an important point to 
note here: if, as in some cases with the Oregon database, a DMU has no data is reported for 
an output metric, the virtual DMU most likely does not utilize that output in its model and 
therefore no improvement is reported to be available - presumably because the comparator 
also did not use that metric. The analysis of the slacks indicates that there is no statistically 
significant difference between the populations ofprojects (CMJGC and DBB) with respect 
to improvement. 
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4.3 	 Research Question 3: PDS I Project type Interaction through Analysis of 
the DEA Scores and Weightings 
This analysis was perfonned to detennine if one of the PDS's outperfonned the 
other on specific types of projects, that is, if there is some kind of interaction between 
project type and PDS based on DBA efficiency score. The intent here is to determine if 
some guidance can be offered to public agency project owners on the type of PDS they 
should consider using for specific types of projects. In other words, if, for example, PSU 
was going to build a library, can we detennine if CMlOC or DBB is the more appropriate 
PDStouse? 
We use the results from the Modified DEA Model obtained in the earlier analysis 
for the first part of this analysis, which looks at the mean and median DEA scores by 
project type to determine if there is any interaction between project type and PDS. The 
second analysis looks at the mean DMU weighting schemes to detennine if there is a 
difference in the way each of the project types maximizes their particular DEA score. 
These weightings were taken from the EMS® software model using the "virtual weights" 
option, which reports the weighting schemes of the virtual DMUs associated with each 
inefficient DMUi and of course, in the case of the efficient DMUs, EMS reports their 
weighting scheme directly. These weights are actually the Ui Xi,O and VO'i,O for the virtual 
and efficient DMUs, which results in a sum of 1.0 for all inputs and outputs in the model. 
For this analysis we test the hypotheses: 
HA3: CM/GC PDS results in projects that outperform DBB PDS 
on similar types of projects. 
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HA3.1: When applied to corrections projects, CM/GC PDS 
results in projects that outperform DBB PDS projects. 
HA3.2: When applied to hospital projects CM/GC PDS 
results in projects that outperform DBB PDS projects. 
HA3.3: When applied to institutional projects CM/GC PDS 
results in projects that outperform DBB PDS projects. 
HA3.4: When applied to library projects CM/GC PDS 
results in projects that outperform DBB PDS projects. 
HA3.S: When applied to office building projects CM/GC 
PDS results in projects that outperform DBB PDS 
projects. 
HA3.6: When applied to parking structure projects CM/GC 
PDS results in projects that outperform DBB PDS 
projects. 
HA3.7: When applied to building remodel projects CM/GC 
PDS results in projects that outperform DBB PDS 
projects. 
HA3.a: When applied to school projects CM/GC PDS 
results in projects that outperform DBB PDS projects. 
HA3.9: When applied to sports facility projects CM/GC PDS 
results in projects that outperform DBB PDS projects. 
H03: CM/GC PDS does not result in projects that outperform 
DBB PDS on similar types of projects. 
(Note the sub-hypotheses of the null hypothesis H03 are omitted for 
brevity.) 
4.3.1 DEA Scores by Project Type and PDS 
This analysis is perfonned to detennine if one PDS or another works best in one 
particular situation or another, and to detennine if one PDS or the other is significantly 
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better for a particular type of project. In Table 18 below, the nwnber of projects, mean 
DEA score, median DEA score and standard deviation of DEA score are given by project 
type and PDS. 
Note that while these are non-nonnally distributed populations, the non-parametric 
methods generally will not work because those methods typically require an N ~ 10 [120], 
and while that is met for some ofthe comparison groups, it is not met for each ofthem. 
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Office 
Parking 
Remodel 
School 
Table 18: Results of DEA Scores by Project Type and PDS; note that bolding of the 
PDS by type indicates a higher average DEA score and light shading 
indicates that the difference in the average DEA score are greater than 5% 
From the results in given in Table 18, it should be noted that the CMlOC PDS has a 
higher mean DEA score on six of the nine different project types, although none of these 
differences are statistically significant (principally because the N's are so small and the 
variances in the data so large). Hospitals show the greatest difference in DEA Scores with 
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CM/GC DEA scores 10.35% higher on average, but in the case ofCMlGC projects, it's an 
average of one. DBB projects average about 8% better than CMlGC PDS projects on 
office buildings, but again, this is an average of only two projects, compared with seven 
CMlGC jobs. DBB projects achieved DBA scores 5% higher than CMlGC parking garage 
projects, and while these are nearly equal populations (3 DBB projects and 4 CMlGC), the 
difference between the two means is not significant. The three largest populations of 
projects were institutional projects with 25, remodel with 51, and schools with 81. CMlGC 
projects had higher mean DBA scores on all three of these project types than DBB: 4.05%, 
3.28% and 1.0%, but again, none of these differences are statistically significant, and the 
practical significance ofthese differences is not great. 
Another way to look at the DBA scores is to look at the number of efficient and 
near efficient projects (those with DBA scores> 95%) by project type and PDS. This data 
is captured in Table 19 below. 
1 
1 
7 5 
3 2 
1 1 
1 2 
22 
7 
1 
Table 19: Number of Projects with DEA Score> 95% 
Here the difference between the CMlGC and DBB project scores is made more 
clear and is consistent with the non-parametric analysis results above. Note that most of 
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the data are relatively close in comparison except in the case ofRemodel and Corrections 
projects, where CM/OC dominates the DBB PDS performance. In schools, since there are 
so many DBB school projects (58 as compared to 23 CM/OC school jobs), the fact that 
there are more efficient and near efficient CM/OC projects is significant also (as well as 
counter intuitive. )57 
4.3.2 DEA Model Weights 
The weighting schemes used by each DMU to maximize their efficiency score are 
assumed to be an indication of how a project is managed. A project manager that puts a 
heavy emphasis on schedule performance as opposed to budget performance should result 
in a higher relative weight on the schedule as opposed to the budget metric. The intent of 
this analysis is to determine if CM/OC projects are managed significantly differently from 
DBBjobs. 
Table 20 presents average virtual DMU weighting scheme given by the EMS 
software for the DEA model in order to maximize the particular DMU's technical 
efficiency score. Note these are averages of the weighting schemes given by project type 
and the total average for each PDS and are not the weight of any particular project, except 
in the case where only one project is a member ofa particular project type. 
57 As mentioned earlier, schools are the most common public building built in Oregon and elsewhere, as 
reflected in the Oregon data. Since there are more schools than any other type building one would 
expect that competitive bidding on schools would be fierce and that any problems in construction of this 
type would have been worked out, meaning little or no unknowns. Furthermore, since schools more or 
less have to open at the beginning of the school year, the opportunity for schedule growth is extremely 
limited. Ofcourse, looking at it from the other side, perhaps those are reasons why the CM/GC projects 
have a higher average DEA score and higher proportion of efficient and near efficient projects. Fierce 
bidding reduces profits through winner's curse and errors, things that are not present in CMlGC. In 
addition, since the amount ofknowledge and experience on schools is so broad and great, perhaps that 
allows CMlGC's to start even earlier and pay no cost in terms ofperformance. 
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An analysis of the DEA model input and output weightings gives some clues how 
the two populations maximized their DEA scores and made it to the production frontier 
(see discussion in [64] at page 25). 
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DBB 
Tota 
Corrections 
0.897 
0.996 
0.103 
0.004 
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0.656 
0.270 
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Hospita 0.964 0.036 0.000 0.000 0.644 0.000 0.356 
I nstitutiona 0.931 0.069 0.000 0.110 0.596 0.252 0.043 
Libra') 0.969 0.031 0.001 0.103 0.876 0.000 0.020 
Office 0.993 0.007 0.000 0.003 0.243 0.258 0.498 
Parking 1.000 0.000 0.184 0.039 0.147 0.476 0.154 
Remode 0.916 0.085 0.049 0.177 0.376 0.322 0.077 
Schoo 0.977 0.023 0.017 0.068 0.432 0.472 0.011 
Sports Facilities 0.965 0.036 0.013 0.045 0.655 0.000 0.288 
0.962 0.038 0.023 0.087 0.466 0.369 0.055 
Table 20: Mode) average weighting scheme by project type and PDS for inputs and 
outputs 
The difference between the two populations is slight. The CMlGC proj ects placed 
a slightly lower weight on the "0/0 complete of plans and specifications" input than the 
DBB projects did, which is perhaps indicative of the fact that the plans and specifications 
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are generally incomplete and to a lower level of quality in the CMlGC projects than in the 
DBBjobs. 
On the output side the differences are again generally slight. The DBB projects 
place a higher proportion of their weight on the schedule control metric than do the 
CMlGC projects, while the CMlGC projects place more weight on the profit output metric 
- but this may be due to the fact that few ofthe DBB projects reported "profit," whereas in 
most of the CMlGC projects, the fee was known.58 Both methods place about the same 
weight on the budget control metric and total cost per square foot metric. CMlGC projects 
place a higher weight on the quality metric than the DBB jobs, but the difference is only 
4.5% on average for CMlGC as compared to 2.3% for DBB. 
One interesting difference is found in Hospital work, where CMlGC projects 
placed no weight on the cost control metric and nearly all (98.9%) on the schedule control 
metric, whereas the near opposite is true with the DBB projects, where all of the weight is 
distributed between budget control and profit maximization metrics and no weight is given 
to schedule control. However, it should be noted that this analysis is based on just one (1) 
CMlGC project and three (3) DBB jobs, meaning the result is probably an anomaly. 
58 The CMlGC jobs were mostly cost reimbursable jobs and therefore were audited, which often 
included the amount paid for fee. DBB projects on the other hand were not audited nor billed in the 
same manner. The only projects where the profit metric was known was in cases where the contractor 
provided it to us. 
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Table 22: Absolute differences in average weightings: CM/GC-DBB 
163 
Table 21 and Table 22 present two different ways of looking at the different 
weighting schemes employed by the different PDS's. The percent different statistics can 
be somewhat misleading because they magnify what may actually be rather small 
differences, such as the 92% difference in corrections quality input metric (SF/(RFI+AR» 
which is in fact only a 5.1% absolute difference. But overall, these statistics do point out 
some very important differences in weighting schemes, which we take to imply differences 
in management priorities. Project quality has a 63% higher weighting in CMlOC than 
DBB, which is consistent with the comments taken from the stakeholder analysis (see 
Chapter 5). CMlOC projects place a 36% lower weight on the schedule control metric than 
DBB projects do and a much higher (63%) weight on the profit maximization metric, but 
this is likely misleading as discussed above. 
Lastly, a cluster analysis was perfonned using all of the weighting data from the 
DEA model to detennine ifthe PDS were clustered by output metric. For example, did all 
of the CMlOC projects cluster into one group with a significantly. different output 
weighting scheme than DBB projects did? For this analysis a K-means clustering method 
was used and three different clustering arrangements were specified: four clusters, three, 
and two. 
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1 2 3 4 
CMGC 22 38 18 33 
9 59DBB 10 26 
1 2 3 
CMGC 24 40 47 
DBB 12 63 29 
1 2 
62 49CMGC 
DBB 69 35 
'----­
Table 23: Cluster Membership by PDS 
In all three clusterings, there is one cluster that places a high weight on the Budget 
Performance Metric and another cluster that places its highest weight on the Schedule 
Performance Metric. However, cluster membership does not appear to be related to PDS, 
except in rare si!Uations. In the four cluster analysis, cluster 1 is dominated by CMlOC 
projects (more than 2:1), cluster 2 is dominated by DBB projects (about 3:2), and cluster 3 
appears to be dominated by CMlOC projects (nearly 2:1). However, while there is a large 
difference between cluster 1 and cluster 2, with cluster 1 placing its highest weight on 
Budget Performance and cluster 2 placing its highest weight on Schedule Performance, 
there is no notable similarity between clusters 1 and 3, nor is there a large difference 
between the memberships by PDS of cluster 4. In the three cluster analysis, there is a 
significant difference between clusters 2 and 3. Cluster 2 is dominated by DBB projects 
and places its highest weight on the Schedule Performance Metric, whereas cluster 3 is 
dominated by CMlOC projects and places its highest weight on Budget Performance. The 
two cluster analysis indicates little difference between the memberships by PDS but 
follows the same pattern ofweightings as the previous analyses. 
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It is possible to conclude that CM/GC projects are managed with a higher emphasis 
on budget perfonnance than schedule perfonnance and vice versa for DBB projects. This 
is consistent with the earlier analysis, but weakened by the fact that the major differences 
disappear in the two-cluster situation and a discriminate analysis ofcluster membership by 
PDS was not significant. 
4.3.3 Slacks 
The other important question to ask is how could the inefficient DMUs actually 
improve? In linear programming models like DEA, the slacks tell us "the possible input 
excesses and output shortfalls" [64] at page 44, or in other words, areas where the project 
can improve in order to become efficient. 
Table 24 below is a gross comparison of the means of the output slacks from the 
DEA model for the 159 inefficient projects by PDS. 
Project Delivery System 
~ 
-tG
::s 
a 
LL 
UJ
., 
til 
0 (.) 
"0
...
... 
c 
0 (.)
.. 
til 
0 (.) 
... q:: 
e 
D.. 
(1)_
-0 
::::s ...
"t1 ..CDC 
.co 
u(J
UJ 
ClVVGC !\lean 
(N=70) Std. l:eJiatioo 
0.208 
0.386 
0.255 
0.364 
0.018 
0.098 
OJJJ7 
0.151 
0.131 
0.265 
DBB IVean 
1{N=89) Std.l:eJiatioo 
0.169 
-0.149 
0.128 
0.210 
0.033 
0.149 
0.081 
0.131 
o.em 
O.~ 
Table 24: Statistical comparison of the DMU slacks 
The data presented above gives us only a broad notion ofperhaps how the projects 
on average can Improve. Nonnally, the value of the DEA model is derived by evaluating 
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the projects on an individual basis and detennining how each individual project or groups 
ofprojects would have to improve in order to reach the efficiency frontier. For example, it 
would have been possible to break the projects down by construction company and let the 
management know if there are any trends in their projects that make them inefficient and 
suggest ways to improve them. However, in order to obtain project data for this research, 
complete confidentiality about the projects had to be granted (as detailed in Chapter 3), and 
therefore is not presented here. 
One note ofcaution is that missing data in the outputs will have a significant effect 
on the slacks (for example, in the profit performance output metric). In general, both 
CMlGC and DBB projects show the least available improvement in the cost control metric 
and relatively high available improvement in quality and cost per square foot output 
metrics. But, the variances in the data are quite high relative to the mean in all categories. 
Lastly, it must be remembered that the slacks only occur in inefficient projects; the fact that 
a higher proportion ofCMlGC projects are efficient, as compared to DBB, raises questions 
about whether or not this analysis can be generalized to the entire population of CMlGC 
projects. 
4.3.4 	 Summary of the Interaction of PDS by Application 
In answer to the third research question regarding the interaction of proj ects by 
project type and str~tegy of getting to the efficiency frontier, there is no significant 
difference between the PDS's. Neither PDS appears to be significantly out-performing the 
other on specific types of projects,. nor does it appear the popUlations of projects use 
different management priorities or emphasis in order to reach the efficiency frontier, 
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although there appears to be a weak relationship between CMJGC projects and budget 
control emphasis and DBB projects and schedule control emphasis. These differences in 
the weighting schemes used by the two popUlations of DMUs and differences in the 
efficiency scores ofthe different project types by PDS are marginal and do not appear to be 
statistically significant. In addition, only institutional, remodel, and school project types 
had sufficiently large numbers in both types to make the comparison particularly 
~eaningful. This finding is unfortunate because one of the early goals ofthis research was 
to provide public agency building owners some guidance in making a PDS choice based on 
the type ofproject. 
We fail to find sufficient evidence to support the hypotheses that CMJGC projects 
have higher mean technical efficiency scores than DBB projects for specific project types 
(the principal hypothesis H03 and each of the sub-hypotheses: H03.1 to Ho3.9). We find no 
basis for rejecting the null hypothesis that CMJGC does not outperfonn DBB projects of 
similar proj ect type. 
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5 Surveys from Stakeholders 
As has been noted throughout this dissertation, this research emphasizes the 
application of operations research and statistical models to evaluate a public policy in the 
public construction industry sector. The analysis of public policies in a complex 
environment simply cannot be limited to quantitative models, as Quade noted in 1982: 
"In public policy affairs, no matter what problem the analyst investigates 
there will always be aspects for which quantitative techniques are 
clearly inapplicable or inadequate. Sometimes, (but rarely) this is of 
little consequence ... a quantitative model, which may not include all 
aspects of the problem, may provide the analyst or decision-maker with 
sufficient insight for him to modify the results in the light of his additional 
knowledge about aspects that could not be incorporated into the 
modeL" "policy analysis is critically dependent upon the use of [expert] 
judgment" [163]. 
This extended quote demonstrates that, in the realm of policy analysis, the tole of 
expert opinion is often times a key ingredient in the final outcome. Furthennore, as 
Crowley [67] states, ''there is a puzzling contrast between policy-makers and practitioners 
on the effectiveness ofcompetitive procurements." 
ill order to better understand the PDS decision, that is, the choice to exempt or not 
exempt a specific project from competitive bidding, expert opinion ofthe practitioners was 
sought. ill addition, we sought to uncover information that would either support or refute 
Crowley's supposition, that there are strong differences of opinions among project 
stakeholders. Finally, we sought to better understand and explain the different underlying 
attitudes ofthe stakeholders. 
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5.1 Research Question #4: 
The fourth research question basically asks whether or not the opinions of 
practitioners, the actual persons that deal with projects on a daily basis, are consistent with 
the data analysis, and secondarily, if all of the practitioners' views are consistent with 
respect to project perfonnance under the different PDS's? 
5.1.1 Multiple Stakeholder 'Analysis 
The idea of utilizing mUltiple perspectives in analysis dates to the 1950's with 
extensive contributions in the 1960's culminating in Linstone's 1984 book, Multiple 
Perspectives in Decision Making [142]. However, stakeholder analysis, as discussed by 
Harrison and S1. John in Strategic Management ofOrganizations and Stakeholders [106], 
has generally been treated as an analysis tool to fonnulate business strategy that balances or 
optimizes the rewards (and penalties) to the various stakeholders. Here, we use the 
stakeholder analysis to better understand the PDS decision, and the different attitudes and 
perceptions ofthe project stakeholders with regard to the choice ofPDS. 
In the Washington study [99] the authors elicited comments from the different 
stakeholders in the projects as part of their analysis. The authors asked the participants to 
answer to provide comments and observations about the use of CMlGC59 and to compare 
CMlGC with DBB on these public projects. The authors did not make an evaluation of the 
comments; however, they did put all of the comments arranged by commenter type: 
architect/engineer, contractor, owner, and subcontractor in their, "Appendix 1." 
59 Or in their case "GC/CM or sometimes referred to as CM with a GMP" but they are equivalent PDS 
to CMlGC used in Oregon, and CM@R and CMR used in the ClI Studies. 
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The analysis here generally follows the "Systematic Form for a Narrative 
Analysis" outlined by Manning and Cullum-Swan [144] with conclusions and evaluations 
made consistent with additional sections found in [73]. 
5.1.2 Project Stakeholders 
ht the construction industry, stakeholder analysis has been used as part ofthe TQM 
process. As noted by Kumaraswamy [130], its purpose is to recognize the "heightened 
need for effective and efficient evaluations by stakeholders... [to help] improve the 
management of ongoing and oncoming projects." Kumaraswamy lists the construction 
project stakeholders as owners, contractors and professional consultants and notes that the 
construction industry is currently lacking the type of systematic project evaluations 
proposed in [130]. 
ht addition to owners, consultants and contractors, the subcontractor and supplier 
connnunity along with the taxpayer could be considered as project stakeholders. Clearly, 
subcontractors have a stake in successful project outcomes since a bad project outcome 
inevitably reflects poorly on them as businesses (i.e.: poor quality) and a bad financial 
outcome might be passed on to them from the general contractor (i.e.: withholding 
retainage or progress payments). However, the enabling legislation that allows for the 
exemption from competitive public bidding requires that an exemption will not result in 
reducing competition or favoritism (see Section 2.6 above). This requirement has been 
taken by many public agencies to mean that all subcontracts are to be competitively bid. 
For this reason, the relationship between general contractor or CMlOC and their 
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subcontractors is not fUndamentally changed by the change in general contractor selection 
method.60 
5.1.2.1 DBB Lump Sum Bid Selection Management Model 
Figure 30 below depicts the management relationships typical of the lump sum bid 
selected construction project as presented by Eberwein [85]. 
Relationships in the 
Lump Sum Bid Selection Model 
Selected by Bid, Managed Strictly by Contract: - - - - - - -.. 

Selected by Preference, Managed as Team: III .. 

Figure 30: DBB or Lump Sum Bid Relationship Diagram 
Note that in this model the owner and the design consultants fonn a team, while the 
general contractor and subcontractors are managed strictly by contract provisions. 
Furthennore, note that the relationship between the design consultant and the general 
contractor passes only through the owner. This is due to the "privity of contracting" 
60 Although some subcontractors may argue that the CMlGC method is actually more difficult for the 
subcontractor because the CM/GC acts as the owner's agent to deny subcontractor extra work claims 
since the CM/GC does not stand to benefit from the change order, particularly if it exceeds the GMP. 
This changes the CM/GC from an ally to an adversary. 
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requirements. The owner and the design consultants have a strong mutual relationship 
because the owner, by selecting the design consultant on the basis ofpreference as opposed 
to lowest bid, has a stake in the design consultant's success and vice versa. The 
relationship between the general contractor and the owner is much weaker on a personal 
level because the owner has less personal credibility at stake ifthe lowest bidder happens to 
fail in one way or another. That is, the decision to select the contractor was not entirely in 
the owner's hands because the lowest bidder is automatically selected.61 
In the nonnal process, general contractors select subcontractors on the basis of 
lowest bid price in assembling their bid. This process results in relationships that are more 
often than not contractual as opposed to personal or team oriented. 62 
5.1.2.2 Non-bid (CM/GC) Selection Management Model 
Figure 31 depicts the management model for the non-bid or CMlGC construction 
project as presented by Eberwein [85]. 
61 There are some pre-qualification requirements contractors must meet for bidding; however, these are 
minimal, and if a contractor is capable of obtaining a performance and payment bond, they are normally 
considered "qualified." Also, contractors can be disqualified post bid if they fail to meet various 
minority business utilization requirements on some contracts. 
62 General contractors have substantially more flexibility in selecting subcontractors in that there is not 
legal mandate that the general contractor must use the lowest sub contract bidder; it is simply a rational 
business decision to use the sum ofthe lowest sub prices when the general contractor is selected on the 
basis of lowest total price. 
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Relationships in the Competitive 

Negotiation (CM/GC) Selection Model 

,; - ... 
,; , ... 
," , " 
,;,;,;,;,; , " 
Selected by Bid, Managed Strictly by Contract: - - - - - - + 

Selected by Preference, Managed as Team: ~ III 

Figure 31: CM/GC Relationship Diagram 
Note in this model the management relationship between the owner and the 
CMlGC is essentially the same as the relationship between the owner and the design 
consultant. This is because the method by which the CMlGC and the design consultants 
were selected is essentially the same. They are both selected on the basis of owner 
preference based on perceived qualifications for the job, among other considerations. Note 
also that there is now a direct "team management" relationship between the CMlGC and 
the design consultant. However, since the selection method for the subcontractors remains 
the same as in the lump sum model, the relationship between the general and 
subcontractors remains essentially the same. This analysis holds equally true for suppliers, 
perhaps even more so, because suppliers nonnally simply ship materials to a jobsite and 
receive payment through purchase orders, a practice common to both management models. 
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Since the fundamental relationship between the subcontractors and either a general 
contractor or CM/GC is essentially the same, we have decided not to include 
subcontractors in our stakeholder analysis. This is not to say that subcontractors and 
suppliers are not stakeholders in project outcomes; they certainly are, as discussed above. 
We are simply saying that since the relationship is the same in both models, we expect their 
view ofefficiency would not be affected by selection method. 
5.2 Goldblatt and Septelka [99] Stakeholder Analysis 
Goldblatt and Septelka [99] asked stakeholders and competitors to provide their 
observations and comments about the use ofCM/GC on public projects and to compare the 
PDS's in terms ofproject performance, project team performance, design, pre-construction 
services, subcontractor work-packages, project management, construction, commissioning 
and start-up, and acceptance and close-out. They also asked competitors, both contractors 
and subcontractors preswnably who did not work on projects, to provide comments. 
Finally, they invited the Agencies to provide "Project Evaluation Survey Comments" on: 
Schedule, Cost, Changes, Quality, and Process Evaluation. 
5.2.1 Team Survey Comments 
The project teams, including the CM/GC, the architect/engineer, owner and 
subcontractors were asked to comment on the project performance and compare the 
CMlGC process on the particular project that they were working on. The comments by the 
CMlGC, the owner and the architect/engineer were generally positive observations with 
some caveats such as: 
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• 	 Subcontractors have performed well in dealing with tough remodel 
conditions. The change order prices are at a premium. 
• 	 Met & exceeded a very aggressive schedule while delivering a high 
quality product. Cost was appropriate to the product value. 
• 	 The design took longer than expected; however, we are on track for 
an early building delivery. 
• 	 Good project except for warranty issues. 
• 	 The resulting building has received an AlA Honor Award, as well as 
others. User satisfaction is very high. Process to get there was very 
difficult and painful. 
• 	 Very good input from the [CM/GC] RE: Cost, Schedule, and 
Con structa bility. 
Subcontractors had distinctly different observations: 
• 	 Unreasonable and inflexible schedule drove cost increases. Lack of 
CM/GC self-performing significant portions of the work themselves 
caused a disconnect between the CM/GC and the project schedule. 
• 	 Poor CM/GC performance. Withholds information. Slow to respond 
to RFl's and change orders. 
• 	 For a variety of reasons, the build-out was delayed 6 months with the 
completion date remaining unchanged. The compression created 
significant impacts given 250 electrical changes & 2500 RFI's. 
In comparing the PDS's directly, again the architect/engineers (AlE), contractors 
(C) and owners (0) comments were generally positive and in favor of CMlGC. A sample 
ofthe comments by commenter type are given below: 
• 	 AlE: Project proceeded more smoothly with [CM/GC] leadership as 
agent for the owner. 
• 	 AlE: Performance was accomplished with less conflict than in DBB. 
• 	 AlE: The [CM/GC] contractor has been only "slightly" more of a 
partner in problem solving for design problems than with a DBB 
contract. 
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• 	 C: There was considerable project savings. 
• 	 C: [CM/GCl process provided the owner beUer control of the program 
components at a lower cost than a similar DBB. 
• 	 C: WSU had many bad DBB experiences and opted for [CM/GC]. It 
was a wise choice - project has been a resounding success. 
• 	 C: This project was completed on time, within budget, and without 
claims, which likely would not have happened under the traditional 
DBB process. 
• 	 0: Better construction documents, no surprises and better team 
attitud.e on the side of the contractor. 
• 	 0: It is very difficult to separate cost and schedule problems into 
those resulting from conditions at the time of project, and those 
resulting from [CM/GC] methods. 
• 	 0: Reduced Claims by subs. 
• 	 0: [CM/GC] process has no vested ownership except $, they sided 
with the subs on all disputed issues. 
• 	 0: The performance of the [CM/GCl on this project is far superior to 
that on any other DBB project with which I've been involved. 
• 	 0: [CM/GCl cost management between design phases (estimates) 
yield better cost control of project. 
• 	 0: Higher level of cooperation among team members. Changes 
rnade with less impact. Better quality. 
There was only one subcontractor comment listed: 
• 	 [CM/GC] offers the subcontractor no control in comparison to DBB. 
Job stagnated due to multitude of RFI's/changes. [CM/GC] removes 
subcontractor from direct contact with the owner. 
On Team Perfonnance, again the architect/engineer, contractor, and owner 
comments were generally positive, while the subcontractor comments were generally 
negative. It is clear from the comments that the owner-contractor-architect/engineer 
relationship in CMlGC is considered improved over the DBB process. Each of these 
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construction team members commented that the "relationships have been good and 
positive," ''very collaborative I trusting," ''Team worked very well together'" "Excellent." 
There were a couple ofisolated negative comments: 
• 	 AlE: Owner's representative was too weak. 
• 	 0: Partnering process was incomplete and virtually abandoned. 
• 	 0: Biggest problem was lack of mechanical/electrical design 
coordination. 
Subcontractor responses, which include only three (3), were not as positive: 
• 	 Overly aggressive design period and incomplete project 
programming prevented complete design prior to construction 
phase. This contributed to cost overruns. 
• 	 [eM/Ge] and AlE were poor performers; slow to respond; avoided 
problern resolution. 
• 	 Performance suffered from magnitude of design deficiencies. 
[eM/Ge] had limited experience with several key personnel. Job 
tended to move on its "mass" as opposed to positive schedule 
directions. 
The survey in [99] goes on and elicits comments regarding Design, Project 
Management, MACC Negotiations,63 Pre-construction Services, [CM/Ge] Selection 
Process, Subcontractor Work -packages, and other topics. The responses under these topics 
are consistent with those discussed above. Architect/engineers, contractors and owners are 
generally positive with a very few negative comments and caveats, and the Subcontractor 
comments, which are few by contrast, are generally negative with a few positive notes. 
63 MACC is Maximum Allowable Construction Costs - a process that is solely part of the negotiated 
contract and does not pertain to DBB. 
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One area that [99] was able to look at that this research did not, was a survey of 
disappointed competitors. While these comments, sixteen (16) in all, and equally 
distributed between general contractors and subcontractors, make up only one of the 18 
pages ofcomments, they do provide an interesting insight to the process by those who were 
unsuccessful in obtaining CMlGC work or, in the case of subcontractors, work on the 
CMlGC jobs. (Comments are preceded by "C" and "S" for contractor and subcontractor.) 
• 	 C: This selection process was still based on a low fee proposal as 
opposed to including qualifications and interview as part of the 
selection process. The current law and selection process is much 
better. 
• 	 C: The owner selected an out-of-region contractor who has 
performed poorly and jeopardized the [CM/GC] process for this 
owner. 
• 	 C: The delivery method is proven. Your process of applying this 
method restricts you from greater value. Your rigid RFP limits 
creativity and forces us back into the box. 
• 	 C: You're more concerned about past similar experience than the 
best team & the best ideas. 
• 	 C: [CM/GC] submitted a very low fee/GC proposal, which moved 
them from last to 1st in the ranking and got them the job! 
• 	 S: The drawings were so convoluted we could not tell what we were 
bidding for and what was by others. On top of that, State General 
Conditions [CM/GC] have many more requirements that just make it 
harder to comply. They would like to do all the work themselves. 
• 	 S: [We] did not pre-qualify because of [a] technicality (no shop 
drawing sample with proposal) and we were later told they had too 
many applicants. 
• 	 S: Project was bid with no solicitation process. Only contractors that 
qualified for Phase 1 were allowed to bid on Phase 2. 
• 	 S: Pre-qualification was largely based on sales volume and having 
performed much larger projects than this project. Eliminated free 
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competition to small &mid size contractors who have had proven 
success in project of this magnitude. 
In summary, it is clear from the comments in [99] that the process in Washington 
state has a lot of supporters, particularly among the ranks of the successful CM/GC 
contractors, owners and architect/engineers. Subcontractors, on the other hand, both those 
who worked on the projects and the disappointed bidders, revealed some of the 
shortcomings of the process as it's practiced in Washington. This would likely be true of 
any new process; however, and is probably not limited just to CMlGC. However, as 
discussed in above, it may be difficult to get an honest and objective set ofcomments when 
the vast majority ofthe respondents either are personally invested in the decision to use one 
PDS over another, and the others are the beneficiaries, the successful contractors. The 
comments from the disappointed contractors and those from the architect/engineers reveal 
more skepticism about the process than the owners and the successful contractors did. 
5.3 Stakeholder Survey 
For this research, it was detennined that the stakeholders and construction 
professionals should be asked specific questions regarding the different PDS's, the benefits 
and drawbacks, and to whom they accrue. The different stakeholders were given the 
following questions to consider, in the order found in the following Table. 
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Please describe, in your own words, the benefits of the negotiated public 
contracting project delivery system, commonly known as CM/GC for the 
contractor, the owner, the design professional, and the public at large? 
Benefits for the contractor: 

Benefits for the project owner: 

Benefits for the project design professionals: 

Benefits for the public at large: 

Please describe, in your own words, the drawbacks of the negotiated public 
contracting project delivery system, commonly known as CM/GC for the 
contractor, the owner, the design professional, and the public at large? 
Drawbacks for the contractor: 

Drawbacks for the project owner: 

Drawbacks for the project design professionals: 

Drawbacks for the public at large: 

Please describe, in your own words, the benefits of the competitive bid public 
contracting project delivery system, commonly known as Lump Sum Bid 
Method, for the contractor, the owner, the design professional, and the public at 
large? 
Benefits for the contractor: 

Benefits for the project owner: 

Benefits for the project design professionals: 

Benefits for the public at large: 

Please describe, in your own words, the drawbacks of the competitive bid 
public contracting project delivery system, commonly known as Lump Surn 
Bid Method, for the contractor, the owner, the design professional, and the 
public at large? 
Drawbacks for the contractor: 

Drawbacks for the project owner: 

Drawbacks for the project design professionals: 

Drawbacks for the public at large: 

Table 25: Stakeholder Survey Form, which was originally published on eight pages, shown here 
with blank sections removed for brevity. 
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This method could not be described as a "scientific" survey because a broad cross­
section of stakeholders was not surveyed; only those members of project teams who 
provided project data were asked initially to respond. Additional contacts were made 
through the Oregon Public Contractor's Coalition (PCC) as well as members ofthe Expert 
PaneL Finally, professional associates, many ofthem members ofthe Oregon Construction 
Bar, were asked to give their comments on these questions and their observations on the 
two PDS's. In all just under five-hundred individual comments from 21 stakeholders were 
recorded. And, while this research instrument was structured differently than the one used 
in [99], no claim is made here that these responses are better considered or carry more 
weight. 
5.4 Stakeholders 
The principal stakeholders in the public construction sector of the economy are the 
contractors that build the jobs, the design professionals that prepare the plans and 
specifications, the public agency project team that manage the project from womb to tomb 
(referred to here as "owner") and the public at large who eventually use the project Three 
of these members are readily identifiable by the roles that they have on a project, but the 
fourth, the public in general, is a bit more difficult to identify. In absence ofa broad survey 
of building users or the public, this research considers the guardians of public trust, the 
"owner," as the adequate proxy for the concerns of the "public at large." It should be 
realized that the project management staff may not always have what's best for the 
taxpayer or public at large first and foremost in their minds, especially when what's best 
for the taxpayer may not be what's easiest or most convenient for themselves in the 
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manag~ment of the project in pursuit of its completion, and keeping as much "stomach 
lining" as possible at the end ofthe project. 
A group that is neither a proxy for the public nor a direct project participant, but 
one included in this analysis, is the members of the Construction Law Bar of Oregon. 
These attorneys handle the vast majority of construction disputes that rise to the level of 
third-party negotiation, mediation, arbitration and litigation. Their insight was considered 
valuable infonnation to include in this section ofthe research. 
5.4.1 Contractors 
Contractors are perhaps the most affected members of the project team by the 
choice of PDS on the project because that defines the roles and risks the contractor must 
execute the project under. Contractors make up the largest number ofthe comments in this 
survey; roughly 44% ofall comments were contractor comments. 
As documented in Chapter 3 above, contractors on the Expert Panel were the first 
to be contacted in the data collection effort. Included in their data collection Notebooks 
was "Tab 6 Written Comments" that contained the questions listed exactly as they appear 
above.64 This is the principal reason that contractors provided the largest number of 
comments. Of course, contractors also have the most experience in the different PDS' s 
since their jobs involve the construction of public building projects on a daily basis. 
Furthennore, unlike owners and design professionals, contractors, in particular estimators, 
see many projects each year that they bid on but do not "win." This gives the contractor a 
64 Although the survey form presented above has been edited to remove the empty spaces between the 
individual questions, the original Tab 6 Written Comments was eight pages long. 
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distinctly different viewpoint than either the owner or the designer. In addition, ofcourse, 
the contractor is in business to make money on construction work, period. The beauty of 
the job may be pleasing, but the construction project manager and superintendent that 
consistently build high quality, beautiful projects that lose their companies large sums of 
money, generally find themselves not working in the business long. Conversely, the 
superintendent that consistently returns large job profits on marginal quality work is likely 
to be retained. 
Construction is a risky business with total fees on sales to the general contractor in 
the range of two and one-half to five percent (2.5% to 5%), which is among the lowest of 
any business sector. However, the fact is that while the general contractor on building 
projects has a substantial risk ofsubcontractor performance, much of that risk is laid offon 
the surety industry. The total amount of actual performance risk a general contractor has 
on a project is typically only about ten percent (10%) ofthe total project cost, which means 
that the general contractor's fee is more in the range of twenty-five to fifty percent (25% to 
50%) of their direct work. Furthermore, the subcontractors that account for about ninety 
percent of the actual work performed are also in business to make a profit, and their fees 
range from five to fifty percent (5% to 50%) of their total subcontract bid cost. This means 
that the total amount of fee derived from a construction project to all parties is more in the 
range of thirty percent (30%), which is more in line with other service industries. 
Nevertheless, as businesses go, few have the potential for such large gains or windfall 
profits and extreme bankrupting losses on a single endeavor as construction contractors 
face on virtually every job. Contractors bring to the construction team the understanding of 
184 
how a project actually gets built and what kinds of sacrifices and trade-offs have to be 
made along the way to make it happen. As a group, it is fair to say that contractors see 
themselves as protecting the public interest against wasteful design solutions brought by 
design professionals that have little or none of the practical building experience that comes 
from actually building a project. Even in the competitive bid market where 
contractor/owner relationships are more confrontational and adversarial contractors 
probably complain more about wasteful design solutions that make their job harder for no 
visible benefit than they do about the unfairness of an owner's position on the design issue 
or decision about the cost. 
The part of the construction business that is the subject of this research, namely 
large building construction, attracts a group of individuals that are very bright, imaginative, 
highly motivated people that are extremely hard workers, fiercely competitive and almost 
bluntly self reliant. In the competitive bid market, they compete in a remarkably pure fonn 
of economic competition in the US economy, a market where an owner puts a project up 
for a sealed price auction and the competitors, each acquiring symmetric infonnation about 
the task, weigh the risks and rewards and gives a price. And, in absence of some fonn of 
gerrymandering the bid, the lowest price bidder takes the prize. The construction project 
managers, estimators and company executives that responded to the survey for this 
research have built literally billions of dollars in public construction between them. Their 
experience is vast and deep and without their contributions to this research, it simply would 
not have been possible. 
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5.4.2 Owners 
Owner's representatives are the agents of the public charged with the public trust 
and responsible for spending the public's taxes wisely. They initiate the projec~s, hire the 
design professionals, guide the process through design into construction, manage the 
construction process, pay the design professionals and the contractors, and finally occupy 
the end product the building. Often, the owner's representative is even involved in the 
financing or procuring offunds through bond sales or other forms ofpublic finance. 
Owners may have a difficult time relating to other stakeholders, but they know that 
building projects cannot be accomplished without the teamwork of all three construction 
partners. It is the owner who decides on how that working relationship will be structured 
through the choice in PDS, and therefore understanding the motivations and feelings of the 
ones who make that decision is an important contribution to the understanding of why and 
how that decision is made. 
As with the contractor group, the initial contact of owners was through the expert 
panel members. That effort extended when the data collection phase included directly 
retrieving information from the owner document files at the different institutions. The 
majority of the owner comments come from expert panel members or senior project 
management personnel, in particular those directly involved in making the PDS decision. 
5.4.3 Design Professionals 
Architects and engineers playa key role in the execution of any public building 
project. Architects prepare the information upon which the pricing for the project is based. 
They more often than not follow the project from design through construction, inspecting 
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the construction professional's work and advising the owner on change requests and 
pricing submitted by the contractor. The contractor too has to rely on the architect for 
design solutions for unanticipated and hidden conditions as well as a fair interpretation of 
the plans and specifications when a change request is submitted. In the most recent version 
of the General Conditions prepared by the American Institute of Architects (AIA), AIA 
form 201, the role of the project architect is so important that the owner cannot summarily 
dismiss and replace the architect without the prior acceptance ofthe contractor. 
The design professional respondents predominantly come from the expert panel, 
which includes partners in many of the largest architecture and engineering firms in 
Oregon. Most have extensive experience in both PDS's being considered in this research 
and are often called upon by owners to give their opinion on which method should be used 
in the performance of a particular project. Furthermore, several served in the past on the 
selection committees that selected CM/GC's for specific projects that they mayor may not 
have had direct responsibility for. 
5.4.4 Attorneys 
One group that was not originally considered in the Stakeholder Analysis Proposal 
was the members of the Construction Bar in Oregon. Construction law is a very 
specialized field with fewer than one hundred fifty (150) active members,65 the majority of 
whom work for one of fewer than two ..dozen firms, mostly located in Portland. The 
members of the Construction Bar are not actively involved in the direct execution of 
construction work, except as it may relate to specific contract provisions that they may be 
65 Which, compares to the more than 1000 members of the Tort Law Bar in Oregon. 
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asked to opine upon. However, these professionals have a unique role in the construction 
process in that they are involved in mediating, arbitrating and litigating construction 
disputes. From that vantage point, they witness what kinds of things go well, and more 
importantly, what kinds ofthings don't. 
The lawyers that responded to this survey serve owners, contractors and 
subcontractor clients. Most practices emphasize one or another type ofclient, but very few 
if any only take "owners" or "contractors" as clients, and each of the respondents in this 
survey has. served or serves each of the three parties. That fact makes them uniquely 
qualified to comment on the impact ofdifferent contract structures on various parties. 
Finally, while attorneys are advocates for their clients' position, like engineers, 
their duty extends beyond that owed to their particular client, to the Court and the public at 
large. Attorneys accounted for a total of 61 individual comments, with benefits 
outnumbering drawbacks 38 to 23. Since attorneys are perhaps the least directly affected 
by the use of one PDS or another, it is likely that, as a group, they provide the most 
objective observations,66 although it should be noted that three of the attorney respondents 
worked directly for an owner or a contractor as either an in-house counselor a project 
manager. 
66 Although at least one contractor Stakeholder would disagree, noting that ifCMlOC reduces claims, 
lawyers are out ofwork, which is a valid point. However, it is actually quite rare that construction 
disputes actually go so far as trial;, as many as 95% of all construction disputes are settled in 
negotiation or mediation according to one prominent mediator. And, while the CM/OC - owner 
relationship changes, the CMlOC - subcontractor relationship is changed little from the DBB model. 
The OSU Valley Library Project discussed above, for example, was a multi-million dollar claim 
brought by a subcontractor against both the CMlOC and the owner. Nevertheless, the point is well 
taken. 
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5.5 Responses 
There were 499 individual responses from the stakeholders, although at least three 
of the responses from one owner were word for word the same for three of the four 
beneficiaries. The breakdown ofthe comments is reflected in the following table: 
Stakeholder Benefit! Drawback CM/GC DBB Total 
Attorney Benefits 
Drawbacks 
25 
13 
13 
10 
38 
23 
Attorney Total 38 23 61 
Contractor Benefits 
Drawbacks 
108 
34 
30 
49 
138 
83 
Contractor Total 142 79 221 
Design Professional Benefits 
Drawbacks 
28 
24 
17 
19 
45 
43 
Design Professional Total 52 36 88 
Owner Benefits 
Drawbacks 
58 
21 
21 
29 
79 
50 
Owner Total 79 50 129 
Grand Total 311 188 499 
Figure 32: Stakeholder Survey Responses 
The most striking observation is that contractor comments reflected benefits from 
CMlGC more than three-to-one over drawbacks, while indicating drawbacks to DBB 
nearly five-to-three over benefits. While all of the Stakeholder groups had more benefit 
than drawback comments for CMlGC, and more drawback than benefit comments for 
DBB, no other group showed such a striking difference. In part, this was due to the fact 
that several of the contractors simply refused to comment on drawbacks to CMlGC, 
perhaps feeling that their comments could come back and be used against them or the 
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process. Some contractors also decided not to provide any benefit comments under DBB. 
These actions call into question the objectivity of the respondents; however, their 
comments still have importance because they allow us to understand the motivations and 
mindset ofthese participants. 
5.5.1 Contractor Responses 
All of the contractors have experience in CMlGC, some more than others; 
however, all of the largest CMlGC contractors in this study did provide responses to this 
survey. Thirty of the one hundred eight (108) noted that the benefits of CMlGC were 
benefits that accrue to the "contractor," and contractors contributed two hundred twenty 
one (221) ofthe nearly five hundred comments in this survey. 
5.5.1.1 Contractor's Perceived Benefits of CM/GC 
The "majority of the benefit cOlmnents from contractor respondents deal with risk 
and the contractor's ability to mitigate his risk by having significant input during the design 
process as well as gaining a better understanding of the proj ect before the budget and 
schedule are established. One commented that, "basically risk is shared with the owner." 
There are also administrative and financial benefits accruing to the contractor on the cost 
reiInbursable form. hl spite of the fact that the overall profit is expected to be lower, there 
is a greater assurance that the profit goal will be met and that they can count on an adequate 
level ofadministrative support. 
The relationship between the parties is another benefit that contractors felt accrued 
to themselves from the CMlGC PDS. "It makes the whole construction process a team 
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effort." '''The potential or opportunity to develop a good working relationship with the 
owner and designer." And "Less chance of adversarial relations ... more stomach lining 
[left] at the end ofthe job." 
Contractors generally responded that design professionals benefited from the 
CMlGC process by having the contractor's input during the design stages. They 
commented that, "construction professional input [resulted in more] cost effective 
construction," and that they aid design professionals in coming up with "more realistic 
schedule milestones" and "cost estimates." The contractors felt that CMlGC "reduces or 
eliminates redesign efforts" and costs, and results in a "far better working relationship," 
which is a benefit to the design professional. Contractors responded that the "reduced risk" 
generates "increased profit potential" for design professionals through mechanisms as an 
"independent design review" oftheir work by the CMlGC. 
In short, as with the benefits accruing contractors, the contractors responded that 
the same apparatus that reduces risk and results in better working relationships benefit 
design professionals in similar ways. The one difference, of course, is the fact that 
contractors did not see design professional's input in CMlGC as a benefit to contractors, 
but they consistently remarked that their input during design was a benefit to the design 
professionals. 
Contractors commented that owners benefit from CMlGC principally by reduction 
in the risk of claims and lawsuits; faster construction schedules; better designs through 
contractor involvement; "reduced conflict;" more reliability on costs and schedules; 
"lower fees" and lower overall costs. 
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Of course, the data analysis perfonned in Chapter 4 of this research does not 
support their comments that CMlGC results in more reliable costs or schedules than DBB, 
and competitive bidding theory dictates that a single competitor will result in higher, not 
lower, costs. There is little doubt that the relationship between the owner and CMlGC is 
far better than the typical owner DBB contractor relationship, and contractors 
consistently commented that the change in relationship results in a higher likelihood of a 
"successful project." In addition, the cooperative process allows for and generates 
"improve [ d] opportunity for a lower cost of construction on larger or more complex 
contracts." While the early input from the CMlGC gives the owner, "the benefit of an 
experienced and practical mind set in the development of the design, i.e. function leading 
fonn" and "the overall opportunity for a better design ... [resulting from] the availability of 
a practiced eye, In the review of design documents [that] provide for the opportunity to 
reduce errors or inconsistencies in the drawings, catching mistakes on paper rather than in 
the field." Finally, the CMlGC "can use their skills and experience to advise the owner and 
architect as to the cost and efficiency of a project design at the time when those ideas can 
be incorporated most easily and cheaply" thereby providing for the most efficient use of 
limited public funds. 
Contractor's comments on the benefits to the public in general mirrored those of 
the owners and design professionals but elicited the fewest total number ofcomments from 
the contractors. Contractors generally commented that the public benefits when the project 
team relationship is improved, in that projects are delivered with "less risk for delays [and] 
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claims," and they "receive better accountability through open book methods of contract 
administration67" and "better use oftaxpayer dollars." 
One extended comment from a contractor questioned the premise of the question: 
If one is willing to take the broad view and consider the public at large 
as the "owner" of Public Works projects, then it would seem logical that 
the benefits to the owner section could conceivably be duplicated here. 
Outside of the broad view, the issue of a potential increase in quality, 
value, schedule, etc., may have a direct impact on the public. This 
would be in the form of quicker access to, use of, and/or enjoyment of a 
public facility, highway, etc. Aside from this "potential" I see little benefit 
to the public at large. 
But generally it is fair to conclude that contractors felt that the public benefits from 
lower risk and "enhanced potential for project productivity" creating lower construction 
costs. 
5.5.1.2 Contractor's Perceived Drawbacks of CM/GC 
While contractor's felt there were a lot of benefits of CMlGC, they provided far 
fewer comments regarding drawbacks. While there were thirty (30) benefits to contractor 
comments, there were only thirteen (13) drawbacks accruing to contractor comments. 
Most of the drawback to the contractor comments reflected the lower fees derived from 
CMlGC contracts and complaints and fiustrations about the non-level playing field of 
competition. The following comments are examples ofthe latter: 
67 However, Section 2 ofthis research documents the Audits Division of the Oregon Secretary of State's 
office audit ofseveral CMlGC prison projects and their conclusion does not appear to support the claim 
ofbetter accountability. Further, it should be noted that the model contracting rules (see Oregon 
Administrative Rules 137-30) requires an auditing provision on all public contracts, which is mirrored 
in most agency construction contracts. 
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• 	 First, foremost and generally likely is the potential for abuse. The 
misuse of the CM/GC delivery method as a means of getting around 
fair solicitation practices hurts all but a very few privileged 
contractors. 
• 	 The contractors with little or no experience in the process have very 
few options in the way that they can develop the necessary 
experience to compete in the CM/GC RFQ/RFP solicitation process. 
It's the old Catch 22: one needs the experience to get the projects, 
yet needs the projects to gain the experience. Unlike bonding 
capacity, it is very difficult to grow into qualifying requirements 
necessary to compete. 
• 	 CM/GC projects tend to cherry pick the larger, more desirable 
projects out of the general marketplace. 
• 	 The success of CM/GC for the contractor depends upon the skills of 
the personnel the contractor has assigned to the project. They are 
different skills than a design-bid-build contractor uses to make 
money. 
• 	 Difficult to impossible to penetrate existing relationships i.e. 
[CONTRACTOR NAME] and the Port of Portland and Justice 
System. 
• 	 Harder for the smaller, newer contractor to obtain work. 
• 	 Contractors must develop staff resources and knowledge of CM/GC 
to be competitive for public CM/GC contracts. 
While generally positive about CMlGC, contractors do acknowledge its 
drawbacks, particularly on smaller and up and coming contractors and their ability to 
obtain negotiated work in competition with the more established firms. In addition, there 
has to be a change in attitude that is difficult for some project team members to assume, to 
"shift to [an] owner first mentality." Further, in order to compete successfully, the CMlGC 
has to devote more time and money to "marketing," and those who depended solely on the 
competitive bid market in the early years of the CMlGC implementation saw fewer jobs 
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coming their way.68 This increase, and in some cases start-up of marketing department 
costs, is an added "overhead" cost that must be paid from construction fees, thereby 
reducing the aggregate profit ofthe organization. 
Contractors made few comments regarding drawbacks to design professionals, and 
some of the comments on the surface do not appear to be drawbacks, for example, "allows 
fast track construction at the public level" and "allows contractors to influence design with 
cost schedule issues." Why contractors considered these to be drawbacks to the design 
professional is not clear. Also, the comment that "the architect is no longer working in a 
vacuum; the contractor is looking over its shoulder and this sometimes annoys son1e 
architects" is directly in conflict with the comment that the team approach alleviates much 
ofthe project animosities. 
Contractors also commented, "I've never known any [drawbacks], ask an 
architect" but added from the contractor perspective, ''Not sure there are any." And finally 
this: 
The drawback for design professionals may have some dependency on 
the ethical nature and/or the quality of the firm and the construction 
sawy or sophistication of the owner. A less than higher quality firm, 
which might normally have little concern of performing QC work and 
being paid directly by the owner. Aside from that anomaly the process 
should only benefit a design professional. 
68 Note that there was a substantial concentration ofearly CM/GC awards to one contractor. On the 
order of 19 of the fIrst 21 projects were awarded to one general contractor who probably had the most 
established marketing apparatus in place because they competed in both the public bid and private 
negotiated construction markets. The shift to negotiated public construction contracts played directly 
into their strategic strengths, which resulted in capturing the lion's share of the market in the early 
years. This changed as other contractor developed better marketing skills and the market matured to 
where it is today with more broadly distributed awards. 
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This essentially means that the drawbacks to the design professional may be 
outside the PDS itself, but are rooted in the owner, architect and contractor's failings, 
irrespective ofthe PDS. 
5.5.1.3 Contractor's Perceived Benefits of DBB Contracting 
Contractors seem to comment that the benefits of DBB contracting are primarily 
financial because of reduced administrative costs, "Marketing department not required" 
and "opportunity for maximum profit." It's "easier to acquire work" but the work "may 
not be profitable." It's easier for a contractor to penetrate new and different markets and 
easier for "newer contractors to get work." It may be easier to motivate personnel to 
perform because they "can be profit oriented" as opposed to "owner first." 
Good DBB contractors with well trained personnel can successfully execute work 
under DBB, and on occasion DBB is the best PDS for both the contractor, its 
subcontractors and the owner, as the following comments attest: 
• 	 By a clean record of good performance and financial stability, a 
contractor can grow bonding capacity and therefore increase overall 
number and dollar size of the projects they can go after and complete 
for. While some of the "Catch 22" problems exist here too, it is not 
quite as insurmountable. 
• 	 Lump sum bid or design-bid-build (DBB) is generally best understood 
by both the public contracting entities and the construction industry, has 
the strictest rules and remedies for all in the event of a failure of any 
party to adhere to those rules. For these reasons, it is therefore less 
likely to be abused. 
• 	 Skills in construction management, fair treatment of subcontractors, 
good record of performance and stability leading to lower bonding costs 
all provide a "good" contractor with legitimate means of gaining a 
competitive edge. 
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Contractors see fewer benefits ofDtaccruing to design professionals, with only 
five comments and one of those being "?". d another that "Some design professionals 
will like to not have to include the contract+ in the pre-construction phase (they are short 
sighted, of course)" are probably honest and maybe even true, but seem kind of mean-
spirited. 
Ultimately contractors view CMlGC as providing design professionals with more 
benefits, but they do comment that the "old tried and true project delivery system" that is 
understood well by most parties, and the freedom to assert "more control over the design 
processes," are benefits ofthe DBB PDS that accrue to the design professionals. 
Contractors disagree on benefits to the owner, one stating that "I don't see any. The 
only one I have heard 'floated' is the certainty of the bid price, with which I vehemently 
disagree. Change orders on a bid job can hurt an agency budget badly." Others comment 
that DBB "insures the greatest [amount of] competition" and "depending on the design," 
results in ''the cheapest price available." 
According to contractors, the benefits that accrue to the owner are the same as 
those that accrue to the public in general. In fact, of the six comments provided by 
contractors, one is word for word the same and all but one, that there is "less potential for 
the perception of unfairness in the public works arena," which was not mentioned with 
regard to owners, are similar. 
5.5.1.4 Contractor's Perceived Drawbacks of DBB Contracting 
While it is fair to say that the drawbacks to DBB Contracting that accrue to the 
contractor are principally the opposite ofthe benefits that accrue under CMlGC, the lack of 
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a cooperative and team-oriented relationship stands out. The competitive bid award that 
creates the adversarial relationship can be blamed for virtually every drawback comment 
that contractors raised: 
• 	 "Increased" and "very high risk" 
• 	 Creates owner's rep and the architect/engineer as decided 
adversaries 
• 	 Lack of repeat business objective 
• 	 All parties in an adversarial position (protect [your] own turf) 
• 	 The amount of fires increase 
• 	 Bad jobs get worse 
Not explained, of course, is that DBB "must" create or result in an adversarial 
relationship - which is not necessarily true69, but if one does assume it to be the case, a 
logical explanation of how and why should have been forthcoming. Conversely, it is not 
necessarily the case that CMlOC completely eliminates the possibility of an adversarial 
relationship, but admittedly, project professionals report that it happens a lot less often, but 
as seen in [99], some of the owners commented that the relationship was little changed 
fromDBB. 
5.5.2 Owners 
Project owners accounted for 129 of the 499 responses, or nearly 26%. These 
included 79 on CMlOC (58 of which were benefits) and 50 on DBB (29 of which were 
drawbacks). 
69 Much literature has been de.voted to the concept of"Partnering" as a method of reducing adversarial 

relationships on projects [96]. 
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5.5.2.1 Owner's Perceived Benefits of CM/GC 
Owners clearly see the greatest benefit of the CMlGC PDS accruing to the 
contractor, principally through the reduction of risk and "working in a cooperative team 
atmosphere." Risk is further reduced by the "opportunity to fully understand the job before 
committing to a GMP." 
Design professionals, according to owners, benefit from CMlGC through lowered 
risk of claims (perhaps owing to the fact that the CMlGC better understands the contract 
documents and works with designer during their part of the preparation, therefore the 
chance of a misunderstanding of the contract requirements is reduced, which in tum 
reduces the possibility ofclaims). 
Owners see themselves and the public in general to be the biggest beneficiary from 
CMlGC PDS, but are split on some specifics. These comments are examples: 
• 	 Requires less sophisticated staff by owner if architect/engineer is 
used to administer the construction contract. 
• 	 Contractor can sacrifice quality and schedule for profit if owner does 
not have sufficient resources or knowledge to provide administration 
and quality control. 
• 	 Contractor can make additional profits through change orders if the 
drawings and specifications are poor quality and the owner is not 
knowledgeable. 
And these regarding the working relationship on the job: 
• 	 This process almost always creates an adversarial relationship with 
the contractor since his objective is to maximize profits and the 
owner's objective is to minimize costs. 
• 	 Team approach in completing project 
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And these regarding the types ofprojects it should be used on: 
• 	 Works best on small projects, less technically complex projects ... 
• 	 Contracting method to deal fairly with complex projects having 
significant unknowns (for example: remodels/seismic upgrades). 
And finally on Cost: 
• 	 Ensures the public the lowest cost project ... 
• 	 CM/GC results in a lower overall price ... 
• 	 This process does not necessarily guarantee the lowest life-cycle 
cost or the best quality project for the cost. 
In fact, it appears that some ofthe respondents were confused about which question 
they were answering, particularly in light of the fact that they appeared to "cut and paste" 
in the san1e answers to different questions, in some cases both benefits and drawbacks of 
the same PDS. 
At least one owner forthrightly stated that CMlGC allowed the "opportunity to 
choose the contractor" that the agency wanted and exclude contractors they didn't want to 
use. (Two others made similar but less pointed statements regarding choice ofcontractor.) 
It was clearly not the intent of the exemption clause to allow the public agency owner the 
ability to exclude contractors on public projects, but the possibility certainly exists 
whenever such latitude is afforded "less-than-perfect" human beings. In order to avert such 
an abuse of discretion, agencies generally have adopted policies governing selections, but 
these policies are in no way unifonn nor are they statutorily required. And, instead of 
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tightening up the statutory scheme, the legislature in Oregon enacted more sweeping 
exemptions for its university system and Oregon Health & Sciences University.70 
5.5.2.2 Owner's Perceived Drawbacks of CM/GC 
Owners remarked that contractor's only drawbacks resulting from CMlac are the 
additional financial burdens of "lots of up-front marketing," taking more time to complete 
the job (due perhaps to extensive pre-construction services period), and the inability to 
"strike it rich" on a given job. 
Owners see few drawbacks accruing to design professionals, except that they have 
to surrender some of their "pride of ownership in the design" to the team, and that they 
"have to deal with the contractor's comments [and] opinions." For the owner and the 
public in general, owners seem to agree that the process "could cost more up front," and 
that the process "takes longer [and] professional fees are higher" and "may cost a little 
more than a hard bid job." Another drawback is the fact that there is no clear objective 
winner in the selection process and that the "selection process may be viewed as biased by 
some contractors calling into questions ethics and public administration." But others saw 
no drawbacks to the use ofCMlac PDS. 
5.5.2.3 Owners Perceived Benefits of DBB Contracting 
Owners commented that contractors benefit most from DBB PDS in that the 
selection process is very objective and the opportunity for profits especially through 
70 ORS 351.086 Oregon University System exempt from certain laws; authority to contract with public 
agencies. (1) Except as otherwise provided in this chapter and ORS chapter 352, the provisions ofORS 
chapters 240, 279, 282 and 292 do not apply to the Oregon University System. 
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"change orders" (one commented "Lots of'), is higher, including through deceptive 
bidding practices. 
Design professionals gain little benefit from DBB, according to owners, except that 
it is a common practice that designers are familiar with and that they have complete control 
over the design process, and once they've finished the design, "they are done." 
Owners benefit from the bid process by obtaining the lowest first price and, 
depending on the quality ofthe contract documents, perhaps the lowest overall price - after 
claims and change orders. Owners may even "get a bid price below what the actual cost 
is." 
5.5.2.4 Owner's Perceived Drawbacks of DBB Contracting 
Owner's comments on drawbacks ofDBB were principally concerned with money 
issues and risk, principally that the contractor has higher risk and initial profit margins are 
low with the "opportunity to lose a lot ofmoney." Design professionals have to do a better 
job of writing specifications and drawing the plans to avoid claims by the contractor, and 
they may have to redesign certain parts ofthe job to meet the budget and are forced to work 
in an "adversarial situation at times." Owners face the prospect ofgetting a contractor they 
do not know or may not want, and may be faced with a lot of change orders, which drive 
up the cost of the work beyond the allowable budget. The public in general may suffer 
from higher cost, lower quality work, particularly if the "contractor embraces claims as a 
way ofdoing business." 
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5.5.3 Design Professionals 
Design professionals accounted for about 18% of the total comments and were 
fairly balanced in assessing benefits (45) and drawbacks (43) but gave the majority (60%) 
oftheir comments on the CMlGC PDS. 
5.5.3.1 Design Professional's Perceived Benefits of CM/GC 
Design professionals comments regarding benefits accruing to the contractor from 
CMlGC were generally along the same lines as the contractor saw them: "less adversarial 
relationship;" "less risk from unknowns;" the ability to have "input on constructability 
issues." Oddly, design professionals commented that the administrative costs for the 
contractor and cost ofpreparing for the selection cost less, when in fact administrative costs 
are necessarily higher due to pre-construction services and additional cost reporting 
required for a cost reimbursable contract. Also, the cost to prepare the kinds of documents 
required for a CMlGC selection are significantly more detailed and difficult to prepare than 
a simple bid, particularly when the total cost ofmarketing is factored in. 
They themselves benefit from the process by working with the contractor in a less 
adversarial context during the design phase, resulting in fewer instances of "redesign" for 
budget purposes. 
Owners and the public in general benefit from "less risk of change orders;" "more 
certainty of the final costs;" lower "possibility of claims;" and getting "higher quality" 
projects that have a better chance ofbeing completed "on time." These perceptions are not 
entirely borne out in this research; while quality may be higher, and that is difficult to 
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judge, the CMlGC projects do not have a higher likelihood of finishing on time or lower 
total change order costs. 
5.5.3.2 Design Professional's Perceived Drawbacks of CM/GC 
Design professionals probably see themselves as the most negatively affected by 
the CMlGC PDS as evidenced by the following comments: 
• 	 Must be willing to spend some extra time revising documents when 
input is gathered from contractor during pre-construction. 
• 	 Contractor can control the pre-con phase, extended time for 
architect during design. 
• 	 Possible conflicts when more individuals are involved in the design. 
• 	 Higher price, typically about 15%. 
• 	 With no competition, it is a more difficult position if it is felt that the 
price of a system should be less. 
• 	 Required extra time for inclusion and involvement with the 
contractor, typically the contractor is not very good at estimating 
design drawings instead of completed documents and 
specifications. 
Contractors, on the other hand, suffer only from the fact that the original estimates 
and budgets may not reflect the final product, particularly when the contractor has to "lock­
in" a price based on incomplete information. The owner and public in general may suffer 
from higher costs and unscrupulous contractor pricing and the possibility that a contractor 
may be selected for factors other than being the best to do the job based on "relationships 
and not qualifications." 
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5.5.3.3 Design Professional's Perceived Benefits of DBB Contracting 
The basic fairness ofthe bidding environment is the major benefit ofDBB PDS for 
contractors according to the design professionals, but they see little benefit accruing to 
themselves (only four comments, and none dealing with the actual "work''). Again, design 
professionals comment that owners and the public in general benefit due to lower initial 
costs (and possibly lower total costs) and having a larger pool ofcontractors looking at the 
job. 
5.5.3.4 Design Professional's Perceived Drawbacks of DBB Contracting 
The drawbacks to DBB PDS come from increased risk due to unknown pricing 
prior to bid, which may cause the project to be dropped or redesigned. They note an 
increased risk of claims, a more adversarial relationship that can generate "conflicts and 
claims [that] could delay completion." Finally, design professionals note that the "most 
qualified contractor is not always selected," which may mean a lower quality project. 
5.5~4 Attorneys 
The unique perspective of the attorneys in this survey is described above. As a 
group they contributed sixty one (61) ofthe nearly five hundred comments, or a little more 
than 12% of the total responses. One thing that sets the attorneys apart from some of the 
other respondents is the length ofsome oftheir responses, many being several lines long. 
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5.5.4.1 Attorney's Perceived Benefits of CM/GC 
Seifer notes that, "any contract serves the primary purpose of allocating the risks 
and responsibilities between the parties" [185], and therefore it is not surprising that the 
attorneys focused many of their comments on "risk" and risk reduction. With respect to 
the benefits that accrue to the contractor: 
• 	 The contractor is clearly able to identify its risks and negotiate specific 
terms in the contract that it would otherwise simply have to accept as 
part of the RFP or ITB process, which may increase its profit and 
decrease its risk on the project. It may also exclude out of the project, 
elements it does not want to undertake, that it would otherwise have to 
accept. 
• -Less risk more certainty to profit percentage, may be low but fair 

certainty that that's what you book. 

• 	 I think for the contractor the negotiated public contracting process offers 
much more "certainty". The negotiated process involves more 
opportunity to understand the project and the owner's objectives and a 
contractor is much surer of the costs, adequacy of design plans and 
overall reasonableness of the construction project before it begins. The 
negotiated process involves the contractor at a much earlier state, 
which benefits project communications which can lead to more 
certainty. 
Attorneys also commented on the flexibility granted the contractor and the owner 
under CMlGC, and the better team relationship that seems to result: 
• 	 OAR's do allow some ability to negotiate some terms of the contract ­
time of performance - LD's, can't negotiate statutory requirements i.e. 
prevailing wages. 
• 	 Fee based performance - advantageous because becomes more of a 
"Partnered" less adversarial. 
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Design professionals, according to attorneys, benefit least of the stakeholders; in 
fact, only one genuinely positive comment was made: 
• 	 I think the project design professionals benefit from a negotiated project 
for the same reasons the contractors and owners benefit--more 
certainty. The contractor and designers talk much earlier in the 
process, and this helps to define issues and affords everyone an 
opportunity to become familiar with the project objectives. The 
standard bid process has the designers estimating construction costs in 
a vacuum, which leaves the public owner in a tough position in terms of 
project budgeting. When a project is put to bid and it comes back too 
high, this leaves the owner frustrated and the designers looking bad. 
The negotiated process helps to reduce the chance of error, lawsuits 
and disappointments. 
Attorneys commented that owners and the public in general also benefit from both 
the reduction in risk (which includes greater cost and schedule performance certainty, as 
well as a lower chance ofclaims) and the different contractual structure: 
• 	 Greater certainty as to completion: in a Lump sum the owner chooses 
the time, in CG/MC the CM negotiates the date to complete and that 
means the date is more certain. In LS the GC might just add LD's to 
bid price risk. 
• 	 I think the project owner benefits by being more assured that he/she will 
get what he/she expects. I n my opinion and experience, the 
ordinary/regular "low bid" process was a lot like a game of chance--you 
really didn't know what you were getting with that low bid. Furthermore, 
it's tough to throw out the low bidder unless it is obvious way, way, way, 
way out of any reasonable ball park. Low bidder doesn't necessarily 
mean highest quality either. However, high bidder doesn't mean high 
quality either. That's my point: price shouldn't drive a public (private or 
any other kind) of project! With a negotiated public contracting process, 
the public owner gets to introduce many more issues (Le. quality, 
timeliness, project coordination, involvement of MBE/wBE & DBE's, 
etc.) into the discussion. Being able to introduce those types of 
substantive issues into the discussion with a contractor is a good thing 
for the public. 
• 	 General reduction of claims, less pass through claims. 
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• 	 Single point of responsibility: owner does not get caught between a 
designer and the contractor. 
Perhaps because the owner can select the CM/ac contractor on a basis other than 
lowest price, overall project quality is seen as another benefit ofthe CM/ac PDS: 
• 	 Prescreen and solicit good capable contractors, not just everybody that 
is not irresponsible. 
• 	 Price can become a secondary selection criteria, could be quality. 
• 	 I believe the public at large benefits from higher quality projects that are 
built more on time and within budget. The reason is that the (astute) 
public owner can build a multitude of incentives into a negotiated deal 
to ensure that the contractor is highly motivated to do a great job. For 
example: a negotiated deal might include performance incentives (Le. 
sharing in a projects savings), which can help boost a contractors 
margin. Those kinds of "money in the pocket' incentives work, and the 
public at large benefits. Theoretically, the public benefits from lower 
taxes, but more directly the public benefits from better projects. 
5.5.4.2 Attorney's Perceived Drawbacks of CM/GC 
While attorneys as a group recognize several benefits to the use of CM/ac on 
public building projects, their observations also caution significant drawbacks for all of the 
stakeholders. In the case of"contractors" these are financial market-related risks: 
• 	 Fewer contractors have the ability to participate. 
• 	 Less than level playing field to get the benefits of public works. 
• 	 Tends to favor larger, union-oriented contractors (my observation) at 
expense of smaller shops. 
• 	 If an owner doesn't use adequate safeguards, the negotiated public 
process can easily turn into a "closed" process. This type of process 
can reduce competition because usually the process starts with an RFI 
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to narrow the field to the relatively small group of contractors who will 
be asked to submit answers to an RFP. The contractor who wins the 
RFP is the one who gets to negotiate. This can be a closed process 
that hurts contractors, particularly smaller, less RFI/RFP sawy players. 
And particularly with respect to subcontractors: 
• 	 Second tier subcontractor - it is a beauty contest against/between big 
contractors. Locks out smaller contractors, nobody gets fired for buying 
IBM syndrome. This leads to some economic waste because the lack 
of competition in the long run will eventually raise costs. Also, not every 
sub will bid the beauty queen and thus the public will not get the lowest 
price possible. 
This comment is practically the only comment received that specifically recognizes 
the fact that by reducing the competition from several general contractors competing for a 
project to one negotiating for the work, that other parties could be damaged. Further, here 
the respondent points out that, "in the long run [this process] will eventually raise costs," 
which is precisely what theory would predict and a reasonable interpretation of what the 
state found in [135]. However, recall from Section 2.6.3, the court in ABC v. Tri-Met 
expressed little concern for subcontractors and the relationship between subcontractors and 
the general contractor, opting instead to interpret ORS Chapter 279 to principally apply to 
the relationship between the government agency and the general contractor. 
Attorneys did not consider the design professionals to suffer many drawbacks from 
·the CMlGC PDS. In fact, the sole comment on this subject from attorneys concerned 
reduction in fees due to fewer field adjustments, which in some sense is not necessarily a 
drawback, particularly if the designer is on a fixed-fee basis. 
Owners and the public in general lose out some when competition is reduced and 
in fact commented that CMIGC can make a problem project worse for owners: 
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• Often no cost savings. 
• 	 Less competition may not lead to best or most effective results; CM/GC 
is best when used with some competitive selection process. 
• 	 Often cost savings very elusive. 
• 	 When it works, it works well; when it fails, it results in major disasters 
(Le. owner has less control over outcome, particularly during course of 
performance). 
In addition, attorneys recognized there may be some unforeseen costs associated 
with implementing the process that the owner may not consider: 
• 	 I think the primary drawback for the project owner is the costs and 
personnel time it takes to effectively conduct a negotiated public 
contracting project process. This type of construction delivery system is 
not for every public owner. The public owner must devote the 
appropriate level of time and have the necessary staff of consultant 
talent available to "negotiate" a good/fair contract. 
• 	 The negotiated process, if not handled properly (see comments above) 
could actually lead to higher project costs without commensurate 
benefits. Also, as I mentioned earlier, the negotiated process allows a 
public owner to more creatively and legally address other relevant 
issues such as MBEIWBE/DBE involvement, but unless the public 
owner has skilled, experienced staff doing the negotiating, then such 
goals may not be attainable. 
5.5.4.3 Attorney's Perceived Benefits of DBB Contracting 
The benefits of DBB PDS, according to attorney respondents, are few and limited 
to issues like objectivity and fairness in contractor selection. For contractors, they also 
observed that DBB can result in more profits if executed properly. Owners may be able to 
shift more risk to the contractor, if, of course, the plans and specifications are adequate. 
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And, once the bid price is received, there may be greater certainty as to the final cost, 
although that observation was disputed by the other parties in the survey above. 
5.5.4.4 Attorney's Perceived Drawbacks of DBB Contracting 
Attorneys made the fewest comments regarding drawbacks to DBB, with only ten 
(10) comments, and one of those being "few." The two principal comments appear to be 
that the owner does not realize the benefit of an experienced and creative building 
professional during the design that may result in delays and additional costs. In addition, as 
one respondent observed: 
• 	 Nothing is "guaranteed" in the construction work, and a project that 
begins as a lump sum bid might end up with a stretched budget in the 
end. Things happen along the way and the "lump sum" may have to 
change, and the owner has to be financially prepared for that potential 
reality. 
And design professionals may be among those carrying the greatest burden under 
this PDS as one comment suggests: 
• 	 I think the design professionals are under a lot of pressure to do things 
right (well documented design, excellent cost estimates, etc.) with a 
lump sum bid job. The owner will really be very dependent on the 
accuracy of designer documents and very upset if things go awry with 
what he/she thought was a "lump sum" bid. 
5.6 Summary of Survey Responses 
One constant theme throughout these survey responses is the belief that the 
CMlGC PDS process reduces risk by giving the builder a better understanding ofthe plans 
and specifications at the time when the price for the work is established. Since the process 
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includes the builder during the design phase as an equal member of the construction team, 
the relationship between the owner, contractor and architect/engineer is greatly improved. 
The builder's input during design and estimating throughout the design process is felt to 
avoid the need for costly redesigns and change orders after the contract price is established, 
thus making for greater certainty of the project costs to the owner. Also, since the CMlGC 
Contractor is on the team during the early stages, it is felt that a more reasonable and 
accurate construction schedule can be developed, leading to greater certainty in the 
completion of the work. The better relationship between the parties is thought to deliver a 
better project, higher quality, on time and perhaps at a lower cost. There is near unifonn 
agreement that there are fewer "claims" for additional compensation and change orders 
when CMlGC is used, although the data from Oregon shows that "claims" are actually rare 
in both CMlGC and DBB projects. By no means are CMlGC projects immune from 
"claims" as documented in Appendix F above. Nevertheless, the word "claim,,71 (or lack 
thereof) is consistently used to describe one of the benefits ofCMlGC and the drawbacks 
ofDBB. 
The assertion that CMlGC results in lower and more predictable costs is contrary to 
what competitive bidding theory and empirical studies would suggest. The data from the 
Oregon projects in this research does not support the conclusion that there is greater 
predictability in either cost or schedule metrics, which is consistent with the ClI study 
71 The tenn "claim" evokes an almost irrational emotional response from both owners and design 
professionals, as though all "claims" are frivolous and without merit. Yet, a large portion of claims are 
settled in negotiation or mediation or entitlement is established and quantum awarded by a court. 
Owners, almost uniformly fear what they describe as "claims oriented" contractors, who in the owner's 
mind underbid the costs of a job in order to make it up on change orders and claims. This, in spite of 
the fact that these contractors on average appear to save the owner money, according to [135]. 
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[183]. The research perfonned by Lattimer [135] suggests that having mUltiple bidders on 
a project creates significant cost savings on the overall project; however, these results are 
disputed by the building Contractors. They assert that CMlGC results in lower costs, 
particularly on complex building projects, which are significantly different from the 
highway contracts studied in [135]. Attorneys, some owners and design professionals do 
agree that there may be higher overall project costs, owing in part to the fact that there is an 
extensive pre-construction effort and a higher level of cost reporting required in CMlGC, 
both ofwhich are costs not found in DBB. However, they point out, as do the contractors, 
that the fees contractors extract in CMlGC are lower on average because they reflect a 
lower risk than DBB contract. Also, the fact that the owner pays more for pre-construction 
work actually results in higher quality projects, with lower risk of redesign and change 
order costs. Left unsaid, of course, is the fact that the initial negotiated GMP has a higher 
likelihood of including the possible change order costs up front, rather than on the back 
side ofthe project. In short, since the CMlGC contractor has an opportunity to clear up any 
misunderstandings or ambiguities in the plans and specifications prior to establishing the 
GMP, it is less likely that he will wrongly interpret an ambiguity in the contract docwnents 
that results in a lower initial cost. 
Risk to the contractor in DBB is cited as a major drawback to the DBB PDS, in 
spite of the fact that Kagel and Levin [118] determined that construction contractors rarely 
suffered winner's curse and that bonding of major subcontractors can ameliorate some of 
the single largest risk to the general contractor in DBB. But there should be no doubt that 
construction contracting is a risky business and contractors have been known to make a lot 
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of money on projects and lose a lot of money on projects. The CMlGC PDS through 
negotiated procurement clearly reduces the risk ofthose kinds ofprofit and loss swings. 
The adversarial relationship created under DBB PDS is another major issue 
discussed as a drawback to DBB and conversely, its reduction as a benefit ofCMlGC PDS. 
The reason for this paradigm is probably multi-factorial, but most likely is rooted in the 
cross-financial objectives of the parties as pointed out by one of the respondents: The 
"contractor's objective is to make money while the owner's objective is to cut costs," and 
that naturally leads to friction. One construction company owner interviewed in the course 
of this research stated that in the 1960's his company was turning away work with fees of 
twenty to twenty five percent (20% - 25%). Today, large DBB projects are bid in the range 
of three to four percent (3% - 4%) and CMlGC jobs result in negotiated fees as low as two 
percent (2%)! That reduction in fee consequently reduces the contractor's ability to absorb 
additional costs for unforeseen conditions or errors in the plans and specifications. That 
means those costs must be passed on to the owner, who arguably gets the benefit of the 
lower initial cost. 
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6 Case Comparison Review 
The principal reason that construction projects are offered by bid in an auction 
market institution as opposed to other pricing models is that they are generally considered 
unique. This characteristic also makes it very difficult to compare project outcomes. 
Critics of such analyses have rightly pointed out that you will never build the same project 
in the same location under the same environmental, financial and market conditions a 
second time [150]. As much as analysts try to measure one project against another, the 
reality of the construction environment and differences between projects make 
comparisons between all but the simplest of structures subject to doubt. For that reason 
studies like [75] and the present one tend to measure project perfotn;lance in tenns of 
metrics like cost and schedule growth instead of cost efficiency measures like cost per 
square foot. The present research, as well as the studies by the crr cited in Chapter 2 and 
Appendix E, have evaluated PDS's, in short by their ability to assist construction project 
management in delivering projects as promised at the tune the deal was established. 
6.1 Research Question #5: Direct Project Comparisons 
A senior partner in one of the :finns that supplied data for this research pointed out 
that the Oregon database includes three elementary schools that were constructed using 
essentially the same design. Two of the school designs were based on the first and were 
constructed in the same time frame, using different PDS' s. He suggested that a case study 
could be perfonned on those schools and went on to point out that his :finn, which designed 
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all three schools for the srune Owner, had different experiences with the different PDS's 
used. 
6.1.1 Nancy Ryles Elementary - Prototype School 
The Nancy Ryles Elementary School located in the southern part of the Beaverton 
School District was built in 1991 as a prototype school design for the rapidly growing 
District72. The elementary school was originally approximately 56,000 SF and was built 
using the CMlGC PDS. The original GMP was $4,675,000 and incurred cost and program 
growth to a final $5,041,777 actually paid to the CMlGC, an increase of 7.85%. The 
school was opened on schedule and incurred no schedule growth. In 1996 Nancy Ryles 
underwent a second phase that added several additional classrooms and approximately 
12,000 to 13,000 SF, for a new total of 68,000 to 69,000 SF. The second phase was a 
DBB project. 
The fact that the project was a prototype may have more to do with the fact that the 
cost growth was slightly higher than the average for projects in the Oregon database for 
both CMlGC and DBB PDS' s than the choice of PDS itself. Schedule growth at 0% was 
lower than the mean ofthe Oregon database for both PDS' S73. 
Once completed, and the design consultants and owner management team had 
compiled all of the "lessons learned" from the job, the Nancy Ryles school was to serve as 
72 Information on the Beaverton School District can be found at www.beaverton.k12.or.us 
73 It should be noted that very few of the schools in the Oregon database show that they finished early 
and nearly all of the schools finished on time. This is in part due to the unique structure of the "school 
year" in Oregon and elsewhere, that the school building site is essentially vacant during the summer 
months and there is little value in completing school building in July when it won't be occupied until 
September. Conversely, it is extremely important that the building be ready for occupancy when the 
school year begins or there will be serious educational, social and financial consequences to the District 
and the student body. 
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a prototype for future similar sized elementary schools in the district. The designs for 
future schools in the district over the next decade or so would use essentially the same 
"cookie cutter" type design layout, modified and oriented to fit the specific sites. 
6.1.2 Bond Levy Construction 
In the November 1996 general election, the Beaverton School District successfully 
passed a capital construction levy in order to fimd the construction of new schools needed 
to accommodate the rapidly expanding student population in the district. There was an 
immediate need for a new elementary school in the north part of the district, with a new 
elementary school in the southern part ofthe district needed a year later, in the fall of 1999. 
After some time to digest the outcome of the election, to refine their student population 
estimates, identify sites, and decide on construction priorities, the District directed their 
Architect to "dust off' the Nancy Ryles prototype drawings and update them for the new 
site selected along Northwest Saltzman Road. The school needed to be open for the 1998 
school year, only eighteen (18) months more or less from the beginning ofdesign. 
Most elementary school construction programs, particularly under DBB, are a 
twenty four (24) to thirty (30) month process. This school, to be named Findley 
Elementary after the family that had farmed the area for five (5) generations, had to be 
opened in a year and a half. This being the case, the Local Contract Review Board74 
declared an emergency and exempted the new school project from the competitive bidding 
74 See ORS 279.011(1) and ORS 279.055 for defmitions and duties of the Local Contract Review 

Boards. 

217 
requirement under ORS 279.015, allowing the District to immediately bring on a CMlOC 
to accelerate or "fast-track" the construction process. 
The District immediately solicited for competitive proposals from the construction 
community to perform CMlOC services on the project. The process involved a pre­
qualification and selection phases that included SUbmitting a proposal with the highest rated 
CMlGC proposers to be interviewed. When this "RFP" process was complete, the District 
selected and entered into an agreement with the highest rated CMlOC proposer. 
The construction team, consisting of the District management, the architect's team, 
and the CMlOC, immediately started to work on plans and budget. A target amount had 
been set by the District and the architect, based in part on the Nancy Ryles project costs 
with scope additions and site work changes for the new school in order to meet the overall 
bonded program requirements. The District determined that the new school would be 
larger than Nancy Ryles, approximately 70,000 SF. Therefore, the architect's team began 
by making changes in the plans based on scope changes and the site work, while the 
CMlGC started to put together construction budgets for the eventual GMP. The District 
team had the responsibility ofdeciding what to add and what to take out, depending on the 
costs and the funds available. 
The process did not go smoothly. The CMlOC's cost estimates were significantly 
over the budgets the District and their architect had established. The architect made 
numerous revisions to the plans, at the direction of the District, in order to reduce the 
overall project costs. According to the design team, this was a very frustrating period 
because, "the CMlOC would not come to the table with solutions or suggestions for cost 
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savings; they merely gave us a cost estimate for the design solutions [the architect's team] 
developed" [215]. In the end, the original CMlGC was not able to negotiate a GMP with 
the District and the decision was made to part ways. 
Months had elapsed since the original RFP had gone out and the time frame for 
construction had necessarily been reduced, making the situation all the more serious for the 
District. Luckily, the District was able to come to a quick agreement with the second 
highest rated CMlGC to take over the project, and according to the architect, ''within two to 
three weeks, they had negotiated a GMP" that was substantially lower than the previous 
CMlGC had proposed and was within the District's original target range. The original 
GMP for the project was $6,905,000. The project proceeded as required to be ready for the 
opening ofschool in the first week ofSeptember 1997; however, the project did experience 
cost growth of approximately seven percent (7.0%) over the original GMP to a final 
amount paid of$7,388,000 (or an additional $483,000.)75 
At the same time the Findley School was initiated, the District identified the need 
for another elementary school in the south. However, that school, which would come to be 
known as the Scholls-Heights Elementary School, would not be needed until the start of 
school in the fall of 1999. This meant that there would be no need to "fast track" the job, as 
it fell within the nonnal program parameters ofDBB for schools, particularly since the near 
identical design was being implemented at Findley. The decision was made to use DBB 
for the Scholls-Heights School, whose name was taken from the Oregon Pioneer and great­
nephew ofthe woodsman Daniel Boone, Peter Scholls. 
75 The Nancy Ryles School had cost growth of7.85% for a total of $366,777. 
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Scholls-Heights was bid while the Findley School was under construction, and 
while the two schools had nearly identical floor plans, there was some difference in the 
amount ofsite work (less at Scholls than Findley). Scholls is listed in the Oregon database 
as being slightly smaller at 69,000 SF compared with Findley at 70,000 SF, but according 
to the Architect, they are the same design. Scholls-Heights received an unknown nmnber 
of competitive sealed bids76 and awarded the job to the low bid contractor for a price of 
$6,405,000, exactly $500,000 less than the Findley GMP established just a year earlier. 
The architect commented that while some of the difference could be attributed to 
the site work differences, ''There was no one big difference in the projects that accounts for 
the difference in costs." ''The Scholls project was consistently lower in every cost 
category." Furthermore, in spite of the fact that inflation during the period was very low, 
there was some cost inflation, and more importantly, the employment levels in construction 
during the Scholls project were at record levels in Oregon, higher than during the Findley 
project77 • With higher levels of employment, fewer bidders feel the need to be risk taking, 
thus you expect higher not lower bidding. None of the environmental or endogenous 
factors accounts for the difference in costs except perhaps the fact that one project was 
competitively bid and the other was not. 
Scholls-Heights opened on September ih, 1999; as with Findley, the project was 
on time, but did experience cost growth. However, perhaps due in part to lessons learned 
76 The architect had no records of this type for the project, having turned them over to the District, and 
the Beaverton School District was unable to locate any files related to bidding of the job for the 
purposes of this research - meaning that they may still have the documents stored somewhere but there 
was nobody available to look for them and the only way they could be found and retrieved would be if 
someone paid the District to do so. 
77 The Oregon Economic Forecast showed that 86,500 were employed in the construction sector in the 
third quarter of 1999, whereas one 83,300 were employed in the third quarter of 1998. 
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on Findley, the cost growth on Scholls-Heights was considerably less, at only three percent 
(3%) for a total of$192,150. In the final analysis, Findley cost the District nearly twelve 
percent (12%) more than Scholls-Heights, nearly $10.00 per square foot of building floor 
area, which according to the architect, could not be accounted for by any specific 
difference in the jobs [215]. 
6.2 Summary of the Case Comparison Study 
Table 26 presents a summary ofthe two projects evaluated in this chapter. 
School: Findley Scholls 
PDS: i CM/GC DBB 
Year opened: 1998 1999 
Size (sf): 70,000 sf 69,000 sf 
Original GMP/Bid: $6,905,000 $6,405,000 
Final Amt. Paid: $7,388,000 $6,597,150 
Cost Growth: $483,000 $192,150 
Cost/sf: $105.54 $95.61 
Schedule 
Performance: 
On time 
-17 Mo. 
On time 
24 Mo. 
Table 26 Summary of Case Comparison 
As much as anything, this case comparison study demonstrates the difficulty of 
comparing two construction projects, even two that have the same design, same design 
team, same owner and similar time frames. How much were the costs in Findley affected 
by the shortened time frame is really anybody's guess. It is known that the CMlGC on the 
Findley job brought to the owner the three supposed lowest subcontract bids for each type 
221 
of work, and unless there was some convincing reason not to, the low subcontractor was 
selected. But what is not known and quite possible is that given the shortened time frame, 
the CMlGC and Owner may have selected subcontractors that could perfonn the work in 
the time allowed as opposed to the cheapest. In addition, as seen in the legal cases 
described in Section 2.6.3, CMlGC's have broad discretion over whom they wish to "pre­
qualify" for bidding subcontract work. The CMlOC on the Findley project may very well 
have not solicited or accepted bids from weaker but cheaper perfonners 78. 
The . analysis in Chapter 4 showed that, based on the overall construction 
management model, CMlGC projects perfonn better than DBB jobs. However, recall that 
the statistical analysis of the output metrics indicated that there was no statistically 
significant difference between the outcomes. It should be pointed out that both Findley and 
Scholls-Heights fall within the cost control metric means for the overall study and both 
projects perfonned well in schedule perfonnance (both with 0% schedule growth). What 
the case study indicates perhaps is that while broad statements can be made, there is no 
way to precisely predict the outcome of a specific project. And the choice of the PDS 
needs to be carefully evaluated to meet the specific needs of the project and promises no 
guaranteed outcome. 
There may be another factor to be considered regarding the use of CMlGC on 
certain types ofprojects. In two extended interviews with the architect and his partners and 
staff for this research (the latter being [215]), these design professionals questioned the 
value added by the CMlGC in public school projects. In short, the professionals 
78 The CMlOC project team was not available for comment. 
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commented that they had designed literally hundreds ofschools in Oregon and Washington 
in their three decades ofbeing in business, as one commented, "What is the CMlGC going 
to bring to the table that we already don't know or haven't seen before?" He added, 
"We've seen a lot more schools than any single contractor has because schools are pretty 
much all we do, and furthennore, they are not incredibly complex jobs like a hospital or 
require cutting edge materials or technology like a new office building." 
While the Architect's comments and opinions here must be gIven a lot of 
credibility, the analysis in Section 4.3.1 indicates that CMlGC school projects performed as 
well or better than DBB school jobs. There was fewer than half the number of CMlGC 
schools than DBB schools, but more CMlGC schools, seven, achieved efficient or near 
efficient DEA scores, compared with only five of the DBB schools. But these analyses do 
not account for differences felt by the design consulting team, which may be substantial. 
As one of the interviewee's noted, the architect is usually the one that ends up bearing the 
cost of changes incurred during the CMlGC process. By example the architects discussed 
a school designed for a rural Oregon district. The CMlGC maintained that they would be 
unable to get qualified carpenters for the job, so therefore it should be a steel frame 
building. The architect objected but was directed by the owner' to make it a steel frame. 
When the pricing started to show that steel would not be competitive with wood, as the 
architect predicted, the architect was directed to redesign the structure using wood. This 
meant a change to all ofthe details and a redesign of the main structure. Since the ''team,'' 
including the owner, architect and CMlGC, had agreed to "bring this job in on budget" the 
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architect received no additional compensation for redrawing the plans and rewriting the 
specifications for the change in structure. 
This case comparison shows that CMJGC projects do not always result in a 
"substantial cost savings" to the public contracting agency, nor that CMJGC projects will 
always result in substantially lower construction cost growth than similar DBB projects. 
However, the case comparison also shows that CMJGC can deliver jobs in a shorter overall 
time frame (including both design and construction) than DBB. 
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7 Summary, Conclusions and Additional Work 
7.1 Summary and Findings of Analysis 
This research evaluates the public policy in Oregon that allows public agencies to 
exempt projects from competitive public bidding and negotiate with a construction 
contractor (selected in a competitive, but subjective process) to build a project. The 
analyses presented in this dissertation shows the public policy requirement, that the pubic 
agency show that the exemption from competitive bidding will result in substantial cost 
savings, is not supported by the data analysis. 
This research concludes that the exempted projects, the CMlGC projects, are more 
efficient than the competitive bid, DBB jobs, only when the entire input-output model is 
considered. CMlGC projects do not outperform DBB projects in terms of cost and 
schedule control metrics alone. Empirical analysis, including the case study project 
comparison, shows that the CMlGC projects may be more costly than similar DBB jobs. 
This is also confirmed by the opinions ofvarious stakeholders surveyed. 
CMlGC projects become more efficient than DBB projects through the ability to 
fast -track the work. That is, to start the actual construction work with less information in 
terms of the completeness ofthe plans and specifications. Since fast-tracking appears to be 
the principal benefit ofCMlGC, it should be the principal reason projects are exempted. 
Project stakeholders are consistently incorrect in their assertions that the use of 
CMlGC PDS reduces overall project "risk," since there is no statistically significant 
difference between the DBB and CMlGC jobs with respect to cost and schedule control. 
These findings from the Oregon database were validated by similar data from other studies, 
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principally [51, 75, 99, 126], in spite of the fact that Konchar and Sanvido [75, 126] 
reached alternate conclusions. 
7.2 Recommendations 
We recommend that the State of Oregon revise the current public policy and shift 
the exemption requirement from "significant cost savings" to a focus on "schedule" 
requirements, specifically the need to fast-track the project. Also, including an analysis of 
other factors, such as project complexity as suggested by the Oregon Public Contracting 
Coalition [56], should be considered. 
Second, we recommend that the state do a better job enforcing the requirements of 
ORS 279.103, both in tenns of getting the reports done, and also making certain that the 
reports are in fact the "objective analysis" required by the statute. It may require the state 
to shift the responsibility for collecting and reviewing these reports from the Department of 
Administrative Services to the Secretary ofState's Audit Division. 
7.3 Future Work 
This research is neither the final word on this DEA application or the public policy 
debate regarding the procurement of construction services for public building projects. 
Clearly there is a need to better understand the process by which certain types of 
information are converted into inputs for DEA models in order to apply DEA to this 
broader set of service sector applications. The process construction contractors undergo is 
similar to the process that any professional consultant undergoes in order to produce a 
product or outcome for an owner. Whether that person is an accountant, architect or 
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engineer, all are given a varying amount of data from their client, which they convert into 
useful inputs through some "process model" and eventually into outputs. The next step in 
this process is to investigate, both in theory and application, different transformations ofthe 
data to better understand and model "information" as used as an input in the DEA model. 
As for the policy debate regarding construction contracting project delivery 
methods, it is clear from our research that the Oregon legislature must to come to grips 
with the fact that the current policy is simply unworkable since it cannot be supported by 
either empirical or theoretical data analysis. The focus of this effort should be in better 
aligning the policy goals with the benefits that can be achieved by the different methods. 
The fact that the public pays no additional cost for starting a project at the conceptual or 
preliminary design phases is a clear indication of the advantages presented by the method 
that is ignored in the policy statement. 
7.4 Limitations of the Study 
The limitations of this study were addressed in Chapter 1 and are repeated here in 
brief: 
• 	 The study is limited to building projects and may not be generalized to the 
broader construction industry that includes heavy highway and industrial 
projects. 
• 	 The study considered only building projects in Oregon and may not be 
generalized to all states (although Washington state is discussed) or the 
federal government. 
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• 	 The Expert Panel members may have been biased, but the panel was 
balanced with members from three stakeholder groups. Furthermore, the 
metrics derived from the Expert Panel were substantially similar to those 
used in the other PDS studies, and much of the data obtained from the 
Panel members was corroborated from other sources. 
• 	 The projects studied are not a random sample of the popUlation of all 
projects, but the study contained the majority ofCMlGC projects identified 
in the database (111 of 136) and over half the DBB projects (104 of 193) 
constructed in the state over the study period that fit the criteria for the 
study (note that 68 projects were identified and that the PDS was unknown, 
although at least two of these were DB and the majority of the others were 
probably DBB.) 
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Appendix A: Glossary of Terms 
0/0 Complete @ Bid or GMP An estimate or opinion based on the project team's 
experience. As a general rule, Conceptual drawings 
are considered 10 to 50% complete, Schematic design 
can range from 40% to 75% complete, Preliminary 
design range from 60% to 90% complete, and 
Working drawings, somewhere between 90% and 
100% complete. Experience tells us that 100% 
complete drawings are extremely rare in large 
complex construction projects of the type considered 
in this study. 
AP Architect's Proposal or An Architect's Proposal or Proposal Request is 
Proposal Request (PR) similar to an RFI generated by the owner or his 
architect. Unlike an RFI, the AP presupposes that the 
change or addition will affect the cost and schedule of 
the project. AR's like RFI's are followed by a COR 
and finally a CO. 
Bid By Bid, Bid Price or Bid Fee, we mean the 
competitively bid total price, or in the case ofBid Fee, 
the Contractor's fee at the time of the competitive bid 
- prior to buy-out or any augmentation. 
Budget Control The Budget Control metric is calculated as the: 
(Original Budget, Bid or GMP)I(Actual amount paid, 
to the contractor or total final billings at the end of the 
job.) 
C.O. - Change Order A Change Order is an amendment to a contract. 
cn Construction Industry Institute at the University of 
Texas, Austin (http://construction­
institute.org/index.cfm) performs research on the 
construction industry including benchmarking or 
project performance. 
CMlGC CMlGC stands for Construction 
Manager/General Contractor. This method of 
contracting results from a negotiated 
procurement. The term CMlGC is also used to 
denote the entity performing the work such as: 
"the CMlGC on the project." 
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Contractor The tenn "Contractor" is generally used to denote the 
entity that oversees the construction project, it can be 
used when referring to either a DBB construction 
contract or a CMJGC construction contract, but 
generally when the tenn "contractor" is used it 
implies a DBB project. 
COR ­ Change Order Request A Change Order usually begins with a Change Order 
Request by the contractor and most CO's contain a 
number of COR's packaged together in one contract 
amendment. 
DB Design-Build is a method of contracting (a PDS) that 
is used in the private sector and is gaining use in the 
public sector, however DB is not directly evaluated in 
this study. 
DBB Design-Bid-Build is the traditional fonn or 
method of contracting that involves an owner 
hiring an architect to design a project, then letting 
the work out by competitive bidding among a 
group ofqualified contractors. 
DCVR Design Clarification Verification Request is another 
tenn used synonymously with RFI by different finns. 
DCVR is not used in the text of this research simply 
by choice of the author. 
DEA Data Envelopment Analysis is the methodology used 
in this study. See Tab 8 for explanation and detail. 
DMU ­ Decision Making Unit Decision Making Units are the fundamental entities 
used in the DEA model as the basis for comparison. 
In this research, projects are the DMUs. 
Fast-track Fast tracking is a process whereby a project starts 
construction before the final plans and specifications 
for the work is complete. This process is designed to 
allow the beginning of certain work, like earthwork, 
foundations and primary structure to start before 
issues like tile, carpet and paint color have been 
decided on. 
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GMP 
LD Liquidated Damages or 
LD's 
LSBMethod 
Original Budget or Bid 
PDS 
Profit 
Project Manager 
Punch List Item 
Guaranteed Maximum Price: it is typical in a CMlGC 
project for the CMlGC or "Contractor" to give the 
Owner a Maximum Price or GMP prior to starting 
construction, or when they are in the early stages of 
construction. 
Liquidated damages are a common method in the 
construction industry to allocate damages that result 
from the inexcusable late delivery of a project to the 
owner. These are typically per diem damages that 
have a reasonable relationship to the actual damages 
incurred by the owner for not having beneficial use of 
the building. The relationship must be reasonable so 
as not be a penalty, but also, actual damages must be 
precisely incalculable. 
Lump Sum Bid Method is another term meaning the 
same thing as DBB. 
If the project is a CMlGC, the original Guaranteed 
Maximum Price. If the project is a DBB job, it is the 
original bid amount, including the accepted alternates, 
if any. 
Project Delivery System, the PDS is the method 
ofcontracting for construction work, it is literally 
the way in which the work or product is 
delivered. 
Profit is defined in this study as the Contractor's Fee, 
this is all money not included in the direct work or 
jobsite overheads. The Profit or Fee, includes the 
portion of the payment made to the Contractor to pay 
for home office overhead. 
This is defined as the person generally in charge of 
the project and responsible for the financial 
performance, the quality of the work, and meeting the 
Owner's schedule, safety, and other performance 
requirements. Other titles used in some companies 
may be: Superintendent, Operations Manager, Project 
Engineer, Project Executive. 
List ofuncompleted or corrective items ofwork 
to be done to complete the contract. These lists 
are prepared by the architect after an inspection 
of the project at substantial completion 
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RFI's ­ Request for An RFI is a Request for Infonnation or Design 
Infonnation Clarification from the Contractor to the Architect, 
Engineer or Owner. It also may include an 
Architect's Proposal Request, but generally only if the 
Proposal Request is to correct some error or omission 
on the plans made by the Architect or Engineer. 
Some Contractors and some OWners or Architects 
may not use RFI's, or they may be called something 
else, or they may simply be included in project 
correspondence. In your best judgment, how many 
requests for design clarification were made by the 
r. to the Architect, Engineer or Owner. 
RFP - Request for Proposal In most CMlGC projects, the prospective vendors are 
required to submit an RFP, which contains 
infonnation about the finn and description of the 
proposed project team, past history, and possibly 
approach to the work. From these RFP's the owner 
will either make a selection or narrow the field to a 
smaller number ofprospective vendors for personal 
interviews prior to selection. 
Schedule Control The Schedule Control metric is calculates as the: 
(Original project schedule or time allowed under the 
contract)/(Actual amount of time expended at 
substantial completion.) 
Total Final Billings This is the total amount ofmoney paid by the Owner 
to the Contractor, including change orders, contract 
extensions, and so on. 
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Appendix B: Expert Panel Members 
Name Title Group 
Barton Eberwein Vice President, Hoffman Construction . Contractors 
Jose:gh F. Bolkovatz Vice President, JE Dunn Construction Contractors 
Jeffery V. Es~edal President, Pacific Coast Construction Contractors 
R~ger Peterson President, Marion Construction Contractors 
Tom Gerding President, T. Gerding Construction Co. Contractors 
Jack Kalinoski Retired, AGC Staff Member, Lobbyist Contractors 
Donald B. Kane Retired, VP Finance, Drake Construction Contractors 
Patrick O'Brien Owner, OTKM Construction Contractors 
Roger A. Lenneberg Counsel, Performance Contracting Contractors 
: Philip Carter Project Manager, Baugh Construction Contractors 
I W. Lee Schroeder Retired, VP, Andersen Construction Contractors 
Joseph A. Yazbeck Attorney Contractors 
Alan Killian Vice President Turner Construction Contractors 
Patrick L. LaCrosse Retired, President, OMSI, Former Executive Owners 
Director, Portland Development Commission 
Mike Burton Retired, Executive Director of METRO Owners 
Lloyd Anderson Retired, Executive Director, Port of Portland, Owners 
and Portland City Commissioner 
John Lang Retired, Director, BES, City of Portland Owners 
Robert "Bob" Balaski Retired, Director of Capital Projects, Port of Owners 
Portland 
David Bunnell Contracts Manager, OHSD Owners 
William Nealand Consulting Project Manager Owners 
Luis Ornelas Consulting Project Manager Owners 
Ron Jackson Director of Operations, Portland Development Owners 
Commission; now Attorney in Private Practice 
Todd Ainsworth Attorney, Oregon Department of Justice Owners 
John Storrs Architect. dec. Architects 
RaY!Jlond Boucher Managing Partner, BML Architects Architects 
George "Bing" Partner, SERA Architects Architects 
Sheldon 
Dennis Cusack Partner, SRG Partnership Architects 
Philip Beyl Partner, GBD Architects Architects 
Kevin Johnson Partner, BOOR!A Architects Architects 
Donald P. Reay Emeritus Prof. Arch. DC Berkeley, dec. Architects 
George Crandall FF A Architects, ret. Architect 
David Evans Chairman, David Evans & Associates Engineers 
Robert Wright President, Thomas- Wright Engineers Engineers 
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In addition to the Experts, several other people, agencies and finns played key 
roles in supplying infonnation on projects, providing stakeholder survey responses, 
and other support for this research these include the following: 
Andersen Construction 
Baugh Construction, Oregon 
JE Dunn Construction 
Hoffman Construction Company 
Kirby Naglehout Construction 
Lease Crutcher Lewis Construction 
Ramsay-Gerding Construction Company 
Slayden Construction 
Swinerton Construction 
Wildish Construction 
Dull Olsen Weekes, AIA 
BOORA Architects 
Yost Grube Hall 
SRG Partnership 
Zimmer Gunsul Frasca Partnership 
Soderstrom Architects 
gLAs Architects 
Malhum Architects 
Barber Barrett Turner 
Arbuckle Costic Architects 
The Seattle Daily Journal ofCommerce 
The Portland Daily Journal ofCommerce 
Oregon Health & Science University 
Oregon State University 
Portland State University 
Southern Oregon University 
University ofOregon 
Western Oregon University 
Central Oregon Community College 
Portland Community College 
Clackamas Community College 
Oregon Department ofAdministrative 
Services 
Oregon Department ofCorrections 
Oregon Department of Justice 
Oregon Military Department 
Oregon State Library 
Oregon DAS Office ofEconomic Analysis 
Oregon Secretary ofState, Audit Division 
Port ofPortland 
City ofPortland 
City ofSalem 
City ofBeaverton 
City ofGresham 
City of Eugene 
Multnomah County 
Tillamook County 
Washington County 
Beaverton School District 
Eugene Public School District 
Portland Public School District 
Gresham Barlow School District 
Luis Ornelas 
FranzRad 
Jerry Milsted 
Robert O'Halloran 
Arnold Gray 
Martha Hodgkinson 
Gary Christensen 
Michael Bloom 
Thomas Spaulding 
David Douthwaite 
John Weekes 
Todd Anderson 
Roger Brown 
Sharon Peterson 
Greg Peterson 
Gary Wills 
Glen Taylor 
James Lyman 
Karl Shulz 
Mike Courchaine 
Walt Lemon 
Bruce Van Hine 
Kathy Shears 
Dirk Fraily 
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Appendix C: DRS Chapter 279.015 
279.015 Competitive bidding; exceptions; exemptions. (1) Subject to the policies 
and provisions ofORS 279.005 and 279.007, all public contracts shall be based upon 
competitive bids or proposals except: 
(a) Contracts made with other public agencies or the federal government. 
(b) Contracts made with qualified nonprofit agencies providing employment 
opportunities for disabled individuals. 
(c) A public contract exempt under subsection (2) of this section. 
(d) A contract for products, services or supplies if the value of the contract is less than 
$5,000. 
(e) Insurance and service contracts as provided for under ORS 414.115,414.125, 
414.135 and 414.145. 
(f) Contracts for repair, maintenance, improvement or protection ofproperty obtained 
by the Director ofVeterans' Affairs under ORS 407.135 and 407.145 (1). 
(g) Contracts between public agencies utilizing an existing solicitation or current 
requirement contract ofone ofthe public agencies that is party to the contract for 
which: 
(A) The original contract met the requirements of this chapter; 
(B) The contract allows other public agency usage of the contract; and 
(C) The original contracting public agency concurs. 
(h) If a project is competitively bid and all responsive bids from responsible bidders 
exceed the public agency's cost estimate, the public agency, in accordance with rules 
adopted by the public agency, may negotiate with the lowest responsive, responsible 
bidder, prior to awarding the contract, in order to solicit value engineering and other 
options to attempt to bring the project within the agency's cost estimate. A negotiation 
with the lowest responsive, responsible bidder pursuant to this paragraph shall not 
result in the award of the contract to that bidder if the scope of the project is 
significantly changed from the original bid proposaL Notwithstanding any other 
provision of law, the records of a bidder used in contract negotiation pursuant to this 
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paragraph are not subject to public inspection until after the negotiated contract has 
been awarded or the negotiation process has been tenninated. 
(2) Subject to subsection (6)(b) ofthis section, the Director of the Oregon Department 
ofAdministrative Services or a local contract review board may exempt certain public 
contracts or classes ofpublic contracts from the competitive bidding requirements of 
subsection (1) of this section upon approval of the following findings submitted by the 
public contracting agency seeking the exemption: 
(a) It is unlikely that such exemption will encourage favoritism in the awarding of 
public contracts or substantially diminish competition for public contracts; and 
(b) The awarding ofpublic contracts pursuant to the exemption will result in 
substantial cost savings to the public contracting agency. In making such finding, the 
director or board may consider the type, cost, amount of the contract, number of 
persons available to bid and such other factors as may be deemed appropriate. 
(3)(a) Before final adoption of the findings required by subsection (2) of this section 
exempting a contract for a public improvement from the requirement of competitive 
bidding, a public agency shall hold a public hearing. 
(b) Notification of the public hearing shall be published in at least one trade 
newspaper of general statewide circulation a minimum of 14 days prior to the hearing. 
(c) The notice shall state that the public hearing is for the purpose of taking comments 
on the agency's draft findings for an exemption from the competitive bidding 
requirement. At the time of the notice, copies of the draft findings shall be made 
available to the public. At the option of the public agency, the notice may describe the 
process by which the findings are finally adopted and may indicate the opportunity for 
any further public comment. 
(d) At the public hearing, the public agency shall offer an opportunity for any 
interested party to appear and present comment. 
(e) If a public agency is required to act promptly due to circumstances beyond its 
control that do not constitute an emergency, notification ofthe public hearing can be 
published simultaneously with the agency's solicitation ofcontractors for the 
alternative public contracting method, as long as responses to the solicitation are due 
at least five days after the meeting and approval of the findings. 
(4) A public contract also may be exempted from the requirements of subsection (1) of 
this section if: 
(a) Emergency conditions require prompt execution of the contract; 
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(b) In case of sale of surplus property by a public agency, the number, value and 
nature of the items to be sold make it probable that the cost of conducting a sale by 
competitive bidding will be such that a liquidation sale will result in substantially 
greater net revenue to the public agency; or 
(c)(A) The public contract is made between regularly organized fire departments, as 
defined in DRS 652.050, for fire protection equipment, as defined in DRS 476.005, 
and: 
(i) The recipient regularly organized fire department makes a written request for the 
fire protection equipment to the transferor regularly organized fire department; 
(ii) The fire protection equipment is surplus to or unusable by the transferor; 
(iii) The total fair market value of fire protection equipment received by the recipient 
does not exceed $50,000 per calendar year; and 
(iv) The transferor holds a public hearing, with notice given as outlined in subsection 
(3)(b) of this section, .and finds that the public contract is in the public's interest. 
(B) As used in subparagraph (A) of this paragraph, "public contract" includes a sale at 
no cost. 
(5) The director or board shall adopt rules allowing the governing body of a public 
agency and the officer of a public agency for contracts under $50,000 to declare that 
an emergency exists and establishing procedures for determining when the conditions 
in subsection (4 )( a) of this section are present. The rules shall prescribe that if an 
emergency is declared, any contract awarded under this subsection and subsection 
(4)(a) of this section must be awarded within 60 days following declaration of the 
emergency, unless the director or board grants an extension. 
(6) In granting exemptions pursuant to subsection (2)(a) and (b) of this section, the 
director or board shall: 
(a) Where appropriate, direct the use of alternate contracting and purchasing practices 
that take account ofmarket realities and modem or innovative contracting and 
purchasing methods, which are also consistent with the public policy of encouraging 
competition. 
(b) Require and approve or disapprove written findings by the public contracting 
agency that support the awarding of a particular public contract or a class ofpublic 
contracts, without the competitive requirements of subsection (1) of this section. The 
findings must show that the exemption of a contract or class of contracts complies 
with the requirements of subsection (2)(a) and (b) of this section. 
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Appendix D: Example of Mark-up Calculation 
ill the discussion on winners curse and the broader discussion on competitive 
bidding in building construction contracts, the contractor's fee is studied as a principal 
strategic component of his bid. Many papers have been written regarding mark-up and 
contractor's fee; however few if any actually document how contractors derive their mark­
up or fee in practice. The following discussion was provided by an Expert Panel Member 
and vice president ofestimating for a large commercial building contractor. 
While there is some amount of discretion in choosing the exact fee on any project, 
the contractor's choice is significantly constrained by business requirements and market 
conditions. The contractor is faced with two primary concerns in setting the minimwn 
fee79: 
1. Income necessary to run the company, and 
2. Risk 
3. What the market will allow. 
The income necessary to run the company has two components required return on 
capital needed to acquire a bond and company overhead. The construction contractors, 
bidding on public projects, are highly regulated by the insurance industry. ill order to bid 
on a public project, the contractor must (in nearly all cases) obtain a performance and 
payment bond also known as a "Miller Act" bond [20]. Ifa contractor is unable to obtain a 
bond, there is no reason to even consider bidding on a project. 
The illsurer or Surety will require a contractor to post liquid assets or equity of 
between one tenth and one-twentieth the construction project volume. This is referred to as 
"Volume to Equity ratio." Meaning that, any contractor must have between fifty and one 
hundred thousand dollars in liquid assets in order to bid on a one million-dollar project. 
The exact amount of assets required by the surety will depend on the contractors' past 
perfonnance and other factors. A relatively new contractor will be required to post a 
higher amount than a more established finn. The following is an example of how a 
contractor would calculate the return on equity (ROE) component ofthe fee: 
Example 1 
Assume: 20:1 volume/equity (Le.: an established contractor) 

Anticipating $2,000,000 in construction volume during the year 

$100,000 equity required 

Determine the ROE required by the contractor, this depends on the investor, 
and other investments available such as stocks and bonds. Since there is a 
19 In this discussion of "fee" and through out this paper, fee incorporates all of the non-direct work costs 
required to run the company. These typically include main office overhead, salaries for executives and 
estimators as well as company profit. 
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lot of risk associated with an investment in a construction project, assume the 
contractor chooses 40% after tax ROE. 
ROE is then calculated to be: $40,000 or roughly, $60,000 before tax. 
The second component of the contractor's fee is overhead and can be calculated as 
in the following example: 
Office Space: $8,000 

Office Equipment: $5,000 

Office Furniture: $1,000 

Estimators/Executives: $60,000 

Office Staff Salary: $26.000 

Total: $100,000 
Now, sum the two components: 
ROE: $60,000 

Overhead: $100.000 

Total Fee Required: $160,000 
Average Mark-up of: $160,000/$2,000,000 = 80/0 80 
This calculation sets one low limit for the fee. Another low limit, which is also 
influenced by the insurance industry is project risk. Project risk is evaluated in two ways, 
the contractor's direct labor risk and the overall job risk. 
Labor risk is the uncertainty of labor productivity. Contractors estimate the cost 
ofa given project by calculating the quantity ofmaterials in place, and the amount of labor 
(and equipment) required to put the materials in place. From either the contractor's own 
historical records or industry pricing guides, such as Means [212], the contractor will draw 
an estimated labor productivity, expressed as either hours labor per unit ofmaterial or units 
ofmaterial per hour oflabor. By applying the quantity ofmaterial to the labor productivity 
the contractor calculates the total number ofhours, which in turn is converted to dollars by 
applying the appropriate wage rates. However, these estimates have uncertainty, which is 
reflected in the minimum mark-up. Typically, the labor uncertainty is on the order of30%. 
In keeping with the example above, let us assume that half of the contractor's total volume 
is in labor. To calculate the minimum required labor risk fee: 
80 Thanks to Joseph F. Bolkovatz, Vice President of Estimating, JE Dunn Construction Company, 
Portland, Oregon, for providing this example. 
255 
Labor = $1,000,000 

Labor risk = $1,000,000 x 30% = $300,000 

Average Mark-up of: $300,000/$2,000,000 =15% 
Labor risk is a significant consideration for subcontractors, and a to a lesser degree 
general contractors. This is because general contractors typically self perfonn only a very 
minor amount of the labor on a given building project. More often, the general contractor 
has to assess the overall ''job risk", that is the risk presented to the contractor by 
subcontracting 90 to 95% of the project to subcontractors. The assessment of this risk will 
vary from contractor to contractor and job to job and will depend on a number of factors as 
pointed out by Weitzman [217]. Again however, the insurance industry will set a 
minimum fee based on their analysis of the project risks, major subcontractors and so 
forth.81 This number will vary, however it is unlikely to ever be less than 2%. (This "fee 
required" figure is not the same as the actual "bond rate" quoted by the Surety. That rate 
will be substantially less for large contractors.) 
Based on our analysis of ROE, costs and risks, we now have a set of three 
minimum mark-up' s or fees to use: 8%, 15% and 2%. Since we are forced to cover all 
risks we must choose the largest ofthe minimum's, in this case, 15%. 
These market and business constraints set the minimum mark-up or fee the 
contractor must bid, what is the maximum fee the contractor can bid? That depends solely 
on the current competitive market conditions, or ''what the market will allow". Having set 
the minimum fee, setting the maximum or actual fee becomes a game where all of the 
bidders attempt to optimize their expected return based on probability of winning and 
amount ofprofit generated at a given fee (or bid). 
81 In fact, a Surety will not usually contact a contractor and prescribe a minimum fee, typically, the 
Surety's Agent will only get involved after a bid is won and review the contractor's bid at that time to 
determine if the fee is adequate, in order for them to issue a bond. 
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Appendix E: Prior Industry Studies 
The Construction Industry Institute 
The Construction Industry Institute is headquartered at the University of Texas at 
Austin and perfonns a substantial amount of research on construction industry, including 
benchmarking of construction project perfonnance81• TIlls research is supported by its 
members numbering well more than one hundred, including some of the largest public and 
private building organizations in the country, for example Bechtel and CH2M Hill 
ConstructorslIDC; public and private Owners, including the Federal Government of the 
United States of America; and academic institutions including Oregon State University. 
The mission ofthe cn as stated on their website83 is: 
"The mission of the Construction Industry Institute is to improve the business 
effectiveness of the capital facilities life cycle, including safety, quality, 
schedule, cost, security, reliability, and operability. Participation in CII provides 
members the opportunity for a competitive advantage in the global 
marketplace." 
In the 1990's the cn undertook a "Benchmarking" project to evaluate "Best 
Practices" in the Construction Industry resulting in a series ofreports including: [207]. The 
most recent most recent version or update prefaces the report with the following 
statements: 
"The report presents the compilation of data analyses performed in early 2000 
using the Construction Industry Institute (CII) Benchmarking and Metrics 
(BM&M) database." 
"Data included in the report were collected through February 4, 2000. The 
purpose of the report is to establish an authoritative source of information 
providing norms for project performance and practice use metrics. 
Performance norms are provided for cost, schedule, safety, changes, and 
rework. Practice use metrics are included for pre-project planning, 
constructability, team building, zero accidents, change management, and 
design/information technology best practices. In addition, norms for percent 
design completion at authorization and construction start are included. Data 
on each of these practices have been collected for at least 3 consecutive 
years. Additional practices are being added in an on-going effort to establish 
the level of use and value of a" CII recommended best practices." 
This recent version of the Benchmarking Report is produced on Compact Digital 
Disk or CD [51] and contains more than 3000 pages of description and analysis. The 
82 See: http://construction-institute.orgfservicesicatalog/products!PI' pro.cfm#8.5 for specific products. 
83 See: http://construction-institute.orgf 
257 
current version includes $52.2 billion in construction on 989 projects reported by 33 
Contractors and 39 Owners. However, the crr database is heavily weighted to "Industrial 
Projects" as seen in Figure 33, with fewer than 100 domestic building project reported by 
Owners and fewer than 50 reported by Contractors. Chemical Manufacturing (225) and 
Oil Refining (158) make up the two single largest categories of project types in the crr 
database. By contrast there are only two (2) prisons, four (4) parking garages, three (3) 
housing projects and thirteen (13) schools represented in the crr database84• 
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Figure 33: ell Benchmarking Report [51] Project Type Figure #3 
One significant advantage the crr has in its research is the fact that its members 
agree to supply the ClI research team with very sensitive information85 because all of the 
data is kept strictly confidential86• In addition to having access to a lot of data the 
Institute's efforts are well ftmded, as each member pays annual dues of $36,000 per year 
according to their website information on Membership. 
84 The Oregon database ofpublic projects includes a large number of school buildings, which are the 

most commonly constructed public projects. 

85 Safety and accident information, while required by OSHA is not "Public" information that can be 

obtained without the consent of the contractor. 

86 We made several attempts to obtain the ClI Benchmarking Database raw data in any fonn that would 

have been acceptable to the ClI, but the ClI has not released that infonnation. 
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Typical of the crr report are analysis of overall project cost and schedule growth 
such as is presented in Figure 34 through Figure 37 for Domestic Project Cost and 
Schedule Growth, reported by Owners and Contractor's. 
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Figure 34: CII Benchmarking Report [51] Domestic Project Cost Growth Figure #765 
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Figure 35: CII Benchmarking Study (51] Domestic Project Schedule Growth Figure #859 
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Figure 36: CII Benchmarking Study [51) Domestic Project Cost Growth Figure #1310 
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Figure 37: ClI Benchmarking Study [51) Domestic Project Schedule Growth Figure #1375 
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On Domestic Building Projects, that include both private and public projects, the 
cn study found that the Owner's experienced a mean cost reduction of2.0%, and a Project 
Schedule Growth of 7.6%, while Contractor's reported mean Cost Growth on Domestic 
Building Projects to be 7.9% and mean Project Schedule Growth of 4.90/0. It should be 
noted that the Owner's and Contractor's are actually reporting different things because the 
Owner's "Project" is generally more broad than the Contractor's, including such things as 
land acquisition, planning and design through construction and commissioning; whereas 
the Contractor's involvement may be limited to just the "construction" portion of the job. 
This is explained in the, ''Metrics Definitions" section ofthe report. The important thing to 
note here is that the cn Study found both Cost and Schedule Growth in the Contractor's 
reports and Schedule Growth in the Owner's reporting. The Contractor's reports ranged 
from a Project Cost reduction of -12.0% to a Cost Growth of 33.0%, and a Project 
Schedule reduction of-13.6% to a Project Schedule Growth of32.4%. 
The cn study [51] includes statistical analysis of Project Safety using Recordable 
Incident Reports, Project "Rework" (which is a measure of quality) and various "Practice 
Use's" including: Team Building, Pre-Project Planning, Design/Information Technology, 
Project Change Management, Planning for Start-up, and Materials Management. These 
latter metrics are generally measured using a 1 to 10 rating scale contained in surveys filled 
out by different project personnel. It would be difficult to replicate the cn's effort here, in 
that their member organizations had to agree up-front, to training project team members in 
the proper way to fill out these rather extensive reports in a consistent manner. 
Finally, this most recent Benchmarking Report [51] did not replicate the linear 
regression benchmarking analysis performed in earlier versions (as noted in [207]) and the 
reason the cn apparently abandoned that analysis is not known. In any case, the uni­
variant statistical analysis contained in this benchmarking report will provide a good 
independent check against our own findings from the Oregon database for similar metrics. 
ell Project Delivery Systems Reports #133 & #133-1 
In 1997 the cn published the first of two companion studies evaluating Project 
Delivery Systems [75], which lists the Design-Build Research Team as author. The second 
study [183], authored by Sanvido and Konchat'7 is in fact the basis for the former report, 
which is listed as a "Research Summary" (the former is cn Report #133-1 and the latter is 
#133, also the same study is published in [126].) The reports (and [126]) draw identical 
conclusions although the earlier report [75] is more forthright in it's Executive Summary, 
stating: 
"The research shows that design-build systems have significantly less design 
and construction cost growth when compared to design-bid-build; that design­
bid-build systems have the greatest design and construction schedule growth; 
and that quality measurement associated with design-build, often maligned by 
many, is better than quality performance in design-bid-build. It 
87 Konchar also presented the results of this research at the Northwest Construction Consumers Fall 
1999 Conference, "Advantage 2000" in a "Copyrighted" presentation [127] 
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Although the report does add the caveat: 
No one method can meet all owner, project, or individual critical success 
factors. Any delivery system is dependent on the ever-changing dynamics of 
our industry. Now, however, there are statistically analyzed results that will 
improve the owners' ability for selection. Those results are the subject of this 
report. 
The second report [183], is a bit more cautious in its Executive Summary, however 
the report concludes in its Chapter 7: Conclusions and Recommendations: 
"Design-build unit cost was at least 4.5 percent less than [eM/Gel and six 
percent less than design-bid-build. In addition, construction management at 
risk unit cost was at least 1.5 percent less than design-bid-build. This model 
explained 99 percent of the variation in unit cost. 
Design-build construction speed was at least seven percent faster than 
[eM/Gel and 12 percent faster than design-bid-build. In addition, construction 
management at risk construction speed was at least 6 percent faster than 
design-bid-build. This model explained 89 percent of the variation in 
construction speed. 
Design-build delivery speed was at least 23 percent faster than construction 
management at risk and 33 percent faster than design-bid-build. In addition, 
[eM/Gel delivery speed was at least 13 percent faster than desig n-bid-build. 
This model explained 88 percent of the variation in delivery speed. 
This research has clearly shown that there are differences between these 
systems. Design-build offers more speed and more certainty in cost and 
schedule than does design-bid-build. However, design-build may not be suited 
for every situation or each facility type. Likewise, construction management at 
risk offers more speed than does design-bid-build. It is understood that 
design-bid-build may be better suited for specific projects, yet it did not offer 
superior performance on a repeatable basis in any area measured by this 
research." 
The author's conclusions are supported by the following summary of the 
multivariate statistical analysis: 
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Multivariate Model Analysis for: No. of Cases used: No. with missing values 
Adjusted R2 of 
the Model 
Regression for Unit Cost 203 : 144 99.0% 
Regression for Construction Speed 329: 20 88.1% 
Regression for Delivery Speed 328: 22 86.4%) 
Regression for Cost Growth 196 : 152 11.70/0 
Regression for Schedule Growth 215 : 132 14.4% 
Table 27: Summary of en Report #133 Data 
The interesting fact is that the three models with very high adjusted R2 values: Unit 
Cost, Construction Speed and Delivery Speed may not have much importance in the public 
building sector and in fact these metrics and measures may be correlated with project type 
and PDS. For example, Project Delivery Speed takes into account the total time from 
beginning ofdesign to commissioning ofthe project. However, the cn Project Database is 
heavily weighted toward heavy industrial projects like chemical plants where design-build 
PDS is quite common and where DBB PDS's may be very difficult to implement. 
Furthermore, since the defmition of design-build (and CMlGC for that matter) is a project 
where the construction starts before design in 100% complete, it should be a foregone 
conclusion that they should be delivered faster. More troubling however is the fact that the 
most important Models: Schedule and Cost Growth show the least significance. Another 
important consideration, which is not addressed in the above analysis is whether these 
"statistically significant" differences are really important differences [209], or whether they 
are merely structural aberrations ofthe PDS's. 
Sanvido and Konchar discuss ''Univariate Comparisons" in [183] in Section 4.5.1, 
page 49, and state on page 50 that: 
"Descriptive statistics offer ways to measure the central tendency of a large 
data set. Measures such as the mean, median, variance and ranges of 
several metrics calculated from project data were used as initial comparisons. 
However, the common statistical assumption of normally distributed samples 
was clearly inappropriate. The initial analysis of central tendency quickly 
confirmed that mean, median and mode values were very different, thus 
indicating the need for a battery of tests. Therefore, detailed hypothesis 
testing was required to make conclusions about the significance of differences 
between delivery system performance." 
"Hypothesis testing measured the strength of evidence in the data for or 
against precise statements about population characteristics. The first 
hypothesis testing used two sample t-tests based on sample means. For 
example, the tests used to compare delivery systems in terms of cost growth, 
indicated the level of significance with which the researcher could claim one 
delivery system was performing differently than another. Hypothesis testing for 
sample medians was also chosen. Mood's median test was used because it 
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effectively adjusts for outliers in data, and is particularly appropriate in the 
preliminary stages of analysis (Minitab, 1995). Working together, two sample 
t-tests and Mood's median tests allowed the researcher to test Significance 
between a number of critical metrics." 
These univariate results are presented in Chapter 6 of [183] and Chapter 2 of [75]. 
The report sunnnarizes this analysis in the following figures: 
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Figure 39: cn Report #133 Figure 6.6 Cost Growth Comparisons . 
crr interprets the results from Figure 38 and Figure 39 as: 
"Here design-build projects, had less cost growth than either construction 
management at risk or design-bid-build. However, results indicated that both 
construction management at risk (0.029, 0.008) and design-build (0.007, 
0.008) significantly outperformed design-bid-build in terms of sample cost 
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growth. The maximum standard error for cost growth was plus or minus 2.2 
percent." 
And: 
"The bottom and top of the each box indicates the upper and lower quartiles of 
each sample. This reports that 25 percent of all design-bid-build and 
construction management at risk projects experience cost growth over 10 
percent. Conversely, 25 percent of design-build and construction management 
at risk projects fall at or below zero cost growth, indicating that the likelihood 
for cost growth using these systems is slightly less than that using design-bid­
build." 
However, an alternate, and perhaps more interesting observation of the data 
presented above is the fact that 75% of both the CMR (or CMlGC) and DB projects and 
9Q% of the DBB projects experienced "Cost Growth." Since the authors indicate that they 
only address differences that are statistically significant at the 95% level, and they do not 
discuss the difference between CMR and DB on the Cost Growth metric, we are left to 
conclude that the two are not significantly different, in spite of the statement that, "DB 
projects, had less cost growth than either CMR or DBB." Furthermore, the extreme 
points, which represent the outside or maximum risk are not significantly different 
according to these box -plots. 
CM(~ 0 
DB 0 
OBB 4.44 
Median Schedule Growth (0/0) 
Figure 40: ell Report #133 Figure 6.8 Median Schedule Growth comparisons 
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Figure 41: ell Report #133 Figure 6.9 Schedule Growth comparisons 
The cn interpretation ofFigure 40 and Figure 41 obsetVed that: 
Both design-build (0.03, 0.0) and construction management at risk (0.008, 0.0) 
significantly outperformed design-bid-build in terms of schedule growth. The 
maximum standard error for schedule growth was plus or minus 1.7 percent. 
And: 
Figure 6.9 shows representative box-plots for schedule growth by delivery 
system. The distribution of each sample shows, in greater detail, the 
consistent schedule performance of construction management at risk and 
design-build. Fifty percent of all construction management at risk and design­
build projects fell below zero percent schedule growth. This represents an 
area of signi'ficant difference over the performance of design.:.bid-build, where 
50 percent of the projects were more than four percent late in completion. 
Again, over 50% ofboth CMR and DB projects experienced schedule growth, and 
75% ofDBB projects took longer than scheduled. And, while it appears that CMR does 
better than DB on this metric overall, the difference was apparently not significant, whereas 
both CMR and DB performed significantly better than DBB. The report does not give the 
Mean of the data nor does it discuss the fact that the box -plot for CMR indicates that the 
maximwn risk of project increase or decrease in schedule growth was less than both DB 
and DBB. Furthermore, DB appears to fair worst of all in terms ofmaximum outside risk 
ofproject both being finished ahead ofschedule and late. The use ofthe ''Median'' instead 
of the Mean here may tend to hide the fact that DB may riskier than both CMR and DBB 
in terms ofschedule growth. 
The one thing missing from this analysis however is any mention ofthe fact that in 
both the DB and CMR projects, the Contractor has significant input on the initial project 
budget and schedule that is not available in the DBB case. In fact, it is not sutprising that 
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DB projects do significantly better on schedule perfonnance because the DB Contractor 
usually decides on or dictates to the Owner, the original project schedule. The fact that the 
differences are so slight, as depicted in Figure 39 and Figure 41 is perhaps a reason for 
caution. 
One of the principle concerns about Design-Build projects has been "Project 
Quality" because a fixed price Design-Build Contractor has an incentive to "design out" 
expensive design components as the project nears completion and the budget nears 
exhaustion; although, Project Quality is not one of the prominent criticisms of Design­
Build PDS in [139]. In any case Project Quality is one ofthe three pillars that most people 
think of when they think of construction measures: Time, Cost and Quality. Here the 
authors acknowledge that: 
"The nature of quality data was less objective than other principal metrics." 
In spite of the fact that some objective, "Project Quality" measures like: number of 
punch list items88, number or dollar amount of warranty work perfonned, could be 
collected, the authors decided to have the Project Owner's rate the quality on a relative 
scale. Unfortunately however, the relative rating scale included measuring the perceived 
actual level ofquality compared with the level expected. This type ofmeasure would tend 
to bias in favor of low expectations. Ifan Owner expected the project to be pathetic and it 
turned out only lousy, perhaps he rate it high relative to his initial very low expectations. 
Conversely, if the initial expectations were extremely high, it is doubtful that a Contractor, 
under any PDS could produce a very high rating relative to a very high expectation. 
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Figure 42: ell Report #133-1 Figur~ 2.1.3 Quality 
88 Number of square feet constructed per punch list item was the measure ofquality used in the research 
on the Oregon projects DEA model discussed in Section 4. 
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In addition to the bias toward low expectations, the difference between the different 
PDS's as seen in Figure 42 are not terribly great in tenns of overall percentage difference, 
and it's unclear if these different means were statistically significant. Nevertheless, the 
authors point to these statistics and other similar analysis to conclude that DB out-performs 
DBB and depending on the metric, CM@R (what we call CMlGC) stating: 
"It is clear from these results that design-build projects achieved equal if not 
better quality results than other projects studied. In particular, design-build 
offered significantly better quality results than design-bid-build in all categories 
except that of interior space and layout. Design-build significantly 
outperformed construction management at risk in only one area, operation 
and maintenance cost." 
At least in part based on the following figure: 
Em·tibpe., Ron r. Structuro, 
Foundalii.1U 
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Figure 43: ell Report #133.1 Figure 6.15 
It should be noted that on three of the five system performance quality scores 
shown in Figure 43, CM@R (or CMlGC) performs as well or better then DB, whereas, 
DBB always performs worst. However, the difference between best and worst in most of 
the comparisons appears to be very little, whether statistically significant or not, it does not 
appear to have practical significance, particularly in light ofthe fact that these are measures 
ofrelative subjective expectations as opposed to objective data measures. 
Northwest Construction Consumer Council"Advantage 2000" 
In September 1999 the Northwest Construction Consumer Council, an organization 
made up of principally large public and private institutional facility and building owners 
and large construction contractors held its fall conference on the topic ofProject Delivery 
Systems. Dr. Mark Koncharpresented the results of[183] in [127] and Mr. Jon C. Vanden 
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Bosch presented a similar study [210], titled "Comparing Project Delivery Systems." His 
study, which had its beginnings in 1996, used a survey questionnaire sent out to collect 
data on over 7,600 projects, more than 400 were actually returned and 351 were used in the 
analysis. 
The Vanden Bosch paper [210] was lead· by some of the main Design-Build 
Research Team members that produced [75], including Dr. Sanvido and Nonnan L. Strong 
(an executive with Marshall Contractors and crr Research Team Chairman). This research 
focused on Cost, Schedule and Quality metrics, acknowledging the difficult task of 
defining and comparing project Quality. 
Vanden Bosch reports exactly the same results as does [75] and [183], and uses the 
same number, 351 projects in the analysis. However, there is no mention of the more than 
7,600 surveys questionnaires in [183323] or any mention of Vanden Bosch. In any case it 
is a reasonable conclusion that the [210], [75], and [183] studies are all using the same 
underlying data and consequently each reached essentially the same result. 
As a final note on the crr studies, [183] and [75]: the authors felt compelled to 
include a section in their report: 4.6.3 Research Team Bias, wherein they state: 
"The researcher exhibited no bias toward the delivery systems investigated in 
this study primarily due to a lack of extensive experience using each method." 
However one Expert Panel Member for this research, familiar with the crr studies 
and a member of the Northwest Construction Consumer Council, anonymously 
commented that "the Design-Build Institute paid for a study that showed that Design-Build 
was the best Project Delivery System, and that's what they got." He added that both 
principal authors of [183] were currently or recently employed by large Design-Build 
Contractors or the Design-Build Institute. Whether this colored their analysis or not, the 
fact is that the claims made that Design-Build is a significantly better PDS than CMlac 
and DBB, and that CMlac is better than DBB, do not appear to be supported by their 
research. And the only metrics that do support that conclusion are structurally biased to do 
so. 
One thing is clear however, [183] does an excellent job of defining the issues, 
researching the literature (albeit heavily weighted to the Design-Build research) and 
defining the systems, coming up with measurable metrics and defining terms. 
Project Delivery System Selection Workbook CII Report #133-2 
The crr produced a Workbook intended to help Owners determine which PDS is 
appropriate for their project and propose the use of the following data collection sheet, 
depicted in Figure 44: 
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Score 
(Slm) 
Ra.k 
(1-8) 
Figure 44: CII Report #133-2 Figure 2 Critical Project Goals 
However, the authors repeat the findings from Report #133 [75], as Summarized in 
Table 27 above, but in Table 28 below, they include the average differences between the 
PDS's based on [75], using the R2, as opposed to the Adjusted R2 values summarized 
above. 
Metric DB ''i. 
CMR 
CMRvs.. 
DBB 
DBvs. 
DBB 
Level of 
Certainty 
1% % % % 
Unit Cost 4 ..5 Jess 1.5151 6 less 99 
Construction Speed 7.0 rnster 6.0 fitster 12 taster 89 
Delivery Spee:l 23 faster 13 fuster JJ faster 87 
CostOrowth BlelS 7.8 greater 5.2 less 24 
Schedule Growth 2.2 less 9.2 less 11 less 24 
Table 28: CII Report #133-2 Table 2, Summary of Average Performance Comparisons 
ofPDS's 
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It would appear from Table 28 that the only rational choice for an Owner would be 
to use DB for their PDS, since DB is superior to both DBB and CMR on every category 
measured, of course the Level of Certainty is extremely low on two important metrics of 
Cost and Schedule Growth89• The same criticisms discussed in 0 regarding Table 27 and 
its underlying analysis contained [75] are relevant here also. Specifically, that the DB 
contractor has significantly more control over the all ofthe metrics since the DB contractor, 
in most cases, has a significant decision making capacity relative to scope, cost, quality, 
and schedule factors, which the DBB contractor has virtually no control over, and the 
CMR contractor may have some but little impact on. Again, those aspects of the PDS 
differences are omitted from the report. 
89 See the discussion following Table 27 in Section 0 above, note that in Table 27 Adjusted R2 is 
reported, here the unadjusted R2 is used, based on the same data - this is consistent with a similar table 
in [75]. Devore [78] notes that "many statisticians use the Adjusted [R2]," "to balance against the cost 
ofusing more parameters against the gain in R2. Why the authors chose to use the R2 instead is a 
unknown since the adjusted R2 readily available from the statistical program output found in the report. 
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Washington State Alternative Public Works Methods Oversight Committee 
Study 
This study published December 11, 2000, was required by the Washington State 
Legislature when it enacted the legislation authorizing the use ofnon-lump sum bid PDS's 
in the State of Washington. The legislation in Washington is different than that enacted in 
Oregon, with more restrictions placed on public agencies than in Oregon. However, the 
actual form of contract and PDS resulting from its application is essentially the same and 
this review Report serves to add to the understanding of the benefits and drawbacks of the 
CM/GC contracting.9o 
The Report unfortunately falls short of a thorough evaluation of the processes used 
in Washington because it fails to present any objective data analysis and appears to 
discount any negative comments in the subjective analysis. The Report honestly concludes 
in its Executive Summary that: "[CM/GC] project participants strongly endorse the 
[CM/GC] process across all aspects and throughout all phases of their project." Honest, 
because it tacitly acknowledges that it reflects only the voices of the supporters and not the 
critics or those that were excluded from project participation, because as seen in the 
"competitor comments" the disappointed contractors were not as enthusiastic about the 
process as practiced in Washington state. 
The Report, received about 10% response rate on the CM/GC portion and 7% on 
the DB· portion, but fails to acknowledge that these responses may have been positively 
biased. The Report focused solely on 49 CM/GC projects and made no effort to 
objectively compare them against similar DBB projects and provides little objective data. 
Only 30 of the 217 returned surveys (out of 2107 sent out) were from subcontractors who 
actually performed the work. And "8 contractors that competed for [CM/GC] projects 
returned 52 contractor competitor surveys" meaning that 8 contractor's accounted for 
nearly one quarter of all responses. Left unsaid in the Report is whether or not these were 
successful or disappointed proposer's, but indications from the survey comments is that 
these were generally the successful CM/GC Contractors91 • The largest single group of 
respondents, surprisingly enough were government employees, a 65% response rate, as 
opposed to a 5% from subcontractors who actually performed the work. The problem here 
is that the public agency Owner is the construction team member that actually got to decide 
what PDS to use. It seems unlikely that the Owner's project manager would then criticize 
his or her own decision to use CM/GC instead of DBB. Furthermore, it is generally 
recognized that CM/GC contractual relationships are less confrontational and adversarial; 
benefits that accrue directly to the Owner's project management team. But the real 
question is not whether or not the process makes the Owner's project manager's task easier 
or more palatable, but rather is it better for the taxpayers? Clearly ifreducing confrontation 
90 In Washington it is referred to as GC/CM, which means: "General Contractor/Construction Manager" 

or some times CMlGC which means: "Construction Manager" with a "Guaranteed Maximum Price," 

both are the same thing as CM/GC used in Oregon. 

91 In fact more than one comment stated that the project was not yet complete, meaning that they were 

obviously working on the job, therefore the successful Contractor. . 
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and the adversarial nature of DBB contracts were the ultimate goal, that could be achieved 
by simply giving the Contractor every change order asked for without question. 
One important piece ofinformation contained in the Report is the following graph: 
Percent Complete at GMP 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 
ProjectN~r 
Figure 45: Percentage of Design when Guaranteed Maximum Price is established 
1bis information is valuable in comparing Washington state's experience against 
those obtained from Oregon. Based on the Oregon database results, it appears that the 
Washington projects were similarly distributed with very few projects priced while in 
conceptual phases, more during schematic design, and still more during preliminary design 
phases. The biggest difference is the number of projects that are at final design stage 
(1 00% complete) prior to pricing. In Washington that proportion is about ten percent of 
all CMlGC projects, the proportion of Oregon CMlGC projects priced at this stage is 
significantly less. 
Another bit ofobjective data is contained in the following figure: 
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Figure 46: Washington Report 010 Change Orders 
Figure 46 documents Change Order costs as a percentage of the total project cost 
on the CMJGC projects in the Washington Report. Note that this includes only seventeen 
(17) of the forty-one (41) projects reviewed, the inference being that the other projects did 
not report financial metrics. In any case, the average CMJGC project had a cost increase of 
7.2% and a standard deviation of 7.09%, which closely compares with the cn studies 
discussed above (in particular see the results documented in Figure 36 of the 
Benchmarking Study. 
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Appendix F: ORS 279.103 Evaluation Reports and Project Audits 
This appendix presents our complete discussion regarding the actual project reports 
on CMJGC jobs in Oregon. These evaluation reports are required by statute (ORS 
279.103) in Oregon for all projects exempted under Chapter 279. However, very few 
public agencies have complied with the statute and few of the reports meet the objective 
analysis standard intended by the legislature. Following the evaluation reports, there are 
project audits from Oregon's Secretary of State of specific CMJGC projects. Many of 
these audited projects are the same projects that the evaluation reports covered. In several 
cases there are striking differences in how the projects were viewed by the different 
authors. . 
ORS 279.103 Reports 
The Oregon PCC Report [56] documents the requirements under ORS 279.103 and 
gives recommendations on how to comply with the statute as follows: 
The purpose of the ORS 279.103 evaluation is to determine whether it was 
actually in the public's best interest to use an alternative contracting method. The 
following elements are required by the statute to be included in the evaluation: 
• 	 Financial Information conSisting of cost estimates, any guaranteed maximum 
price, changes, and actual costs. 
• 	 The number of project change orders issued by the public agency. 
• 	 A narrative description of successes and failures during design, engineering, 
and construction of the project. 
• 	 An objective assessment of the use of the alternative contracting method as 
compared to the exemption findings required by ORS 279.015. 
An effective way to present the required report is to simply comment, point by 
point, on each statement made in the original project exemption findings. In 
addition, to the above requirements, evaluation reports are to be made available 
for public inspection and must be completed within 30 days ofthe date that the 
public agency accepts the public improvement project. The report is to be 
delivered to the pirector of the Oregon Department of Administrative Services or 
the local contract review board. 
Unfortunately, to date, no one at the Department of Administrative Services is 
directly responsible for collecting these reports nor is any person, including anyone in the 
Director's office, aware of whether any such reports exist or are kept. An attempt was 
made to collect as many 279.103 Reports as could be found by contacting agencies known 
to have used CMlGC since the law went into effect. Only the Oregon Department of 
Corrections has made a great effort to comply with the law, with other agencies like the 
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Port of Portland, for all intents and purposes, ignoring the requirements all together2• 
Others, like Central Oregon Community College have paid the requirement only lip­
service by parroting their own findings reports with affirmative responses devoid of any 
"objective analysis" or data. 
Oregon Department of Corrections (DOC) 
The Oregon DOC undertook a large building program in 1995, following the 
passage of Ballot Measure 11 in November 1994, which required longer prison sentences 
thus requiring more beds. wee new large prisons were constructed using the CMlGC 
PDS, and consistent with the requirements of ORS 279.103, the DOC published reports 
assessing the performance of the projects relative to the original exemption criteria, the 
project successes and lessons learned during the projects. 
Snake River Correctional Institution Phase II (SRCI) 
According to the Department of Corrections [168], the SRCI at $175 million, was 
''the single largest single public works project at that time in the history of the State of 
Oregon." The project included 802,000 Gross Square Feet and had total construction costs 
of$151 ,805,4 77 (on an original GMP of $144,036,000 after two Change Orders amended 
the Contract price). The total amount spent by the State on the project, including all 
design, project management, administrative and construction costs, was $174,954,384. 
The total project budget is summarized in: 
92 Mr. Tom Peterson, the Port's Director of Engineering has promised to have these reports up to date, 
but that promise made in the fall of 2002 remains un kept, and as late as May 2003 he has not had the 
staff available to do the work, in spite of the fact that at least two major CM/GC projects were finished 
in 2002. 
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Original VarianceFinal CostItem Budget 
CM!GC GMP $1,743,044 
Amendment 2 (Change Order 1) 
$142,292,956$144,036,000 
$0 
Amendment 3 (Change Order 2) 
$7,816,155$7,816,155 
$0 
Subtotal (Total GMP) 
$1,696,322$1,696,322 
$1,743,044$151,805,433$153,548,477 
Miscellaneous Construction! 
Support 
ODOC Provided Projects! $4,406,025 $1,037,235 
Management 
$5,443,260 
Consultants 
HOK (Architect) $9,100,000 $9,681,000 <$581,000> 
<$2,499,227> 
AGRA (Special Inspections) 
$0 $2,499,227! CRSSC (Project Management) 
$720,180 $1,083,655 <$363,475> 
Subtotal $9,820,180 $13,263,882 <$3,443,702> 
Offsite Costs 

Idaho Power (Electrical) 
 $0 $28,078 <$28,078> 

Irrigation 
 $0 $2,154 <$2,154> 

Domestic Water 
 $2,200,000 $1,070,594 $1,129,406 

Sanitary Sewer 
 $3,942,467 $4,336,524 <$394,057> 

City of Ontario Community Impact 
 $0 <$6,288> 
Study 
Subtotal 
$6,288 
$6,142,467 $5,443,638 $698,829 
PROJECT TOTAL $174,954,384 $174,918,978 $35,406 
Table 29: Project Summary from [168] 
Note that the ''Final Cost" under the CMlGC GMP actually shows a savings of 
$1,743,044. This takes into account the Change Orders in the G:MP; in short, the CMlGC 
was actually paid about $142 million for the original $144 million scope ofwork under the 
G:MP. (Guaranteed Maximum Price), an additional $9.5 million ofproject scope, not in the 
original G:MP was added to the GMP, raising the final adjusted G:MP to $153,548,477. 
The report describes the overall project experience and use of the CMlGC process 
on the project as follows: 
"The SRCI Phase II expansion project presented various unique and 
complicated challenges requiring intense management review and effort. The 
complicated logistics of staging a major construction project within an existing 
secure facility and the pressing need for beds necessitated a delivery process 
that allowed close collaboration between the architect/engineer and the 
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contractor during design; a single point of responsible communication for 
decision-making purposes between ODOC and construction operators; and 
reduction of the financial risk for ODOC. As a result, the ODOCsubsequently 
chose and managed the CM/GC process to successfully complete the project 
within budget and within schedule" 
Note again that the project was considered "within budget and within schedule." 
Ofcourse it is clear that the original GMP or construction estimate prepared by the CM/GC 
and including an Owner controlled contingency, was not met. However, according to the 
report, this was at least in part due to the fact that the project had undergone a scope 
reduction during the early plamring and estimating stages. During the CM/GC process, the 
scope ''was made whole again thorough the project team's value engineering and 
constructability reviews." 
The report listed a number of challenges faced by the project team in this project, 
which in part justifies the use ofa CM/GC PDS on the project: 
• Infancy of the new prison construction program 
• Project Size 
• Schedule Requirements - Fast Track Construction 
• Security Requirements associated with inmate work program goals 
• Phased Construction at an existing institution 
The report documents significant project successes, including the use of "fast 
track" construction, value engineering, use of inmate labor, twenty-two months and 
700,000 man-hours without a lost time accident, zero outstanding claims93, no breaches in 
security, and successful involvement with the local business community. Under the 
"Lessons Learnedn section ofthe report, the author notes the following: 
"As is the case in all construction projects. lessons can be learned after 
reviewing the successes and failures of the project. The CM/GC process was 
selected for this project because of the advantages it offered for 'fast tracking' 
construction and reducing risk to the Owner. By identifying instances where 
cost of work was adjusted upward in the SRCI project, ODOC has obtained 
invaluable information necessary to improve the way they utilize the CM/GC 
process on future projects. 
Dedicate adequate time and resources to design and constructability reviews 
during the design development phase of the project and the subsequent 
issuance of bid packages. Dedicating additional time and resources by all 
Project Team members during this important phase will enhance both the 
quality of the final design bid documents and quantity of work procured 
93 Although there were substantial subcontractor claims on the project, these were negotiated to 
settlement prior to the end of the project for a total of$1 ,060, 1 00, which was about 20% of the original 
claim totaL 
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through the Project's competitive bid process and fewer expensive change 
orders. As a result of the "fast track" design and construction process 
used on this Project, the typical design and review time of a Project this 
size was substantially shortened. This reduction in design and review time 
resulted in certain systems and components being issued for competitive 
bid before they were fully designed and/or integrated with other work. 
Insure that departmentaillend-users" are actively involved in the design 
development review process. In reviewing the work secured after the 
initial competitive bid packages were awarded, it appears that additional 
efforts need to be made to insure "end-users" are more actively involved in 
the design development review processes. With the likelihood that 
operational personnel will not be experts on the design development 
review process or details of overall systems, additional effort needs to be 
made to explain these systems to them in plain language during regular 
design reviews leading to a more complete understanding and support of 
design by "enq-users." Resulting improved functionality and correctional 
value will insure that the prisons and security systems being designed 
align with operational needs and reduce the likelihood of subsequent 
costly future field modifications or changes. 
Expand commissioning efforts. During the proposal/selection stage of the 
CM/GC, include all requirements for systems commissioning within the 
request for proposal from the CM/GC. Require the CM/GC to demonstrate 
in their proposal their commitment to systems commissioning and then 
contractually obligate them to support the commissioning process. 
Consideration should be given to place the Central Plant main equipment 
(pumps, hydronic piping, etc.) in a single subcontract and pre-qualify the 
sub-contract to ensure completion by a qualified contractor. Consideration 
should also be given to select an independent commissioning firm for 
building systems as well as security systems." 
It is fair to say that the Oregon DOC staff and managers were pleased with the use 
of CMlGC on this project and in fact would use it on at least two more major projects 
undertaken during the same building program (accounting for $250 million more in public 
spending). If the report can be faulted, it would be for glossing over any problems that 
occurred on the project and being somewhat loose (if not out right deceptive) with the use 
of the tenns ''under budget" and "ahead of schedule." All projects in Oregon are 
technically "on budget" because ORS 294.100(2) requires that all contracts be adjusted by 
change order to exactly fit or exceed the amount paid to the Contractor. The facts are that 
the construction budget was initially adjusted to a reduced scope, then when either 
additional funds or savings were realized the budget was increased to meet the added 
scope. But, in the final analysis, the original GMP was $144 million and the final amount 
paid was $152 million, which included approximately $8.5 million in scope adjustments. 
Finally, the report failed to address any of the critical issues raised. in the Secretary of 
State's Audit Division report on this project (see Section 0 below for details.) 
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Two Rivers Correctional Institution (TRCI) 
The TRCI, according to the ORS 279.103 report [170] is described as follows: 
"The Project was built on a 280-acre site in Umatilla County. Groundbreaking 
occurred on April 5, 1997 with substantial completion of the institution on 
March 3, 2000. The Project's design is state of the art and includes such 
innovative security features as biometric palm-readers and centralized 
security control centers with a touch screen computer system capable of 
operating the entire facility from a single room. The Project is made up of 
several free-standing buildings that house administrative functions, a 96 bed 
minimum housing unit, regional transport facility, a medium security facility 
and several support structures including the on-site warehouse and radio 
transmission tower. Within the medium security facility, inmates are housed in 
one of fourteen general housing units, each unit capable of housing 96 
inmates, or one of the two high custody units, capable of holding 88 additional 
inmates each." 
The project team from the Oregon DOC decided to use a CMlGC PDS for the 
construction of the project, in part for the same reasons stated in the justification rationale 
for the SRCI as well as the "state of the art" and other aspects of the job noted above. The 
project had an original GMP of $120,668,503, which was adjusted by Change Order in 
June 1998 to $128,255,948 then adjusted downward in Change Order #6 to the final GMP 
amount of $125,266,646. The report lists the following project successes for the Design 
and Construction phases due to use ofthe CMlGC Process: 
"Design/Engineering Phases: 
• 	 The CM/GC method allowed ODOC to capitalize on contractor's expertise 
during the design phase; 
• 	 early identification of GMP in the design phase allowed more effective use 
of total program funds; 
• 	 design was released in phases allowing a more aggressive construction 
schedule; 
• 	 prototype schematic design and final GMP were completed in less than 
three (3) months; 
• 	 following establishment of original GMP, savings were realized due to the 
collaborative team-approach to value engineering which reduced the 
square footage needed; 
• 	 savings in original design costs enabled ODOC to build a complete inmate 
workforce building that was reduced in scope to meet initial budget goals 
of the Project. 
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Construction Phase: 
• 	 The flexibility of CM/GC process allowed maximum use of inmate labor 
which directly reduced the cost of subcontracted work; 
• 	 direct savings to the Cost of Work due to use of inmate labor totaled 
nearly $1.5 million dollars; 
• 	 procurement methods allowed ODOe 'flexibility to accept or reject credits 
offered by bidders for use of inmate labor, thereby protecting OOOC from 
claims for unavailability of OOOC provided labor; risks for subcontractor 
performance remained with the subcontractor; only minor problems were 
encountered with use of inmate labor; 
• 	 direct purchases from local suppliers accounted for over $1.9 million 
dollars, and together with regional subcontracted purchases exceeded $40 
million dollars; 
• 	 completion of various Project buildings was accomplished ahead of 
schedule including early occupancy of the minimum custody building 14 
months ahead of schedule; 
• 	 early completion of Project warehouse provided cost-savings by 
avoidance of OOOC's rental of off-site storage space, 
• 	 overall Project was completed one month early of the originally planned 
completion date; 
• 	 site safety was extremely successful due to an aggressive safety program 
established by the CM/GC-Project realized over 650,000 man-hours and 
400 consecutive days without a reportable loss-time injury; 
• 	 CM/GC returned $668,000 to OOOC as result of savings in a Contractor 
Controlled Insurance Program (CCIP)." 
fu short the benefits that accrued due to CM/OC on this project accrued through the 
flexibility afforded the project in the CM/OC PDS. Flexibility that allowed better use of 
inmate labor, a Contractor Controlled Insurance Program, and fast-tracking ofthe job. The 
report does admit that competitively bidding the work may have resulted in "marginally 
lower direct prices" but would have required "greater effort during design," reduced or 
eliminated fast-tracking of the job and increased "he need for Change Orders." The 
"Lessons Learned" section went on to point out these additional areas for improvement: 
• 	 "The effort required for accounting of the CM/GC reimbursement were 
time intensive and a fixed-fee for the CM/GC management and general 
condition services could be negotiated, then paid on a schedule of values; 
• 	 the Project team's roles and responsibilities need to be made as clear as 
possible-formal partnering sessions at the start of a project can help; 
• 	 an Owner-controlled contingency could be established in the GMP after 
reconciliation of the buyout status of the Cost of Work for Owner use to 
recover program reduced to meet initial budget goals; 
• 	 allowances could be established within the GMP without CM/GC fee until 
released by Owner when needed; 
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• 	 pre-construction services fee should be competitively bid as part of the 
CM/GC procurement process. For this Project the CM/GC was paid $1 for 
pre-construction services. Other projects might leverage savings to the 
State through a competitive fee process." 
The actual accounting summary ofthe project given in Appendix D of the report is 
a bit confusing: 
Description 
Guaranteed Maximum Price of 
Construction (GMP) 
Budget Actual Balance 
Final Cost of Work 
CM/GC Fee 
Owner Contingency within the 
GMP 
$114, 155, 186 
$3,208,336 
$7,903,124 
$108,858,052 
$3,208,336 
$1,501,334 
$5,297,134 
$0 
$6,401,790 
Total GMP $125,266,646 . $113,567,722 $11,698,924 
Table 30: Partial Summary of Project Accounting in TRCI 279.103 Report [170] 
The implication of this sunnnary is that the CMlGC actually received a higher 
percentage fee than originally contracted for since the Budget Final Cost of Work GMP 
was $114 million and the Actual was $108 million with the same CMlGC fee. This would 
mean an increase from 2.80/0 to 2.95%, a 4.73% increase in fee percentage. In fact, what 
the "Budget" reflects is the amount ofmoney dedicated to these cost categories at the end 
of the job, and the total amount paid is found under the "Actual" column. The proper 
comparison appears to be between the $120,668,503 and the amount finally paid of 
$113,567,772, which represents a cost reduction of 5.88%, the CMlGC on the project 
actually reported payments of$115,280,000 on an original GMP of$120,668,50394• 
It should be noted that the CMlGC received letters of commendation and 
recommendation from this project as well as repeat work from the DOC. They reported no 
complaints from neighbors and that their project team received high marks and promotions 
from the company's review of their management of the job. The project was generally . 
completed on time with only minor outstanding subcontractor claims (apparently unlike the 
SRCI discussed above). Finally, the CMlGC prepared the original GMP on the project 
when the plans and specifications were only 25% complete. 
There appears to be no doubt that both the CMlGC and the DOC were pleased with 
the outcome ofthis project and their decision to use the CMlGC PDS on this job. 
Coffee Creek Correctional Facility & Women's Intake Center 
The Coffee Creed Correctional Institution (CCCF) & Women's Intake Center, the 
project is described in the ORS279.103 report [169] as follows: 
94 The CM/GC's reported figures were used in our DEA analysis. 
282 
"CCCF was constructed on a 108-acre site in Wilsonville, Oregon. 
Groundbreaking occurred on April 21, 2000, with substantial completion of 
Phase 1 portion of the facility on July 6, 2001 and Phase 2 portion of the 
facility on March 14, 2002. The CCCF design is state-of-the-art with such 
security features as a perimeter microwave alarm systems, a card access 
system to expedite internal movement of staff and centralized security control 
centers with touch screen computer systems capable of operating the entire 
facility from a single control room. The intake processing facility was 
developed to allow the processing and housing of both male and female 
inmates while maintaining gender separation. CCCF consisted of two phases 
of construction: Phase 1 - Women's Minimum Security Facility and Phase 2­
Women Medium Security Facility and Co-Gender Intake Center." 
The report documents the following "project successes" and "trials" during the 
"Design, Engineering and Construction Phases" as follows: 
"Design/Engineering Phase: 
• 	 Refinement of the 1997 prototypical design allowed for increased 
efficiency in layout and function. 
• 	 The resulting site plan and layout included efficiencies in fenCing systems, 
site usage, and shaping of the landscape for visual screening. 
• 	 The design process utilized a collaborative effort with Building Codes 
Division (BCD) to apply and implement accepted alternatives and 
maximize to the fullest degree possible the cost-savings potential inherent 
in the State Building Codes. 
• 	 The design process fostered over $20,000,000 in cost saving initiatives. 
• 	 DeSign Team Workshops, collaboratively consolidating the perspectives of 
Architect/Engineer, CM/GC, Project Management Consultant, and Owner 
were scheduled regularly and were central to achieving Project success. 
Construction Phase: 
• 	 Phase 1 of the Project was completed nearly three (3) months ahead of 
schedule. The support buildings (Warehouse and Physical Plant) made 
use of existing on-site structures and were completed six (6) months 
ahead of schedule. The Gatehouse was completed two (2) months early 
and the remaining parts of the Project were completed three (3) weeks 
early. Cooperation with BCD and City of Wilsonville throughout the 
Project and the coordination of ODOC, AlE, CM/GC and Project 
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Management Consultant during design and construction contributed to the 
early completion dates. 
• 	 Contractors from the Northwest region performed 96%> of the work. 
Contractors from outside the Northwest performed 4% of the work. Oregon 
and local contractors performed 78% of the work. 
• 	 Site safety was outstanding with only one lost time accident, a tendon cut 
in a worker's little finger, in nearly 750,000 manhours worked. The Project 
received an award from Oregon OSHA for these excellent safety results. 
• 	 The use of Inside Oregon Enterprises, the inmate industries program for 
ODOC, for detention hollow metal products. detention plumbing fixtures, 
and detention furnishings resulted in nearly $4 million of work for State of 
Oregon inmates. 
• 	 The Project was awarded Portland General Electric's "Earth Advantage 
Certification" for its innovative approaches to energy efficiency measures. 
The CCCF Project was the first public improvement project to receive this 
award. 
• 	 Reconfiguration of the site plan allowed for more cornpact site 
development and reduction in length of security perimeter. 
• 	 By designing stormwater to be sheet run-off to site swales, construction 
and maintenance costs were reduced by eliminating area drain manholes, 
sediment basins, buried stormwater piping, and outflows. 
• 	 Utilizing on-site soils for perimeter landscape berms saved export costs 
and reduced the amount of plant material and irrigation investment while 
satisfying the screening and buffering requirements. 
• 	 To create a foundation pad, the site cut-and-fill design was over-excavated 
to the depth of foundations and utilities. Then the over-excavated portion 
was replaced with compacted fill within which controlled trenching could 
take place in a homogeneous crushed rock matrix. This built-up pad also 
replicated the foundation pad conditions in the filled (built-up) areas of the 
foundation for optimum structural continuity. 
• 	 Having the operable skylights double as potential gas canister dumps 
allowed for lowering of the entire roof plane which saved on the cost of 
wall heights, building finishes, and diminished the heated and cooled 
volume of the building. 
• 	 With dayroom skylights included, day lighting is provided in areas away 
from the window wall. 
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• 	 By using a radial feed power medium voltage concept instead of the 
original loop feed concept, the Project saved hundreds of feet of medium 
voltage cable, conduit, and switching. The new design reduced the 
number of power substations from six (6) to three (3) substations which 
reduces both initial costs as well as life cycle costs due to increased ease 
of maintenance. 
• 	 The interior dayroom illumination was designed to incorporate 'uplighf and 
'down light' for low brightness and contrast - light bounces off the ceiling 
giving the entire volume of the dayroom a more even brightness. Utilizing 
daylight sensors and dimming ballast with the skylights reduces artificial 
illumination during the day. Using this same fixture in the corridors for the 
housing units, results in a substantial energy saving and related costs." 
As in the earlier SRCI and TRCI projects some of these "successes" can be 
attributed to the flexibility afforded by the CMlGC PDS, however others noted above 
appear to be normal design and engineering issues. Engineers fundamentally exist solely 
to save their clients money on building materials through design, while protecting the 
public by implementing sound design solutions. In absence of engineers, all buildings 
would be one or two story buildings of less than 2,000 square-feet floor area95. It certainly 
should not be necessary to involve a CMlGC PDS in order for the design engineer to 
decide on the type ofstorm water that is most cost efficient. The same comment is true for 
the "Lessons Learned" regarding "Landscaping" design, engineered excavations and fills, 
including operable skylights, energy efficiency measures, and site plan layout. The fact 
that "Contractors from the Northwest region performed 96% of the work" and that 
"Oregon and local Contractors performed 78% of the work" is neither important nor a 
product of the CMlGC PDS unless the CMlGC discriminated against "out-of-region 
subcontractor's" which would probably be illegal. The project is located in the mid­
Willamette valley of Oregon, south of Oregon's major city, Portland, and north of its state 
capitol, Salem; in the city of Wilsonville. It would seem highly unlikely that any project 
located in Oregon's most heavily populated conidor, would not have had these results 
regardless ofPDS employed. 
The report notes that on September 29th 1997 the CMlGC established an original 
GMP of$110,000.000 and the final amount paid to the CMlGC was just over $92,242,000, 
an approximately 16% savings96• The report credits the savings to the use of the CMlGC 
PDS in justification of the statutory requirement that the use of CMlGC ''will result in 
substantial cost-savings to the public contracting agency." They further concluded that: 
95 The State of Oregon allows building less than 2,000 square feet to be designed by non-engineers and 

non-architects. The final design still must meet the most current requirements of the applicable 

Building Code, however. 

96 The report states that "the final reconciled GMP of$1 00,000,000 was established in Amendment No. 

3dated April 18, 2000. 
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"While the original scope was reduced to fit within the targeted GMP, efficient 
value optimization efforts by the Project Team resulted in all such reductions 
being reinstated." 
And again herein lies a question about the accuracy and value of the G:MP figures 
reported in [169]: how much ofthe savings from the original $110 million G:MP was scope 
reduction? The report states that the G:MP was reduced to $100 million in Amendment #3, 
after the scope was better defined. So, what should the comparison budget performance 
actually be based on? For example, could they have decided to cut the project in halfto say 
a $55 million project then claim 50% cost reduction due to their management skills and the 
use of the CMlGC PDS? This issue is not addressed, but it seems clear that reporting the 
16% and $17 million figures are probably disingenuous if not a deception. Probably at 
most the CMIGC PDS could be credited with the reduction of$7 million in costs from the 
revised $100 million G:MP to the final payment, and that would be no small 
accomplishment itself. Most public projects in Oregon are smaller than $7 million in total 
cost to begin with! Also, it is important to note that from 1997 to 2000, the time between 
the original and reconciled G:MP's the project location was a hot political debate in Oregon 
and it is not known whether the original G:MP was for the original location: a former state 
mental hospital campus; the second site: some industrial land in Wilsonville; or, the final 
"actual" building site? This is not addressed in the report. Although neither is the benefit 
the state received from having a CMlGC on board during the site controversy and 
evaluation process. Something it certainly would not have been able to do if the state had 
relied on DBB as their PDS for the project. 
Oregon State Library (OSL) 
The Department of Administrative Services (DAS) published their ORS279.1 03 
"Post Project Evaluation" report [90] on December 7th, 2001 following the OSL job. The 
report consists of the following: 
1. 	 "Project background giving a brief description of the project. 
2. 	 Financial information consisting of cost estimates, the Guaranteed Maximum 
Price (GMP), changes and the actual cost. 
3. 	 A narrative description of successes and failures in the design, engineering 
and construction of the project. . 
4. 	 An objective assessment of the use of the CM/GC contracting method as 
compared to the Findings required by ORS 279.015. 
The "single dominating constraint factor in this project's design and construction 
was the requirement that it remain open and occupied during the entire process, from 
concept to completion." And the report notes that requirement was met, to a large part 
because they chose to use the CMlGC PDS. The project did have an increase in cost from 
an initial G:MP of$5,478,554 to a final cost of$5,840,537, a 6.6% increase. 
As in the CCCF project, many of the project "successes" that are noted in the 
report, such as the "Seismic Improvements," the use of "plate steel" sheets instead of cast­
in-place concrete, and "historic materials" searches were as much design issues as 
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construction issues where the value did not accrue due to the use of the CMlGC PDS, or 
rather that it most likely could have accrued to the project had the designer spent more time 
to develop the job specifications. 
This report does address one issue that had not been discussed in any detail in the 
DOC reports above, the competitively bid subcontracts: 
"One of the Project goals was to have 85%)-900/0 of the scope of work be 
performed by subcontractors through a competitive bid process. While the 
actual percentage of GMP expenditures associated with subcontracted work is 
only 78% of the total, this does not take into consideration the fact that 13% of 
the GMP is CM/GC management fee, general conditions, performance bond 
fees and insurance. With those issues out of the equation the actual 
percentage of construction dollars paid to subcontractors is 910/0." 
The issue not discussed is the fact that if the project had used DBB all of the work 
would have been competitively bid, including the contractor's fee and General Conditions 
(another terms for on-site management) costs. The fact is that when multiple general 
contractors bid a job in a market with a large number of subcontractor's to choose from, 
there is a higher likelihood that a bidder will realize the lowest combination of all 
subcontract bidders and thus the lowest possible total project bid, than if there is only one 
(l) general contractor bidder. This effect may not be very large, but a study by the Audit 
Division for the Oregon Department ofTransportation [135], showed that as the number of 
bidders on highway projects was positively correlated with a reduction in lowest bid as 
compared to the engineers estimate, which illustrates this principle precisely. It is 
questionable whether or not the results from [135] are comparable to the building sector 
since the proportion of "self performed work" in ODOT road construction con~cts is 
significantly higher than in the building sector (and in particular CMlGC PDS where self 
performed work is normally kept to a minimum). But, it is important to point out that 
[135] actually shows greater than a 25% reduction in low bid compared to engineers 
estimate, when going from one bidder to more than five (5) bidders (from -.02% to ­
25.9%). Furthermore, the report shows that after all change orders, the low bidders on 
highway contracts remained significantly below the average bid at bid time, which 
indicates in general that low bidders do not systematically under bid work and then "make 
it up" on change orders, as some have thought. The reduction is cost is principally due to 
increased competition and in the CMlGC PDS, the competition at the CMlGC level is 
reduced to one. 
COCC Cascade Hall Project Evaluation Report 
In March 1999 the Central Oregon Community College (COCC) Board exempted 
the Cascade Hall project from the competitive bidding requirement of ORS Chapter 279 
for its Cascade Hall project. In an undated two-page report with a one-page attachment 
described as the project cost accounting [115], COCC staff documented the project as 
required by ORS 279.103. Of the reports obtained for this research, this report was the 
least detailed and least well reasoned. The project was initially intended to be a classroom 
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building for COCC, but mid-project the scope of the job changed to accommodate the fact 
that the Oregon State University had won approval to open a branch campus in central 
Oregon, noting that: "the OSU-Cascades Campus essentially stopped the design process 
mid-stream." Unlike a lot ofCMlGC PDS jobs, this project was started, then delayed mid­
plan for fifteen (15) months, while the parties decided what the impact of the OSU's 
presence in Central Oregon. In fact, the original exemption order was justified, in part on 
the determination that the campus building had to be delivered in an expedited manner, "to 
accommodate projected enrollment growth in COCC and University Center programs by 
fall 2000." At the time 9f the exemption order this was only six months away, but by the 
time the project actually broke ground that urgency no longer mattered. 
The report does not allege, as required in the statute that the public agency will 
realize significant cost savings instead it concludes that it will achieve "greater cost 
reliability" than if it used DBB PDS. This conclusion probably made sense when the 
original project was intended to be six-months, but once the project was delayed, this 
justification became dubious. In fact, the report states that the project incurred a cost 
increase of"approximately $500,000 over the original" G:MP, although the majority ofthis 
was scope additions, presumably due to the changed mission after OSU arrived. However 
surprisingly enough, the report concludes that the use of CMlGC PDS would reduce cost 
increases and delays, but the project that was intended to be occupied in the fall of 2000, 
was not occupied until July 2002 and would not be fully utilized until fall 2002, two years 
after it was originally planned. 
The report claims that the cost impacts were mitigated in part by the fact that the 
CMlGC for the project used "$120,000.00 of its contingency and some material savings to 
cover other changes to the building thereby reducing the cost impact to the college by 
$120,000." But the "contingency" is just that, money that is set aside to pay for undefined 
or unforeseen work that is required in the project. For example ifthere was no time to do a 
complete soils analysis, the Owner and CMlGC may set aside in a "contingency account" 
some amount ofmoney to cover cost ofunknown conditions. However, if the costs exceed 
the contingency amount, the Owner still has to pay for them, and if the costs never 
materialize the Owner doesn't pay them. To say that the college received savings because 
the CMlGC used contingency funds to pay for changes saved the college money is simply 
not true. If the changes had not occurred, the college would have realized the total benefit 
ofthe contingency funds in the form ofa cost reduction to the Contract. The fact is that the 
college did not receive any benefit from the CMlGC's use of contingency funds to cover 
change orders unless for some reason the college was going to allow the CMlGC to keep 
the contingency funds without earning that money. 
It appears from the cost accounting that is attached to the report that the original 
G:MP for the project was $4,996,410 and the total amount actually paid to the CMlGC after 
six change orders was $5,671,839 (which is about $175,000 more than the report claimed 
$500,000 Contract overage). These figures hardly· support the report's claims of cost 
reliability and cost control, and in fact represent a relatively poor performance for a 
construction project, with cost increases exceeding 10% of the original budget. Granted, 
the project underwent significant scope changes due to the changing mission, but at the 
point that the project changed significantly, it is questionable whether or not the original 
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exemption, based in part on the requirement to occupy a building in six months, reflected 
the changed reality of the project and whether COCC should have revisited the exemption 
issue and the selection ofthe CMlGC. 
Other 279.103 Report Considerations and Comments 
One problem with the 279.103 reports is that agencies do not have the time or money 
at the end of a project to adequately devote to making the proper evaluation as 
required by statute. The fact is that while the legislature made this a requirement, they 
put no penalties or incentives into the law to make sure these reports actually got done. 
Furthermore, the legislature exempted the Oregon University System, its member 
Colleges and Universities, and the Oregon Health and Science University from 
complying with this law. The end effect is that there are very few agencies that 
actually have to comply with the law, and fewer still that have the time and money to 
do so. Even the Port ofPortland, one ofOregon's largest public agencies, in terms of 
total revenues and expenditures, has failed to produce even one single report in spite 
of the fact that the Port had used CMlGC one some ofthe largest building projects in 
recent years at the Portland International Airport97. In fact the probable reason that 
the Oregon DOC has done such a "stand-out" job in their three reports is the fact that 
they were so harshly criticized by the Secretary of State's Audit Division for, what the 
Auditors felt was mishandling of several million dollars in the process ofusing 
CMlGC PDS on one of their early prison projects. No matter, the fact is that the 
Oregon DOC and DAS have done the best job in completing and documenting their 
projects as required by ORS 279.103. 
In an interview with the officials at the Department ofAdministrative Services, the 
agency that the statute requires reports to be submitted to, it was learned that there is no 
formal process for collecting the 279.103 reports, no specific person responsible for 
collecting them, and no specific location where they are kept. The states Architect, Mr. 
Bill Foster had possession ofonly one report, the report that he wrote for the Oregon State 
Library project [90]. 
Finally, Oregon statute ORS 294.100 states: 
294.100 Public official expending money in excess of amount or for 
different purpose than provided by law unlawful; civil liability. (1) It is 
unlawful for any public official to expend any moneys in excess of the amounts 
provided by law, or for any other or different purpose than provided by law. 
(2) Any public official who expends any public moneys in excess of the 
amounts or for any other or different purpose than authorized by law shall be 
civilly liable for the return of the money by suit of the district attorney of the 
district in which the offense is committed, or at the suit of any taxpayer of such 
district, if the expenditure constitutes malfeasance in office or willful or wanton 
neglect of duty. 
97 These include the Tenninal Expansion North, the Terminal Roadway Expansion, the Parking Garage 
Expansion and the new Terminal Access and Cover projects, which in total exceed $500,000,000.00. 
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TIus provision is quite onerous for public officials and is perhaps one reason the 
DOC reports do not explore the expenditures oftheir CMlGC Contractor as in depth as did 
the Secretary of State's Audits Division. In fact, both this law and state policy requiring 
that work be accomplished for the least cost would tend to make any public employee shy 
away from second guessing their decision to use one PDS over another. For this reason, 
and the fact that the public agencies have failed to comply with the intent of the statute, it 
seems reasonable to conclude that if the legislature actually wants these reports honestly 
completed, that work needs to be delegated either to the Audits Division or to an outside 
party. 
Audit Reports 
In 1999, following the inception of one of the largest state funded building 
programs in history, the $1 billion prison building and renovation projects, the Oregon 
Secretary of State Audits Division undertook an audit to detennine if the money was being 
properly spent. The Auditor started by the auditing the Snake River Correctional 
Institution in far off Eastern Oregon, near the Idaho border, eventually three projects were 
audited: the SRCI, the TRCI and the CCCF (however the last ofthese three, the CCCF, had 
just begun at the time of the audit and little was addressed). The reason the Auditor 
undertook this mission was in part because the alternative fonn of contracting, CMlGC 
was still relatively new on these major projects and the state has an interest in knowing if 
the projects were being administered properly. 
The Audit Division also audited the Change Order Management and Subcontractor 
Procurement practices on all three prison projects and made an abbreviated audit of the 
Valley Library expansion project on the Oregon State University campus. Multnomah 
County's Auditor also audited the perfonpance of their Capitol Construction Process, but 
that work was motivated by concerns fue county had about their own administrative 
I 
procedures and was not concerned with th¢ PDS used on the jobs. 
Prison Construction Oversight 
March 18, 1999 the Audits Division of the Oregon Secretary of State's office 
published their Audit of the prison building program [134] discussed in Section 0 above. 
In the cover letter, the Director of the Audits Division, John N. LattiIner stated: 
"This report contains the results of our audit of the Department of Corrections' 
prison construction program, specifically the department's oversight of the 
Snake River project. The expansion of the Snake River Correctional Institution 
is the first project completed on the department's current prison construction 
plan. Because this $1 billion construction program is the largest prison 
construction program in state history, the Oregon Audits Division has been 
reviewing this program through a series of audits. This audit of the 
department's construction oversight is the fourth such review. It is our 
intention that, by reviewing the department's construction program as it 
progresses, we will provide the state with meaningful recommendations for 
improvements. 
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This audit found that the department can improve its oversight of contractor 
payments, better monitor contract requirements, and strengthen contract 
terms. The department has already made some changes from the experience 
it gained from the Snake River project, and it should continue to make 
necessary improvements in its management and oversight practices to benefit 
both current and future construction projects. The department's response to 
our audit has been inserted throughout the report. 
In the audit report itself, the authors admonished the DOC for inappropriate 
expenditures and advised that the DOC "should seek the recovery of $465,000 and review 
an additional $3.7 million in other payments for possible collection" from the CMlGC on 
the job. 
The report is highly critical of the DOC's management of the SRCI and 
expenditures on the project and concluded in its Executive Summary that: 
"The Department Should Improve Its Oversight of 

Contractor Payments. 

A critical area in which the department has opportunities for oversight 
improvement involves payments made to contractors. Ensuring that progress 
payment expenditures are reasonable and appropriate is essential to project 
cost control. We reviewed project expenditures incurred by the construction 
manager/general contractor (CM/GC), project management, and materials 
testing firms for the Snake River project. For all contractors reviewed, we 
found that the department paid for inappropriate expenditures, including the 
following for the CM/GC: more than $170,000 in unallowed overhead and 
purchasing markups, $23,000 for catered luncheons, and almost $107,000 for 
excessive travel and living expenses. We recommend that the department 
conduct a thorough review of contractor payments, and for any payments 
found in error, seek monetary recovery from the responsible firm. In total, we 
identified $465,000 in recoverable expenditures that 
the department should collect; $1,700,000 in expenditures which were not in 
compliance with contract requirements; and an additional $2,000,000 in 
payments that need further review by the department." 
"The Department Should Improve Its Monitoring of 

Contract Requirements. 

Each contract specifies certain requirements for deliverables and expertise 
that contractors are to provide the department. We found several instances in 
which the department did not receive all promised deliverables from its 
contractors. When the department does not receive reports, schedules, and 
other project performance documents, its ability to monitor and control the 
project is limited. This also constitutes a form of overpayment as the 
department paid for services it did not receive. The CM/Ge, project 
management, architect, and materials testing firms all failed to provide the 
department with certain required documents. For example, the CM/GC 
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contractor promised a thoroughly documented and controlled project. One of 
the documents the CM/GC prepares is a monthly progress report, which it 
provides to the department. Our review found, however, that as of September 
1998, the last monthly report the department received was for April 1997. In 
addition to deliverables, contractors promised specific experts to the Snake 
River project. We found that the CM/GC and project management firms did 
not comply with their contractual agreements on the use of these experts. For 
example, the project management firm committed 25 percent of the project 
director's time to the Snake River project. Our review of time billed during a 
four-month period found that the project director spent only four hours (less 
than % of 1 percent of his time) on the Snake River project. We recommend 
that the department closely monitor its construction contracts to ensure that all 
requirements, including promised deliverables and expertise, are fulfilled." 
"The Department Should Strengthen Its Contract Terms. 
Contract formulation is critical to a construction project's success because the 
acceptance of imprudent terms and conditions impacts both project cost and 
quality. To ensure thatthe best interests of all parties are well protected, it is 
important that contracts be clear and enforceable. Our review of project 
expenditures noted opportunities for the department to improve its contract 
development practices. Two specific areas for improvement include ensuring 
that contract fees are clearly defined and that reimbursable costs are specific 
and limited. For example, the department agreed to reimburse the CM/GC firm 
for the cost of its safety program. The contract did not specify allowable safety 
program costs or establish a limit for these expenditures. As part of the 
contractor's safety program, we found that the department paid for safety 
awards, which included $5,000 for items like baseball caps and jackets, and 
more than $10,000 in monetary awards. To preclude overcharges and 
increase the ease of managing project expenditures, we recommend that the 
department improve its definition of and establish limits for reimbursable 
expenses and fees." 
It is clear that the Auditors felt that at its core, the problem was one ofpoor contract 
language and poor understanding of the state's obligations and policies on the part of the 
project team. The audit did not allege any specific illegal activities or unlawful profiteering 
by any of the parties involved. But the report did find some glaring excessive charges as 
swnmarized in their Figure 1, our Table 31 below. 
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Item Rented Description 
Fax machines The CM/GC rented six fax machines to the 
department at a rate of $165 per month. We 
estimate that. as of January 1998, the 
department paid more than $14,000 for fax 
machine rentals. Several fax machines are 
available through state purchasing; the most 
expensive model costs $500. 
Estimated Excessive Charge: $11,000 
Copier The department paid the CM/GC $27,390 for a 
copier which could have been obtained through 
state purchasing for $11,310. 
Estimated Excessive Charge: $16,080 
All-terrain The department paid $24,913 for the rental of 
vehicles four aI/-terrain vehicles; or $6,228 per vehicle. 
The department could have purchased each 
vehicle for approximately $3,260. 
Estimated Excessive Charge: $11,873 
Flatbed truck The CM/GC rented a 1978-flatbed truck to the 
department for $1,620 per month over a period 
of six and a half months for a total cost of 
$10,530. According to a local heavy-equipment 
rental company, it is unusual for a vehicle of 
that age to be rented out, and in fact, any 
vehicle made before the year 1990 is difficult to 
rent. Depending on the condition of this 1978 
truck, the estimated market value ranges 
between $3,500 and $6,500. 
Estimated Excessive Charge: $4,030 - $7,030 
Table 31 Summary of Excessive Rental Charges, Figure 1 from 1134) 
One ofthe areas the Audit focused on was a $959,000.00 charge for "survey work" 
perfonned by the CMlGC and paid for by the DOC. The DOC defends the expenditure as 
appropriate noting that the work was actually done, however the audit points out that state 
policy requires all work to be bid if the total amount exceeds the statutory limit. The 
interesting omission is any analysis ofthe costs themselves. $959,000 for surveying is a lot 
ofmoney to be spent on surveyors. According to a local survey firm, their 2003 rates are 
$110 per hour for a survey crew, which translates to 8,718 crew hours or about 4.2 crew­
years in 2003 dollars (note of course that the project broke ground in September 1995 and 
was completed four years later, September 1999). What this means is that the CMlGC 
could have hired a survey crew full-time for the entire project construction period. Of 
course, once the buildings are laid out, the earthwork and utilities staked, there is little for a 
survey crew to do on, what is principally a building project. It is likely that a lot of work 
that was not specifically "survey" was charged as survey work. These items may include 
things like interior partition and anchor bolt layout, which is usually considered "carpenter" 
work under the union collective bargaining agreement. 
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Some other project costs that raised Auditor's concerns included: $16,800 for 
computer equipment ofthe DOC project manager; $23,739 in catered lunches; $107,000 in 
travel related expenses; $5,586 for business lunches; and, approximately $2,000,000 in 
subcontractor payment that were made to the CMlGC but apparently not passed on to the 
subcontractors. 
The audit provides for "Agency Responses" to each of the findings of the Audit 
Division, but allows the Audit Division the last word in the audit, as evidenced in the 
following exchange between the Audits Division and the Agency. Ofcourse since it is the 
Audits Division's Audit, they do get the last word. 
"Subcontractor Payments. 
The CM/GC contract allowed reimbursement for payments made to 
subcontractors. Of the 55 subcontractors who worked on the project through 
September 1998, we judgmentally selected payments made to 11 
subcontractors, representing almost 50 percent of subcontractor payments, for 
review. For seven subcontractors who appeared to have finished work on the 
project, we found that the CM/GC billed $38,480 more than actually paid to 
five of them. The four remaining subcontractors were still working on the 
project and were owed more than $2 million. The department should enhance 
its review of all subcontractor payments to ensure that it paid the CM/GC no 
more than the amount paid to the subcontractors. 
Agency Response: 
There is no mention in the report that these payments relate to contractor 
retainage, which is held pending completion of the work. The releasing of 
subcontractor retainage is a decision of the CMlGC. The department only has 
contractual relationship with the CMIGC. The department is also relying on the 
contractor's certification in accordance with section K 3 of the Standard 
General Conditions requiring disclosure that all subcontractors and suppliers 
have been paid in full and no claims are outstanding on the project. 
Audits Division Comment: 
The department has the responsibility to ensure that it pays the CM/GC 
no more than the amount the CM/GC paid to the subcontractors. Relying 
on the CM/GC's certification that the subcontractors were paid in full is 
not adequate assurance." 
The Audit concludes with a set of recommendations to help the DOC avoid some 
of the problems identified in the Audit. Most importantly, the Auditors focused on the 
Contract tenns and stressed that the reimbursable expenses and fees need to be better 
defined in the Contract. In a later compliance memo from the Audits Division, it appears 
that the majority oftheir recommendations had been adopted. 
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Department of Corrections, Change Order Management and Subcontractor 
Bidding 
November 15, 1999 the Audits Division of the Oregon Secretary of State's office 
published their Audit of the prison building program [136] discussed in Section 0 above. 
In the cover letter, the Director of the Audits Division, John N. Lattimer summarized the 
audit finding: 
Contracting Practices 
While the prison construction contracts generally complied with laws 
and standards, the contracts were not clear. For example, the contract 
did not clearly identify which changes that occur during construction 
would fall under the general scope and cost of the original contract and 
which changes would warrant construction cost adjustments. 
Change Order Management 
The department's independent review of project change orders was 
insufficient to ensure that the state's interests were protected. The 
department paid additional markup for costs not explicitly allowed by 
the contract, and allowed substantial increases to many subcontractors. 
Project change orders can be substantial (e.g. one increase of 3,000 
percent), making a rigorous review process essential. 
Subcontractor Bidding 
The department's contractor did not obtain bids at one prison 
construction site in compliance with the contract's "sealed bidding" 
requirements. Further, the department has made little effort to review 
bids awarded by its contractor. These practices do not protect against 
the possibility of preferential treatment of some bidders. 
This audit reviewed subcontracting practices on both the SRCI and the TRCI. The 
report did mention the CCCF, but that project was not complete at the time of the audit. 
This audit generally found that both the SRCI and TRCI projects were "in compliance with 
ORS and OAR regulations as well as industry practices." But did go on again to criticize 
the Contract language, stating: 
"[w]e find that the applicable standard general conditions do not clearly identify 
the standards or factors under which changes warrant guaranteed maximum 
price adjustment. In fact, there were many SRCI changes performed within the 
guaranteed maximum price that fit the standard general conditions criteria. 
The TRCI contract provisions better satisfy the requirement to identify factors 
under which changes fall outside of work scope. 
However, the audit team found the TRCI provision to be too broad. We believe 
that if the CM/GC is unclear as to what is and what is not to be included in the 
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guaranteed maximum price, the CM/GC is more likely to include considerable 
contingency in its estimates." 
Then went on to praise the CMlGC's for their project management, stating: 
In our professional judgment, the TRCI CM/GC has exercised good oversight 
and review of proposed changes and subcontractor cost proposals. However, 
the Department should not rely solely on the contractor to protect the owner's 
interests in this regard. SRCl's change order records did not provide as clear 
evidence of change order management. However, the project management 
firm applied proven change management techniques to carefully track and 
review changes, and our review found that at times, the SRCI CM/GC reduced 
subcontractors' prices. 
While generally chastising the DOC for relying too heavily on the CMlGC to guard 
the Owner's interests and questioned the large amount ofchange orders in the two projects, 
as follows: 
"To date, the percentage of change order amounts has not exceeded 
allowable amounts. However, with allowable amounts (set by Oregon law) 
ranging as high as 20 percent, SRCI changes equaled 20 percent of the 
original guaranteed maximum price contract, and TRCI changes stand at 14 
percent of the original guaranteed maximum price (at approximately 73 
percent project completion)." 
"Many individual subcontracts experienced increases well over 20 percent of 
their original value. On SRCI alone, twenty-seven subcontractors had their 
contracts amended by more than 20 percent, including the major 
subcontractors for electrical, mechanical, concrete, and site utilities. In one 
case at SRCI, a subcontractor had an original scope of $22,920 increase by 
over 3000 percent (to $525,148) through change orders." 
But, the last example given by the Auditor really requires more in-depth analysis, 
because it is simply not plausible that ''work'' would be increased 3000% as noted. More 
likely is the possibility that this particular subcontractor took over some other 
subcontractor's responsibilities or scope ofwork. If that is the case, then there would be a 
similar reduction found in another subcontractor's Contract amount to offset the increase. 
The Audit did evaluate the Change Orders by type or Cause and presented the 
following figures: 
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SRCI 

Changes by Cause 

$3,853,328 
Sequencingf$7,936,165 
ScheduleOwner Requested 
14%Change 
27% 
$4,012,199 
...-{~MI(,.{~ Buyout 
14% 
$473,191 
Other (permitting 
requirements, etc.) 
2% $5.329,959 
'-(;omiolete Design 
18% $7,338.022 
Design 
Coordination 
25% 
Figure 47: Change Orders by Cause fr'om (136) 
TRCI 
Changes by Cause 
$1,186,407.00 $1,117,880.00 
$121,883.00 Design 
Other Coordination 
1% 10/0 
$1,575,472.00 
CM/GC Buyout 
9% 
$12,073,511.00 $737,027.00
Owner Requested Sequencingl
Change Schedule 
72% 4% 
Figure 48: Change Orders by Cause from (136) 
The Audit concluded with the following statements about CMlGC PDS and the 
DOC: 
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The department is embarking upon an ambitious new prison construction 
program. The audit team specifically invested time at the beginning of the 
audit to meet with department management in order to understand the 
program, as well as the issues and trends impacting it. Resultant findings and 
recommendations were intended to answer specific audit questions, and, as 
possible, assist the department in successfully meeting its construction 
program objectives. 
However, the tenor of the department's reaction to the audit, as illustrated in 
their response, indicates a high level of frustration with the audit - which 
concerns the audit team. The audit team concludes that a major theme 
underlying this frustration, according to the number of the department's 
response comments related to it, is the CM/GC project management 
approach. 
CM/GC is a newer project management approach that has not had 
widespread application in many sectors of the construction industry. Because 
of this, it provides wide latitude for defining its parameters and its application 
to prison construction within Oregon law. The audit team believes that, in 
some cases, the department has used the undefined nature of the approach 
to its advantage when defending management decisions and project 
performance. Some key occurrences in the department response included: 
• 	 The department maintains that change order management best 
practices differ radically between contract delivery methods, and 
therefore the CM/GC approach cannot be compared to other 
approaches, such as the more traditional "hard bid. However, change 
order management incorporates scope definition and control, project 
cost and schedule controls, and quality construction documents ­
factors that affect all approaches, including hard-bid contracts. If the 
department does not exercise good change order management 
practices, as outlined in audit recommendations, the result will be 
increa.sed costs, schedule and cost impacts, and diminished return. 
The view that change order management best practices do not apply 
to department projects explains why the department's response views 
the addition of the Workforce Addition, the Laundry Transfer Building, 
the Regional Transport Building, the Vehicle Maintenance Building, 
and the Industrial Laundry as adjustments and not scope increases. 
• 	 In response to any findings or recommendations that the department 
increase its oversight of the subcontractor bidding process, the 
department response maintained that it was the role and responsibility 
of the CM/GC to manage lower tier relationships. This is defended 
based upon "minimizing project overhead and overlap of contractual 
responsibilities". The audit team pointed out that while it is true that the 
CM/GC process does give control over management of lower tier 
relationships to the CM/GC, it does not negate the responsibility for 
oversight to reduce risk to the department. 
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• 	 The basis for analysis of the subcontractor bidding practices at SRCI 
and TRCI was a comparison against ORS 279 and industry best 
practices. The contract documents for both projects specify that the 
CM/GC support ORS 279, while the department response asserts that 
they are not legally bound to it since the CM/GC process falls outside 
of the standard public project process. However, since it is the intent of 
the contract documents that the CM/GC support ORS 279, the audit 
team determined that evaluation against ORS 279 was appropriate for 
benchmarking. The department should reconsider its approach in light 
of the contract documents taken, not the flexibility of the CM/GC 
approach. 
It is important to note that review of the CM/GC approach was not a specific 
audit question the audit team was asked to answer. However, the issues it 
raised in light of the department's response to the audit findings and 
recommendations make it an issue worthy of consideration. It is the opinion of 
the audit team that while the department may be able to have good flexibility 
and fast-track ability with the CM/GC approach, the newness of CM/GC as a 
project management approach that is not fully defined may not necessarily be 
a good match with an organization establishing itself in the field of project 
management. " 
Again, in its Conclusion, the Audits Division does not criticize the PDS so much as 
it criticizes the DOC's management of the projects using CMlGC, in part due to the 
"newness" ofthe application and their relative lack offamiliarity in using the PDS. 
Department of Corrections, Prison Construction Procurement and Contract 
Development 
On July 29, 1998the Audits Division of the Oregon Secretary of State's office 
published their second Audit on the prison building program [133] discussed also in 
Section 0 above, this audit focusing on the Procurement and Contract development systems 
used by the DOC. In the cover letter, the Director of the Audits Division, John N. Lattimer 
introduces this audit, stating: 
"This report contains the results of our audit of the Department of Corrections 
(department). It is the second in a series of reviews of the department's prison 
construction program. Following a July 1998 report on infrastructure planning 
and development, this audit focuses on the selection methodology used by the 
department to procure the services of construction contractors and the 
department's contract development practices. 
With an estimated total cost of over $1 billion, the department's prison 
construction program is the largest such program in Oregon history. By 2008, 
the department plans to increase prison capacity to accommodate an 
expected inmate population of more than 14,000, which is 79 percent over 
current population levels. At the time of our review, the department had two 
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projects under construction with a third project planned to begin in spring of 
1999. 
While the department faces a significant challenge in managing a program of 
this size and complexity, we believe that by implementing our 
recommendations for contract procurement and development, the department 
can better protect and maximize the state's investment in prison construction." 
This audit dealt with the three prisons discussed in Section 0 above, the SRCI, the 
TRCI and the CCCF (although again the CCCF was just undelWay as this audit was being 
perfonned). The audit contained three major findings and the DOC "generally agreed with 
the conclusions and recommendations" ofthe Audits Division. These were: 
"Construction Contract Procurement 
We found opportunities for improvement in the department's processes for 
contractor selection, decision documentation, and determination of contract 
cost. For the three construction projects referenced above, we found that 
selection panel composition, training, and appearance of fairness can be 
improved. Improvements can also be made in documenting the selection 
process and award decisions; we found incomplete and conflicting 
documentation for existing projects. Finally, we noted that the department 
should place more emphasis on contract price for CM/GC firms. This includes 
ensuring that the department has a clear understanding of cost proposals 
made by firms and conducting the analytical review necessary to determine if 
the proposed fees are reasonable. To improve construction contract 
procurement, we recommend that the department develop processes to 
ensure that selection panels are experienced and objective, ensure that the 
selection process and award decisions are fully documented, and assess 
whether contract cost and amounts proposed by CM/GC firms are reasonable. 
Construction Contract Procurement 
We found opportunities for improvement in the department's processes for 
contractor selection, decision documentation, and determination of contract 
cost. For the three construction projects referenced above, we found that 
selection panel composition, training, and appearance of fairness can be 
improved. Improvements can also be made in documenting the selection 
process and award decisions; we found incomplete and conflicting 
documentation for existing projects. Finally, we noted that the department 
should place more emphasis on contract price for CM/GC firms. This includes 
ensuring that the department has a clear understanding of cost proposals 
made by firms and conducting the analytical review necessary to determine if 
the proposed fees are reasonable. To improve construction contract 
procurement, we recommend that the department develop processes to 
ensure that selection panels are experienced and objective, ensure that the 
selection process and award decisions are fully documented, and assess 
whether contract cost and amounts proposed by CM/GC firms are reasonable. 
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Contract Development 
We found that the department can improve its establishment of cost limits and 
its control over contract amendments. For the Snake River-II project, we noted 
opportunities for the department to specify cost limits and improve the 
timeliness of contract amendments. For example, the department did not 
establish an initial total contract cost with the materials testing firm and 
allowed the amount paid to grow 86 percent over the original amount 
proposed by the firm. To improve its contract development practices, we 
recommend that the department establish contract cost limits as we" as a 
process for improving its control over contract amendments." 
This Audit focused more on the implementation of the management processes and 
PDS and CMlGC selection rather than the actual project, CMlGC or PDS performance. 
One of the early common complaints of the CMlGC process was the appearance that the 
selections were not "fair." This was particularly true when the first several projects were 
awarded to a very small select group of contractors and a large proportion of the selection 
criteria involved past experience in CMlGC projects, which effectively locked out may 
would-be competitors. 
Oregon State University Review of the Valley Library Expansion Project 
"During the course ofother Audit work at Oregon State University," state Auditors 
received information regarding the settlement of a claim on the Library project totaling 
$421,000 and decided to make a preliminary investigation. On December 17th, 2001, the 
Audits Division published their findings and recommendation from this Audit. 
"As a state agency governed by state laws and rules, the university is required 
to document its contracting activities. The university did not adequately 
document its procedures in selecting either the project contractor or the 
architect. The state and university designed and negotiated a contract that 
lacked clear provisions for guiding key contracting decisions. In particular, the 
contract did not clearly describe which costs incurred by the contractor and 
subcontractors as part of the project would be considered reimbursable. 
Lacking clear contract language, the university, the contractor, and certain 
subcontractors took disputed actions that resulted in increased costs to the 
state. 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
We recommend that for construction projects the university: 
• 	 Document its selection and hiring of contractors as required by state 
laws and rules. 
• 	 Consider increasing the number or portion of external, independent, 
and knowledgeable parties serving on selection committees. 
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• 	 Continue to work with the attorney general's office in creating and 
negotiating clear and supportable construction contracts that 
adequately protect the state's interests." 
Here again the Audits Division focused on unclear Contract provisions and 
documentation but did not fault the University's use of the CMlGC PDS as the reason for 
the problems and cost increases incurred on the project. 
Multnomah County, Capital Construction Process - Early Planning will Reduce 
Costs 
Multnomah County Auditor, Suzanne Flynn published an Audit of four specific 
county building projects: the Multnomah Building, the East County Building, the Wapato 
Correctional Facility, and the Hillsdale Library and concluded that the county construction 
project management had significant weaknesses that resulted in increased costs. 
Specifically, the Auditor found: 
• 	 Upfront planning to define projects, establish responsibilities, identify 
financing options, and plan project activities did not occur in most of 
the projects stUdied. Time and resources were often committed without 
fully understanding what was needed, what problems might occur, or 
what alternatives were available. As a result, the County spent more 
than necessary in aI/ four projects. 
• 	 Decision-making authority was not clear, leading to a poor 
understanding of roles and responsibilities. This meant that projects 
were often conducted in an environment of confusion and/or 
disagreement over control. 
• 	 The County did not have the skills and tools necessary to manage 
large capital construction projects. Limited administrative capacity and 
knowledge of project management practices led to inconsistent 
tracking and oversight of projects. 
These deficiencies were the result of several factors, including the rapid 
growth in the number and size of capital construction projects. Responsibility 
for problems did not rest with one individual, department, or official, but 
weaknesses existed throughout the County. The net effect was financial loss 
due to major changes in scope, multiple project delays, and competing project 
goals. Departments and staff also did not always have the support, guidance, 
or training necessary to manage projects and properly do their jobs. 
The .Wapato Jail is the only one of these projects that was performed using the 
CMlGC PDS and no mention is made whether or not that had any impact on the Auditor's 
findings and recommendations. As in the Audits Division reports above, the County 
Auditor faulted the people, and county management not the PDS for these problems. 
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Appendix G - Oregon Public Contracting Coalition Guide to CM/GC 
Contracting 
This appendix reviews recent reports and publications in Oregon and Washington 
that purport to evaluate Project Delivery Systems (PDS) and when alternate procurement 
methods should be used. 
When the Washington state legislature allowed negotiated procurements by statute, 
they attached a condition that an assessment of the process had to be done after a certain 
amount of time had passed. Based on that report, the legislature would either allow the 
authorizing legislation to "sunset" or lapse, or would reauthorize it. At roughly the same 
time, as controversy over CMlGC procurements persisted, a group of construction 
professionals organized through the Associated General Contractor's (AGC) formed under 
the name Oregon Public Contracting Coalition and published a report assessing the proper 
use ofCMlGC. This Section is a review ofthose reports. 
Oregon Public Contracting Coalition Guide to CM/GC Contracting 
OWNER 
CMlGC AlE 
Figure 49: Cover Figure on Oregon Public Contracting Coalition Report 
In February 2002 a group of construction industry professionals, several of whom 
served on our Expert Panel, with the aid of students and faculty from the Construction 
Engineering Management Program at Oregon State University, published a CMlGC 
Contracting Guide. This publication explains in simple and straight fOlWard terms what 
CMlGC is, what the benefits are and, in the opitllon of the author's what types ofprojects 
and Owners should consider using CMlGC [56]. This is a truly excellent overview ofboth 
the construction industry Project Delivery Systems, and an explanation ofwhat CMlGC is 
and how it can benefit the Contraction Team. The Executive Summary ofthis docwnent is 
as follows: 
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"Since the early 19S0's, the Construction Manager/General Contractor 
(CM/GC) project delivery method has been utilized to successfully deliver 
construction projects in the State of Oregon. Public agencies that have 
traditionally employed the design-bid-build method of project delivery 
increasingly select CM/GC. CM/GC offers opportunities for success that are 
not necessarily available through traditional contracting methods. Greater use 
of the CM/GC contracting method has provided the construction community 
with insight regarding the benefits and limitations of its use along with 
knowledge of the best practices for implementing it on public construction 
projects. Drawing on the knowledge gained from past projects, the Oregon 
Public Contracting Coalition (PCC) has developed this guide to assist owners' 
with the implementation of the CM/GC contracting method on construction 
projects in Oregon." 
The report goes on to advise prospective users of this process on: Legal 
Requirements (under existing state of Oregon law,) Selecting CM/GC for a project (what 
should be considered and how to get the best results,) The Solicitation Process, and The 
CM/GC Contract, The Guaranteed Maximum Price. The Executive Sununary section 
honestly concludes with the following cautionary statement: 
"No set formula or framework exists which prescribes how the CM/GC 
contracting method is to be implemented. A public agency can modify the 
general process to suit its particular capabilities and needs. However, 
agencies should be cautioned that developing new practices that are too far 
removed from common practice may attract additional audit scrutiny. This 
document addresses significant practices and issues that are important to the 
process and should be considered by public agencies when employing the 
CM/GC process. It is recommended that legal counsel be sought as well to 
help provide guidance throughout the process. The Oregon PCC along with 
other industry organizations can also provide additional information and 
guidance." 
The report expends considerable effort to define the roles and relationships of the 
different partners in the CM/GC process, along with their second tier partners as 
demonstrated in Figure 50: 
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Figure 1. CM/GC Contracting Method 
Figure 50: Oregon pee Report Figure #1 
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Figure 51: Oregon pee Report, Figure #2 
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Figure 52: Oregon PCC Report, Figure #3 
Figure 52 is used in the Oregon PCC Report to help visualize the impact a CMlOC 
can have on a project during the different stages of the project timeline. The stages 
depicted above do not exactly confonn to those generally recommended by Architects in 
our Expert Panel (which included also: Conceptual and Schematic Design) but is helpful in 
understanding the different phases of a project and the impact a CMlOC can have on the 
outcome. This figure or those strikingly similar have been used in numerous presentations 
including one by Oregon PCC member and Expert Panel Member Bart Eberwein [85]. 
In answering the question: who should use a CMlOC the PCC authors respond in 
the following cautionary fashion that is consistent throughout the report: 
"Use of CM/GC is not restricted to any particular type of public agency. The 
method can be employed by all public agencies. However, gaining approval 
for exemption from competitive bidding requirements, and thus the use 
of CM/GC, does not necessarily suggest that a public agency should use 
CM/GC for a project. The public agency should consider other factors, 
especially its own capabilities and resources and the requirements that 
CM/GC places on the owner, when weighing whether to use CM/GC for a 
project. The consideration of owner capabilities is reflected in ORS 
279.011 (5)(d), which states that the findings must include information 
regarding the "specialized expertise required" for the project. The findings 
need to show that the agency has the capacity, through staff or contract, to 
bring the needed owner's representative resources to the project." 
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The report points out that the types ofproject most likely to benefit from CMlqc 
include those with "Technical Complexity" where the CMlGC can help to "incorporate the 
technical knowledge of a construction contracting firm into the development of the 
project's design." And ''The use ofCMlGC may be justified when the public agency finds 
that the project presents significant technical complexities which are best addressed by a 
team approach, with the CMlGC firm helping the public agency and designer solve 
specific project challenges." The report goes on to list these issues as follows: 
• 	 Operations (e.g., keeping the facility functioning during construction). 
• 	 Tenant occupancy (e.g., maintaining tenant safety and efficiency 
throughout construction). 
• 	 Public safety (e.g., developing a comprehensive project safety plan 
early in the project in concert with the owner and architect). 
• 	 Delivery of an early budget and/or GMP. This enables the public 
agency to provide the public, taxpayers, and other stakeholders with 
greater cost reliability and more effective management of the budget 
process. 
• 	 Fundraising (e.g., the contractor's involvement facilitates in-kind 
giving). 
• 	 Historic preservation (e.g., seismic upgrades while maintaining historic 
facades). 
• 	 Difficult remodel projects with many unknown factors. 
• 	 Projects requiring complex phasing or highly coordinated scheduling. 
This report provides an excellent point ofdeparture for any discussion on the issue 
of CMlGC and DBB PDS, because it provides a thorough but concise explanation of the 
different PDS's and an evaluation of their appropriate uses. The Oregon PCC's members 
include Contractor's, Consultants and Owners, but are admittedly dominated by those who 
support the use of alternative PDS's, specifically CMlGC in Oregon and elsewhere. In 
spite of that bias, the Report is remarkably evenhanded and is really intended more as a 
''How-to'' guide than a justification or promotional publication. From conversations with 
Expert Panel members who also serve on the Oregon PCC, this Report was intended as a 
guide to public Owners on how to best decide on a PDS and how to get the most out ofthat 
decision. 
Table 32 below is copied from the Oregon PCC report [56], and provides a 
comparison of the different PDS' s with respect to different project characteristics as well as 
other considerations. 
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Crttaria CMCC (Altsmativs} 
Doslgn·Bid·Bulid 
(TraditionaQ 
Doign-Bulld 
(AitsmativB) 
Project Charadariatica 
Complexity Probably high; may have 
multiple bid packagas. 
Mooerate to low. May be driving factor; usually 
either high or low, but not in-
between. 
Schedule Aggressive; fast-tacking 
possible. 
Reasonable; not a key factor. Aggressive; fast-tracking 
possible. 
Budget High priaity; likely fixed; 
usually GMP. 
Normal importance Ukelyfixed 
Program 
resolution 
Not a d riving factor. Well resowed Not a driving factor 
Design quality Complexity may driw higher 
qualily~ 
Not a driving fack:r Not a driving factor 
Construction 
quality 
CompleJdty implies higher 
quality. 
Not a driving fack:r Not a driving factor 
Contractual Structura 
Compensation Standard fees to dasign 
19am' GMPto CM/GC. 
Lump sum ­ aU participants Lump su m to consofidaf9d 
team. 
Contact 
arrangeme nt 
AlA contract form or variant 
for design; bid a negotiate 
for construction. 
Agency ­ Design professional 
Agency - Contractor 
Single-Plint contract with 
Design-Builder. 
Doltvory .TGaIft.StructuI1I 
Disciplinas 
required 
Standard design team plus 
CMIGC. 
Typical project design and 
construction teams. 
Contracting and design 
consolidated. 
Experience 
needed 
Complex project - high 
degl'99 of ellPBriencs 
required for all participan1s. 
Moderate Experience in design-build 
needed. 
Communications Design professional as agent; 
CM is contrada" *'open book" 
Traditional design 
ttrofBssional as agent 
Consolidal9d 
LtilaI~ lIardIg-.t 
Uability CMtGC "'at risk"', but design 
19am further exposed. 
Standard Single point of msponse with 
design-build firm. 
Dispute resol ution Standard, but in pannering 
atmcsphere. 
Standard ADR. mediation, 
RUgation. 
Standard ADR. mediation, 
litigatial. 
Confliet of interest Potential to CUIGC ­ dual 
roles during pre-eonstruction 
and OO'lStructiO'l. 
None PoI9ntial professional con'fllet 
fa design team. 
Proja,t Control 
Schedule CCJltol By CMIGC By Contractor Agency looks to D-B 19am for 
guidance. DistibutiO'l of 
I"9sponsibilities within [)'B 
team is internaf issue. 
Cost oontol By CM/GC wth design team 
CXI18ultation. 
Contractor/Design 
professional 
D9sign-Builder 
Quafily contol By CM/GC wth design team 
CD'lSuttation. 
IAsign professionslf 
C'AJntactDr 
Design-Builder 
Ownerstalf Must be able to meet owner's 
obligations in p1"9­
construction services and 
contact administration. 
Standard Depends upon degree of 
owner control over the design 
and construction. 
Table 32: Oregon PCC Report PDS Comparisons Table 1 from [56) 
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Appendix H - Oregon Database 
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SlacksVirtual DMU Weights Project Data and DEA Input/Outputs 
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0.0000.000 0.0000.0000.0000.4980.0000.000 50% 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.S02 0.0001.000School100% CMGC111 
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0.000 0.0000.0000.000 0.0000.0000.0000.985 0.000'83.000 0.983 0.015 0.0000.760 370.000 0.017 0.0001.060 SO%0.950100% CMGC Remodel312 
0.0000.000 0.0000.000 0.000 0.0000.0000.1640.003 0.000 0.833 0.000250.000 75% 671.000 0.0641.060 1.050 0.936Institutional100% CMGC65 
0.0000.000 0.0000.0000.0000.0000.541 0.0000.000 0.459 0.000150.000 75% 130.000 0.763 0.237 0.0001.0000.820100% CMGC Remodel67 
0.0000.000 0.0000.0000.000 0.0000.0000.113 0.2940.023 0.570 0.00050.000 75% 115.000 0.1521.000 1.000 1.000 0.848Remodel100% CMGC89 
0.000 0.0000.0000.0000.0000.000 0.0000.0000.0000.013 0.9870.820 75% 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.0000.000 0.0001.080100% CMGC Corrections151 
0.0000.000 0.0000.0000.0000.0000.827 0.0000.1730.000 0.0000.000 75% 1750.000 0.955 0.045 0.0001.060 1.0000.940Sports Facilities 100% CMGC338 
0.0000.0000.0000.0000.000 0.0000.0000.9530.0460.000 0.001 0.0000.000 75% 0.000 1.000 0.0001.080 1.0600.910100% CMGC School361 
0.0000.0000.0000.0000.000 0.0000.0000.0000.4620.538 0.000 0.00080% 643.000 1.000 0.0001.000 1.000 430.0001.0507 100% CMGC Remodel 
0.0000.0000.000 0.0000.0000.0000.0000.099 0.0000.000 0.000 0.901404.000 0.0241.000 0.670 221.000 80% 0.9761.000CMGC Institutional14 100% 
0.0000.0000.0000.0000.000 0.0000.0000.0260.009 0.000 0.9300.020 0.035110.000 80% 315.000 0.9801.420 1.00C0.86CCorrections100% CMGC31 
0.0000.0000.0000.000 0.0000.0000.0000.0000.000 0.000 0.0310.810 0.9691.000 3.000 80% 200.000 0.1900.940 0.91047 100% CMGC Remodel 
0.0000.0000.0000.000 0.0000.0000.0000.0000.549 0.000 0.45150.000 0.00080% 0.467 0.5331.000 1.010 25.0000.960100% CMGC Remodel48 
0.000 0.0000.0000.0000.0000.0000.0000.0000.905 0.000540.000 0.023 0.074 0.02180% 0.977120.0001.090100% CMGC Office66 
0.0000.0000.000 0.0000.000 0.0000.0000.0000.000 0.2290.301 0.000 0.7710.000 80% 1000.000 0.6991.06C 0.67C0.940100% LibraryCMGC263 
0.0000.0000.0000.0000.000 0.0001.000 0.0000.000 0.000 0.0001.000 30.000 90% 71.000 0.000 1.000 0.0000.86C0.860Remodel100% CMGC12 
0.0000.0000.0000.000 0.0000.000 
0,000 
0.0000.0000.004150.000 0.000 0.000 0.996 0.0000.000 90% 1.0001.000 0.9500.990CMGC100% Other45 
0.0000.0000.0000.000 0.0000.0000.000 0.4520.006 0.000 0.5431.000 190.000 95% 410.000 0.988 0.0121.000 0.000CMGC Corrections100%28 
0.0000.000 0.0000.000 0.0000.0000.0000.348 0.0000.522 0.00050.000 95% 200.000 0.428 0.1301.000 1.000 0.5720.880CMGC Remodel100%88 
0.0000.0000.0000.0000.000 0.0000.0000.684 0.000456.000 0.039 0.316 0.000 0.0001.000 105.000 98% 0.9610.970 0.9708 100% CMGC Remodel 
0.000 0.0000.0000.0000.000 0.0000.0000.00069.000 0.595 0.390100.000 98% 1.000 0.000 0.015 0.0000.9101.000 1.000Remodel100% CMGC10 
0.0000.0000.0000.000 0.0000.000 0.0000.0000.105 0.384 0.51150.000 98% 90.000 1.000 0.0001.010 1.000 0.0001.01011 100% CMGC Remodel 
0.0000.0000.0000.0000.000 0.0000.0000.0000.000 0.000250.000 0.021 0.005 0.9951.000 1UO.000 98% 0.9791.040100% CMGC Corrections61 
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0.0000.0000.000 0.0000.000 0.0000.0000.000 0.0000.6160.382 0.00080.000 99% 1976.000 0.000 1.0001.0000.900 0.000Institutional 
0.0000.000 0.0000.0000.0000.0000.678 0.0000.0720.000 0.2460.000 0.0021.170 100.000 100% 0.000 1.0001.050 0.800School 
0.0000.0000.0000.0000.0000.0000.0000.0000.656 0.000 0.3420.0000.000 100% 300.000 0.0000.950 1.0001.1000.890Library 
0.0000.093 0.000 0.0000.0000.0000.041 0.0000.4470.000 0.48130.000 0.03025.00c 100% 0.0011.00c 0.9991.000 1.00cRemodel 
0.0000.0000.277 0.0000.000 0.0000.486 0.0000.0000.000 0.5010.014 0.01353.000 99% 155.0001.070 0.9861.000Corrections 
0.0270.3200.000 0.0000.5390.0000.000 0.0000.971 0.0000.0290.0000.000 75% 350.000 0.0001.0001.030 1.000O.OOCInstitutional 
0.341 0.3340.252 0.0000.000 0.0000.000 0.0000.995 0.0000.00575% 0.000400.000 1000.000 0.664 0.1360.6700.900Remodel 
0.3520.0001.147 0.0000.8260.2050.0000.0000.3880.000 0.612156.000 0.000 0.0000.000 75% 1.0001.040 0.6300.960Library 
0.0350.019 0.0000.0000.7560.000 0.0000.418 0.0000.582 0.0000.000161.000 0.483 0.5171.000 0.000 100%1.0000.910Other 
0.0800.0001.149 0.0000.4090.5490.0000.615 0.385 0.0000.000 0.00095.000 0.000249.000 75% 1.0000.9000.960 1.030Institutional 
0.0000.0000.0000.0560.0000.0000.0000.6680.235 0.0930.004 0.000278.000 95% 1004.000 1.000 0.0000.9000.890 0.870School 
0.0000.000 0.0000.6820.2410.0000.0000.842 0.094 0.0630.00075.000 0.928 0.00050.000 80% 0.0720.9800.9801.020Remodel 
0.0000.0000.0000.1170.000 0.0430.0000.5320.468 0.0000.000 0.00095% 500.0001.000 1.000 0.0000.990Remodel 
0.0000.0000.628 0.0000.0000.0000.0000.097 0.0650.830675.000 0.966 0.009 0.00075.000 85% 0.0341.0001.0001.000School 
0.1590.0001.539 0.0000.033 0.0000.0000.382 0.0000.609313.000 1.000 0.000 0.009 0.0000.780 148.000 75%0.920 1.000Remodel 
0.019 0.0000.0380.0000.000 0.4060.Q11 0.0000.9890.0000.00075% 1000.000 1.000 0.000 0.0001.0000.970Hospital 
0.0100.0000.0000.180 0.0000.0000.0000.133 0.0000.048 0.8180.009 0.0000.000 100% 150.000 0.9910.9500.970 0.980Remodel 
0.0190.0000.0000.0670.7590.0000.0000.0000.952 0.0460.000 0.000100.000 1.000 0.0001.000 0.000 80%1.020 0.880Remodel 
10.0000.0000.491 0.0000.000107.7730.0000.5830.351 0.0470.019 0.00050.000 80% 0.000 0.0001.000 1.0000.900 1.000Office 
0.0000.0000.0000.0000.04665.8880.0000.5530.073 0.375 0.0000.0000.000 0.0000.000 0.000 100% 1.0001.000 0.000School 
0.0000.0000.310 0.0730.000 0.0000.0000.055 0.9440.000226.00c 0.013 0.001 0.0001.070 120.000 90% 0.9870.950 0.9SCRemodel 
0.0000.0000.370 0.0000.2610.0000.0000.102 0.7340.165865.000 0.994 0.000 0.000460.000 100% 0.0061.0000.890 0.80CSchool 
0.0000.2200.446 0.0000.2330.0000.538 0.0000.0000.000 0.000 0.4620.000 98% 0.000 0.0111.000 0.989O.OOC0.920Sports Facilities 
0.0000.000 0.0000.00016.179 0.0420.529 0.0000.3880.082 0.000O.OOC 0.000 0.0000.000 0.000 100% 1.0000.0001.030School 
0.205 0.0000.0000.213 0.00042.6910.557 0.0000.0000.053 0.390O.OOC 0.0001.000 0.000 100% 1.000 0.0000.0001.000School 
0.248 0.1140.0000.0000.3060.0000.0000.000 0.0000.051 0.949450.000 0.0002872.000 75% 0.885 0.1150.8300.940Other 
0.0000.810 0.0000.0000.364165.1170.0000.8100.000 0.0000.1900.000 1.000 0.000 0.0001.000 0.000 100%0.000 0.000Parking 
0.0000.2530.0000.00034.015 0.2520.558 0.0000.051 0.391 0.0000.000 0.0000.000 0.000 100% 0.0001.0001.000 0.000School 
0.0000.000 0.2950.0000.0070.0000.0000.3600.089 0.551 0.00067.000 0.949 0.00040.000 100% 0.0511.0000.900Remodel 
0.9170.0000.0000.68779.120 0.0000.0000.0001.000 0.0000.0000.000 0.000 0.0000.000 0.000 100% 1.0000.000 0.000Corrections 
0.0000.000 0.2810.277 0.1370.0000.531 0.0000.0000.000 0.000 0.4690.000 0% 0.014 0.0001.000 0.9860.000 0.000Institutional 
0.0000.1360.0000.161 0.00083.9300.0000.5610.055 0.383 0.0000.000 100% 0.000 0.000 0.0000.000 1.0000.980 0.000School 
0.0000.000 0.1650.185 0.00053.7410.0000.5610.0000.000 0.000 0.054 0.3840.000 0.000 100% 1.000 0.0000.980 0.000School 
0.0010.3690.000 0.0000.0000.000 0.0000.000 0.0000.012 O.O~ 0.96268.00c 80% 126.000 1.000 0.0001.0001.010 0.000Office 
0.0000.0550.0000.0000.09990.8330.565 0.0000.377 0.0000.000 100% 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.0580.000 1.0000.950 0.000School 
0.0440.059 0.0000.000 0.0000.1480.0000.000 0.902 0.0000.026 0.07275.000 100% 50.000 1.000 0.0000.8600.740 1.010Remodel 
0.199 0.0000.0000.0000.22443.6980.575 0.0000.050 0.376 0.0000.000 0.0000.000 100% 0.000 1.0001.0000.930 0.000School 
0.00010.1800.0000.0000.21132.8140.576 0.0000.374 0.0000.000 0.000 0.0500.000 100O/C 1.000 0.0000.0000.930 0.000School 
Project Data and DEA Input/Outputs Virtual DMU Weights Slacks 
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40 89% CMGC Remodel 1.000 1.000 1.030 25.000 90% 50:000 0.998 0.002 0.049 0.000 0.000 0.040 0.911 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.812 0.061 0.000 0.000 
172 89% CMGC Corrections 0.940 0.000 0.060 0.000 75% 0.000 0.998 0.002 0.000 0.017 0.983 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.354 0.000 0.000 0.086 0.902 
213 89% CMGC Institutional 1.010 O.OOC 0.920 0.000 100% O.OOC 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.637 0.000 0.363 0.000 213.020 0.134 0.818 0.000 0.143 0.000 
331 89% CMGC Housing 1.080 0.94C 0.870 405.00c 90% 1.00c 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.938 0.062 0.000 0.000 7.767 0.426 0.094 0.000 0.000 0.174 
1 89% CMGC Remodel 0.980 0.980 1.000 20.000 90% 140.00c 0.963 0.037 0.008 0.000 0.830 0.096 0.066 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.737 0.000 0.000 0.000 
161 89% CMGC School 0.960 0.000 0.000 0.000 100% O.OOC 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.058 0.390 0.000 0.551 0.000 49.226 0.130 0.000 0.000 0.113 0.000 
103 88% CMGC Remodel 0.910 1.100 1.000 0.000 90% 60.00c 0.885 0.115 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.861 0.139 0.000 0.000 0.319 0.292 0.019 0.000 0.000 
424 88% CMGC Institutional O.OOC O.OOC 0.830 0.000 0% 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 2.334 0.000 0.719 0.000 0.000 0.048 
44 87% CMGC Other 1.040 1.00c 1.010 25.00c 90% 50.000 1.000 0.000 0.019 0.053 0.928 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.023 0.024 
46 86% CMGC Office 1.020 1.000 0.970 40.000 90% 100.000 0.960 0.040 0.054 0.000 0.898 0.048 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.150 0.000 0.000 0.050 
104 85% CMGC Institutional 0.970 1.000 1.000 300.000 90% 1900.000 0.984 0.016 0.031 0.000 0.000 0.146 0.823 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.166 0.002 0.000 0.000 
280 85% CMGC School 0.950 0.000 0.620 1300.000 85% 1246.000 0.913 0.087 0.000 0.054 0.946 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.140 0.000 0.000 0.426 0.347 
74 85% CMGC School 0.900 1.000 1200.000 90% 1250.000 0.951 0.049 0.002 0.009 0.000 0.059 0.930 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.051 0.000 0.000 
53 84% CMGC Remodel 0.970 0.000 0.000 0.000 100% 500.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.249 0.000 0.433 0.000 0.000 0.842 
195 84% CMGC Corrections 0.970 0.000 0.530 0.000 100% 2.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 16.329 0.000 0.058 0.000 0.000 0.309 
52 84% CMGC Parking 0.820 0.000 0.640 150.000 100% 400.000 0.903 0.097 0.022 0.168 0.810 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.166 
193 83% CMGC Corrections 0.790 O'OOC 1.000 0.000 100% 11.000 0.992 0.008 0.000 0.000 0.412 0.000 0.588 0.000 0.000 0.209 0.218 0.000 0.136 0.000 
68 83% CMGC Other 0.910 8000.000 80% 800.000 0.845 0.155 0.000 0.090 0.910 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.441 0.000 0.000 0.381 0.905 
3 83% CMGC Institutional 0.940 0.950 0.930 120.000 90% 500.000 0.940 0.060 0.008 0.000 0.831 0.098 0.064 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.582 0.000 0.000 0.000 
290 82% CMGC Remodel 0.880 0.000 0.820 0.000 100% 2500.000 0.889 0.111 0.000 0.133 0.675 0.000 0.192 0.000 0.000 0.120 0.000 0.000 0.045 0.000 
180 82% CMGC School 0.950 0.000 0.000 0.000 100% 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 86.391 0.000 0.284 0.000 0.000 0.819 
319 81% CMGC Sports Facilities 1.010 1.0OC 0.880 1361.000 60% 266.000 0.987 0.013 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.797 0.203 0.000 0.000 2.858 0.432 0.092 0.000 0.000 
82 81% CMGC Remodel 0.890 O.OOC 0.690 0.000 70% 600.00c 0.784 0.216 0.000 0.359 0.565 0.000 0.077 0.000 0.000 0.125 0.000 0.000 0.555 0.000 
72 81% CMGC Other 0.930 1.000 1011.000 90% 5OO.00C 0.969 0.031 0.000 0.034 0.000 0.000 0.966 0.000 0.000 0.249 0.000 0.015 0.072 0.000 
69 81% CMGC Remodel 0.950 0.920 500.000 70% 370.000 0.759 0.241 0.000 0.290 0.442 0.000 0.268 0.000 0.000 0.121 0.000 0.000 0.211 0.000 
32 81% CMGC Office 0.980 0.000 1.000 115.000 90% 270.0OC 0.950 0.050 0.011 0.032 0.000 0.000 0.957 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.014 0.194 0.000 
310 79% CMGC Parking 0.870 0.000 0.510 0.000 80~ 126.00c 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.038 0.962 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.507 0.000 0.000 0.407 0.353 
15 78% CMGC Office 0.940 0.940 0.930 532.000 90% 311.000 0.908 0.092 0.000 0.000 0.668 0.285 0.047 0.000 0.000 0.510 0.736 0.000 0.000 0.000 
83 78% CMGC School 0.870 O.OOC 0.700 38.000 70% 746.000 0.738 0.262 0.061 0.000 0.352 0.000 0.587 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.052 0.000 0.639 0.000 
39 73% CMGC Remodel 0.860 0.910 0.870 0.000 90% 300.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.618 0.382 0.000 0.000 0.533 0.724 0.212 0.000 0.000 0.005 
315 73% CMGC Remodel 0.780 0.000 0.000 0.000 100% 154.000 0.975 0.025 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.170 0.150 0.000 0.000 0.742 
81 72% CMGC Library 0.950 0.900 0.900 206.000 70% 1121.000 0.756 0.244 0.032 0.361 0.471 0.000 0.135 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.017 0.000 
204 69% CMGC Corrections 0.790 0.000 0.000 0.000 100% 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 44.306 0.000 0.564 0.000 0.000 0.687 
214 68% CMGC Office 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 100% 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 682.296 0.000 0.927 0.000 0.000 0.683 
18 67% CMGC School 0.930 0.000 1.000 430.000 30% 1150.000 0.239 0.761 0.026 0.374 0.601 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.029 0.020 
34 100% DBB Hospital 0.900 1.33(J 0.420 316.000 93% 150.000 0.933 0.067 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
21 100% DBB Corrections 1.000 0.950 0.920 190.000 95% 90.000 0.999 0.001 0.006 0.037 0.824 0.133 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
26 100% DBa Remodel 0.960 0.730 1.000 90.000 95% 41.000 0.994 0.006 0.056 0.000 0.436 0.003 0.505 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
V...)
-N 
f 
8e tn 
CD ~d 
29 100% 
37 100% 
79 1000/0 
80 100% 
85 100% 
86 100% 
146 100% 
189 100% 
225 100% 
327 100% 
329 100% 
390 100% 
84 99% 
400 98% 
130 98% 
95 98% 
333 97% 
58 97% 
332 96% 
101 96% 
258 96% 
353 95% 
419 95% 
340 95% 
160 94% 
257 94% 
298 94% 
109 94% 
396 94% 
228 93% 
171 93% 
116 93% 
13 93% 
97 93% 
137 93% 
127 93% 
123 92% 
288 92% 
tn 
~ 
DBB 
DBB 
DBB 
DBB 
DBB 
DBB 
DBB 
DBB 
DBB 
DBB 
DBB 
DBB 
DBB 
DBB 
DBB 
DBB 
DBB 
DBB 
DBB 
DBB 
DBB 
DBB 
DBB 
DBB 
DBB 
DBB 
DBB 
DBB 
DBB 
DBB 
DBB 
DBB 
DBB 
DBB 
DBB 
DBB 
DBB 
DBB 
Project Data and DEA Input/Outputs 
i5 Q. Q. 
t: e lID :c eu 0lID 0.. C 0 0iio.. ii lID ca C .0 
'S e ca .,.13'5 13 a-e r;: C ~~ 0"0 0::lID C CD :;-fca"O cat: c-Q. caCD '0 ~~ ~: ;X: d~~ it;; :II: 
Office 0.82C 1.100 1.000 180.000 95% 480.000 
Parking O.96C 0,74C 0,000 82.000 95% 38.000 
Remodel 0.85C 1.0OC 1.000 4.000 95% 60.000 
Remodel 0,84C O,OOC 1.180 146,000 95% 169,000 
Remodel 0.83C O.OOC 0.970 170.000 95% 58.000 
School 0,93C 0.000 0.830 15.000 98% 220.000 
School 0.42C 0.000 0.000 0.000 100% 0.000 
School 1,000 O.OOC 0.000 0,000 100% 0.000 
Library 0.920 O.OOC 1.000 0.000 100% 117.000 
Remodel 0,930 0.000 0.900 79.000 100% 157.000 
Institutional 0.880 0.000 0.960 114.000 100% 622.000 
Institutional 1.09C 1.000 1.000 0.000 100% 0.000 
Sports Facilities 0.970 1.020 0.900 28.000 98% 0.000 
Institutional 0.990 0.950 1.050 0.000 0% 0.000 
School 0'97C 0.000 0.000 0,000 100% 0.000 
Institutional 0.950 0.800 1.050 111.000 100% 55.000 
Library 0.930 0.000 0.870 1414.000 100% 303.0OC 
Parking 0.960 1.080 150.000 100% 350.0OC 
Remodel 0.910 0,000 0,920 0.000 100% 176.000 
Institutional 0.990 0.000 0.790 0.000 100% 0.000 
School 0.920 0.000 0,000 O.OOC 100% O.OOC 
Remodel 0.820 1.050 1,000 O,OOC 100% 0.000 
Corrections 0,91C 0.500 1.100 0,000 0% O,OOC 
Remodel 0.92C O.t5c 1.050 0.000 0% 0.000 
School 0,95C 0.000 0.000 0,000 100% 0.000 
School 1.00c O.OOC 0.000 O.OOC 100% 0.000 
School 0.94( O.OOC 0,000 O,OOC 100% O.OOC 
School 0.950 0.000 0.000 O.OOC 100% O.OOC 
School 0.000 0,000 1.00( O.OOC 100% 0.000 
School 0.970 O.OOC 1.000 0.000 100% 94.000 
School 1.000 0.000 1.00( 0.000 100% 0.000 
School 0.960 0.000 100% 0.000 
Remodel 0.900 1.00c 0.8OC 100% 0.000 
School 0.88C O.OOC 1.090 0.000 100% 57.000 
School 0.990 O.OOC O.OOC 0.000 100% 0.000 
School 1.000 O.OOC O.OOC 0.000 100% 0.000 
School 1.020 0.000 100% 0.000 
School 0.970 0.000 0.000 0.000 100% 0.000 
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0.987 0.013 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.995 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
1.000 0,000 0.537 0.000 0.000 0.463 0.000 0.000 0,000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
0,212 0,788 0.599 0,000 0.000 0.401 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0,000 0.000 0.000 
0.937 0.063 0,000 0,036 0.000 0,000 0.964 0.000 0,000 0.000 0.000 0,000 0.060 0.000 
0.999 0.001 0.028 0.972 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0,000 0,000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
0.325 0.675 0.968 0.032 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
1.000 0.000 0.000 1,000 0.000 0.000 0,000 0,000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
1.000 0.000 0.000 0,018 0.366 0.597 0,000 0.000 0,000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
0.998 0.002 0.000 0.082 0.918 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
1 
0,736 0.264 0.058 0.942 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
0.247 0.753 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.911 0.089 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
0.994 0.006 0.003 0.000 0.422 0.575 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.012 0.000 0.000 0.066 
0.999 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.287 0.270 0.443 0.000 0.000 0.395 0.068 0.000 0.000 0.000 
1.000 0.000 0.000 0.125 0.346 0.000 0.528 0.000 127.560 0.270 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
0.995 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.167 0.097 0.736 0.000 0.000 0.210 0.417 0.000 0.000 0.0001 
0.990 0.010 0.000 0.329 0.671 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.219 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.088 
0.999 0.001 0.014 0.000 0.441 0.000 0.545 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.025 0.000 0.008 0.000 
0.940 0.060 0.000 0.239 0.333 0.000 0.428 0.000 0.000 0.663 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
1.000 0.000 0.000 0.267 0.733 0.000 0.000 0.000 2.403 0.203 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.175! 
1.000 0.000 0.000 0,070 0.335 0,000 0.594 0,000 40,768 0.132 0.000 0,000 0,000 0,000 
1.000 0.000 0,000 0,061 0,000 0.248 0,691 0.000 114.306 0,639 0.000 0.033 0,000 0.000 
0,988 0,012 0,000 0.055 0.333 0,021 0,591 0.000 0,000 0.388 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1 
0.984 0,016 0.000 0.000 0.216 0.082 0.702 0.000 0.000 0.528 0.345 0.000 0.000 0.000 
1.000 0.000 0.000 0.100 0.353 0,000 0,547 0.000 35.811 0.173 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.0001 
1.000 0.000 0.000 0.082 0.371 0,000 0.547 0.000 41.015 0.082 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
1.000 0.000 0.000 0.101 0.350 0.000 0.5;49 0,000 60.502 0.183 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.0001 
1.000 0.000 0.000 0.096 0.353 0.000 0.551 0.000 160.587 0.161 0.000 0.000 0,000 0.000 
1.000 0.000 0.000 0.101 0.347 0.000 0.552 0.000 85.411 0.187 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
0.957 0.043 0.000 0.052 0.577 0.000 0.371 0.000 0,000 0.259 0,000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
1.000 0.000 0.000 0.061 0.386 0.000 0.552 0.000 61.249 0.072 0.000 0.000 0.037 0.000 
1.000 0.000 0.000 0.050 0.370 0.000 0.580 0.000 42.015 0.213 0.000 0.000 0,174 0,000 
0.984 0.016 0.000 0.000 0.505 0.495 0,000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.801 0.000 0.000 0.130 
0.989 0.011 0.000 0.000 0.483 0.000 0.517 0.000 0.000 0.179 0.230 0.000 0.000 0.000 
1.000 0.000 0.000 0.072 0.372 0.000 0.556 0.000 107.245 0.050 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
1.000 0.000 0.000 0.058 0.388 0.000 0.554 0.000 49.248 0.140 0.000 0.000 0.119 0.000 
1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.620 0.000 0.380 0.000 64.962 0.334 0.836 0.000 0.357 0.000 
1.000 0.000 0.000 0.071 0.369 0.000 0.561 0.000 26.951 0.054 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
w 
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325 92% eBB School 0.910 0.950 0.960 1000.000 80% 1700.000 0.958 0.042 0.002 0.009 0.000 0.059 0.930 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.000 
261 92% eBB School 0.990 0.000 0.000 0.000 100% 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.055 0.386 0.000 0.559 0.000 85.314 0.182 0.000 0.000 0.164 0.000 
254 92% eBB School 0.970 O.OO(J 1.000 0.000 100% 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.058 0.381 0.000 0.561 0.000 55.919 0.118 0.000 0.000 0.084 0.000 
153 91% eBB School 0.960 0.000 0.000 0.000 100% 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.060 0.378 0.000 0.562 0.000 38.503 0.065 0.000 0.000 0.017 0.000 
398 91% eBB Institutional 0.000 0.000 1.000 O'OOC 0% 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.045 0.393 0.000 0.562 0.000 18.269 0.366 0.000 0.000 0.388 0.000 
144 91% DBB School 0.990 0.000 0.000 0.000 100% 0.000 0.986 0.014 0.000 0.000 0.467 0.000 0.533 0.000 0.000 0.270 0.180 0.000 0.270 0.000 
154 91% DBB School 0.970 0.000 0.000 0.000 100% 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.055 0.383 0.000 0.563 0.000 36.259 0.170 0.000 0.000 0.146 0.000 
128 91% eBB School 1.000 0.000 0.000 O.OOC 100% 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.615 0.000 0.385 0.000 30.321 0.388 0.190 0.000 0.414 0.000 
173 91% DBB School 0.950 0.000 0.000 0.000 100% 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.060 0.376 0.000 0.564 0.000 56.633 0.057 0.000 0.000 0.005 0.000 
199 91% DBB School 0.000 0.000 1.000 O.OOC 100% 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.058 0.376 0.000 0.566 0.000 81.101 0.090 0.000 0.000 0.043 0.000 
118 91% DBB School 0.960 0.000 100% 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.056 0.378 0.000 0.566 0.000 78.347 0.142 0.000 0.000 0.107 0.000 
145 91% DBB School 0.930 0.000 0.000 0.000 100% 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.070 0.360 0.000 0.569 0.000 141.037 0.069 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
248 91% DBB School 0.960 0.000 0.000 0.000 100% 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.053 0.380 0.000 0.567 0.000 37.705 0.186 0.000 0.000 0.160 0.000 
174 91% DBB School 0.960 0.000 1.000 0.000 100% 0.000 0.989 0.011 0.000 0.000 0.461 0.000 0.539 0.000 0.000 0.235 0.191 0.000 0.220 0.000 
192 91% eBB School 0.950 0.000 0.000 0.000 100% 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.054 0.378 0.000 0.568 0.000 40.211 0.164 0.000 0.000 0.133 0.000 
304 90% DBB School 0.950 0.000 0.000 0.000 100% 0.000 0.992 0.008 0.000 0.000 0.458 0.000 0.542 0.000 0.000 0.175 0.073 0.000 0.146 0.000 
99 90% DBB Library 0.960 0.000 0.660 442.000 95% 158.00(J 0.931 0.069 0.004 0.000 0.996 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.278 0.000 0.000 0.204 
115 90% DBB School 0.950 0.000 100% 0.000 0.992 0.008 0.000 0.000 0.458 0.000 0.542 0.000 0.000 0.180 0.317 0.000 0.151 0.000 
260 90% DBB School 0.960 0.000 0.000 0.000 100% 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.049 0.383 0.000 0.568 0.000 66.681 0.260 0.000 0.000 0.250 0.000 
267 90% DBB School 0.960 0.000 0.000 0.000 100% 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.048 0.384 0.000 0.569 0.000 163.613 0.281 0.000 0.000 0.276 0.000 
250 90% DBB School 0.97C O.OOC 0.000 0.000 100% o.ooe 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.045 0.386 0.000 0.569 0.000 58.203 0.334 0.000 0.000 0.340 0.000 
143 90% eBB School 0.970 0.000 0.000 0.000 100% 0.000 0.980 0.020 0.000 0.000 0.463 0.000 0.537 0.000 0.000 0.369 0.007 0.000 0.383 0.000 
305 90% DBB School 0.960 0.000 0.000 0.000 100% 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.046 0.384 0.000 0.570 0.000 61.548 0.304 0.000 0.000 0.302 0.000 
98 90% DBB School 0.950 0.000 0.770 88.00C 95% 9O.00c 0.927 0.073 0.013 0.000 0.987 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.193 0.000 0.000 0.084 
175 90% eBB School 0.93(J 0.000 0.000 0.000 100% O.OOC 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.056 0.372 0.000 0.571 0.000 34.964 0.113 0.000 0.000 0.065 0.000 
112 89% eBB Remodel 0.920 0.97C o.ooe 100% 211.00C 0.987 0.013 0.000 0.000 0.523 0.000 0.477 0.000 0.000 0.251 0.215 0.000 0.000 0.000 
100 89% DBB Remodel 0.970 0.000 0.840 0.000 100% 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.239 0.761 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.299 0.128 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.060 
297 89% eBB School 0.920 0.000 0.000 0.000 100% 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.052 0.372 0.000 0.577 0.000 215.343 0.180 0.000 0.000 0.142 0.000 
147 89% eBB School 0.950 0.000 0.000 0.000 100% 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.073 0.375 0.000 0.552 0.000 34.784 0.046 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
295 89% eBB School 0.93(J 0.000 0.000 0.000 100% 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.043 0.378 0.000 0.579 0.000 57.041 0.340 0.000 0.000 0.336 0.000 
401 89% DBB School 0.000 0.000 1.000 O.OOC 0% 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.069 0.349 0.000 0.582 0.000 68.843 0.090 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
352 89% DBB Institutional 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 100% 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 43.821 0.000 0.503 0.000 0.000 0.886 
317 88% eBB Institutional 0.890 0.000 0.930 0.000 100% 108.000 0.981 0.019 0.000 0.000 0.531 0.000 0.469 0.000 0.000 0.162 0.111 0.000 0.642 0.000 
78 88% DBB Sports Facilities 0.900 0.000 0.800 90.000 99% 270.000 0.935 0.065 0.022 0.090 0.888 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.064 
318 87% DBB Office 0.960 0.000 0.910 0.000 100% 30.000 0.999 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.485 0.000 0.515 0.000 0.000 0.034 0.381 0.000 0.014 0.000 
121 87% eBB School 0.990 0.000 100% 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.637 0.000 0.363 0.000 3.772 0.133 0.319 0.000 0.141 0.0001 
24 87% eBB Institutional 0.990 0.970 1.000 130.000 93% 87.000 0.980 0.020 0.000 0.000 0.838 0.096 0.066 0.000 0.000 0.048 0.727 0.000 0.000 0.000 
120 87% DBB School 0.980 0.000 100% 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.636 0.000 0.364 0.000 40.815 0.147 0.028 0.000 0.157 0.000 
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0.0000.0000.0000.3670.0230.000 0.0000.5160.0000.4840.0000.95(J 133.000 0.000 0.000100% 1.0000.900 0.0000.000School314 86% 088 
0.0660.0000.0000.0000.000 0.0000.0000.0000.0010.080 0.9030.75(J 0.0160.85(J 95% 151.000 0.942 0.0585O.00C0.10090 85% 088 Remodel 
0.0000.751 0.0000.0000.1730.000 0.0000.000 0.7690.0000.231100% 155.000 0.941 0.059 0.000947.0001.0000.000 0.000School85% 088394 
0.8520.0000.0000.069 0.00033.3910.000 0.0000.785 0.0000.2150.000 0.000100% 1.000 0.0000.000 0.000 0.0000.000School386 85% 088 
0.0000.744 0.0000.201 0.000143.3330.0000.8840.0000.116 0.000100% 0.000 0.000 0.0000.000 1.0000.000 1.0000.000088 Par1<ing155 85% 
0.8470.000 0.0000.000270.729 0.1540.0000.000 0.0000.255 0.7450.000100% 0.000 0.0000.000 1.0000.0000.880 0.000Remodel323 84% 088 
0.1390.0000.0000.0000.0000.0000.0000.0000.0000.149 0.827122.00( 188.00< 0.172 0.023100% 0.8280.67C0.91C 0.0003JO 83% 088 School 
0.0000.041 0.1050.4220.0520.0000.0000.000 1.0000.00068.00C 0.00062.00( 93% 0.958 0.042 0.0001.0000.92< 0.670Institutional83% DBB33 
10.0000.3180.0000.2160.2981.5970.379 0.0000.0000.000 0.621O.OOC 0.0000.000 100% 1.000 0.0000.920DBB Remodel124 83% 
0.000 0.3320.440 0.00036.974 0.0000.000 0.0000.000O.OO( 0.000 1.000100% O.OOC 0.000 0.0001.0000.96C 0.000 O.50CInstitutional181 DB883% 
10.8300.0000.0000.0000.01299.0860.0000.0000.000O.OO( 0.188 0.812O.OOC 0.000100% 1.000 0.0000.000 0.0000.00083% 088 Corrections182 0.1280.0000.0000.157 0.0000.0000.0000.000 0.0000.112 0.8880.000 0.059 0.000O.OOC 100% 0.9410.70C0.8SC 0.000Institutional347 83% DB8 
0.1500.000 0.2270.0000.4960.0000.0000.0000.0000.057 0.943JOO.OOC 0.000100% 0.781 0.2190.660 0.0000.63C 0.00082% DBB School102 
0.0510.0000.0000.4750.0000.4750.0000.0000.0000.000 1.00077.000 1.000 0.000 0.000100%0.770 0.0000.0000.950DBB226 62% School 
0.8160.0000.0000.6030.000464.0750.0000.0000.0001.0000.000 0.000 0.000 0.0000.000 0.000 100% 1.0000.000 0.000Institutional82% DBB185 0.0000.719 0.0000.0000.13878.1170.916 0.0000.0000.084 0.0000.000 0.000 0.000100% 1.0000.000 0.0000.000 0.000School339 82% DBB 
0.0000.1170.0000.1490.2061.9890.0000.7580.0000.2420.000 0.000 0.000 0.000100% 1.0000.0000.970114 81% DB8 School 
0.0000.2320.0330.0000.000 0.4750.980 0.0000.0000.000 0.020 0.00090% 80.000 1.000 0.0000.000 1.000 0.0000.000DBB School392 80% 
0.8020.0000.0000.4560.00013.1920.000 0.0000.0001.0000.0001.000 1.0000% 0.000 0.0000.000 0.000 0.0000.000DB8371 80% School 
0.000 0.7900.0000.2240.1300.0000.0000.0000.0800.920600.000 0.000 0.00093% 0.956 0.0440.000 420.0000.8600.95079% 088 Library35 
0.0600.000 0.0000.4900.4170.0000.0000.0000.972 0.0280.000700.000 1.000 0.00092% 0.0001200.0000.480 0.9200.98078% 088 Hospital23 
0.1520.0000.0000.7030.0000.0000.0000.0000.979 0.0000.021 0.00095% 60.000 0.933 0.06748.0000.81C 0.000 0.58092 77% 088 Remodel 
0.1070.0000.0000.2540.000203.0990.0000.000 0.0000.0000.000 0.000 1.000100% 0.0000.660 0.000 1.0000.000 0.000320 77% DB8 School 
0.1600.000 0.0000.0500.1100.0000.0000.039 0.0000.9610.000 0.00093% 900.000 0.959 0.0410.700 650.0000.96C 0.400. 36 76% 088 Hospital 
0.000 0.0000.5890.0610.09615.9660.000100% 1.0000.000 0.000O.OOC 0.83C 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000O.OOC 0.000 0.00067% 088 Remodel362 
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